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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse étudie plusieurs défis auxquels sont confrontés les systèmes de santé modernes avec 
des modèles calibrés inspirés des théories du capital-santé et du cycle de vie. 
Dans le premier chapitre, nous développons le premier modèle dynamique de demande de 
soins de santé dans un cadre public. Dans ce modèle, les agents choisissent d'utiliser les soins si 
la désut ilité encourue en file d 'attente est dominée par les gains dynamiques permis par l'impact 
des soins sur la santé. Nous intégrons ensuite cette modélisation de la demande dans un modèle 
macroéconomique, que nous calibrons à l'aide de données québécoises de 2005 . À l'aide de 
simulations, nous questionnons la pertinence, du point de vue du bien-être social, de permettre 
à de longs temps d'attente d'émerger afin de réduire les coûts de santé. Nous trouvons que 
les temps d 'attente constituent un mécanisme faible de rationnement de la demande et mènent 
à d'importants coûts sociaux. En contrepartie, toutes les politiques simulées menant à des 
réductions de temps d'attente génèrent des gains substantiels de bien-être. 
Dans le second chapit re, nous étendons notre méthodologie afin d'étudier les impacts du 
vieillissement de la génération du "baby-boom" sur les systèmes publics de santé. Nous faisons 
évoluer la distribution d 'agents selon les prévisions des démographes de l'Institut de la statistique 
du Québec (ISQ) et anticipons l'évolution de l'utilisation des soins et des temps d 'attente de 
2005 à 2050. Nous trouvons que la politique actuelle d'augmentation de 5% par an du budget 
de la santé mènera à un allongement important des temps d'attente d'ici 2030, et ce malgré 
une augmentation marquée de la part des coûts de santé dans l'économie. D'ici à 2050, nous 
estimons qu'il sera nécessaire de doubler la part de l'économie allouée au système de santé afin 
de maintenir les temps d'attente à leurs niveaux de 2005. 
Dans le dernier chapitre, nous nous questionnons sur l'évolution à venir de la santé, de la 
longévité et des coûts des soins des États-Unis d'Amérique (É-U). Nous développons un mod-
èle de demande de soins dont le point focal est l'incertitude pour les agents de contracter une 
xvi 
maladie chronique. Nous calibrons ce modèle sur l'évolution des données américaines de 1985 à 
2005 . Selon nos simulations, les dépenses de santé atteindront 22% du PIB des É-U d'ici 2050 si 
les tendances récentes continuent au même rythme. Nous trouvons que la prévalence de maladies 
chronique continuera de croître durant cette période, mais n'entraînera pas d 'augmentations im-
portante de coûts des soins. Ce sont plutôt les progrès technologiques en santé et l'augmentation 
des revenus qui entraîneront la hausse des dépenses. 
Mots-clé: Systèmes publics de santé, demande de soins de santé, coûts des soins de santé, 
t emps d' attente , vieillissement , maladies chroniques. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to shed light on challenges faced by modern health care systems by focusing 
on the study of the demand for care. 
In the first chapter, we build the first t heoretic health-capital demand model in a public 
healt h care setting. In doing so, we close an important gap in the existing literature: public 
health care systems are the norm rather than the exception in Western countries. To replicate 
key features of public health care systems, our model showcases the importance of waiting 
times, rather than monet ary priees, on the health care demand problem of individuals. We 
t hen embed this demand model in the definition of a macroeconomie equilibrium, calibrated 
with 2005 Québec data. Our simulations reveal that waiting t imes for care constitute a weak 
rationing deviee and lead to important welfare losses if used to contain costs. Furthermore, all 
policies that lead to waiting times reductions result in major welfare gains. 
In the second chapter , we extend the framework developed in the first chapter to anticipate 
the impact of the aging baby-boom generation on costs, waiting times and health care use in 
public systems. Our methodology updates the distribution of agent s according to the Institut 
de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) demographie scenarios, and projects policy responses and 
outcomes for Québec's health care system over the period 2005-2050. Our results indicate that 
Québec's current budgeting approach of increasing health spending by 5% each year will result 
in much longer waiting t imes by 2030. If t he government aimed to maintain waiting times at 
current levels, the share of health spending in the economy would need to double by 2050. 
In the last chapter, we aim to forecast t he evolut ion of health care costs, longevity and 
chronic condit ions prevalence in t he US . We develop a dynamic demand model which focuses 
on the uncertainty of developing a chronic condit ion. Looking ahead, we find that spending will 
continue to increase steadily if current trends continue at the same pace. By 2050, they would 
reach 22% of GDP. While chronic conditions prevalence is most likely to continue escalating in 
xviii 
the years to come, our simulations suggest that it will not generate important addit ional costs. 
According to our results, income growth and technological innovations will be the main drivers 
of the increase in medical costs. 
Keywords: Public healt h care systems, Demand for care, Health care costs, Waiting times, 
Aging, Chronic conditions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent improvements in our capacity to treat illness and extend life have been nothing short of 
phenomenal. Over the period 1960-2010, life expectancy at birth in Organisation for Economie 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries has leaped by over 10 years, to 79.7 years. If 
such gains are extremely valuable, they are also quite costly. Over the same period, resources 
allocated to health care grew from under 5% to 9.5% of Western countries' gross domestic 
product (GDP). On average, over 70% of their health expenditures are public, and represent an 
important and growing share of public spending (OECD, 2012; OECD, 2013) . Simultaneously, 
the demand for care is increasing at an even faster pace. As a result, in many industrialized 
countries, long waiting times for care have emerged and are now an important facet of health 
care delivery. 
Major trends suggest that further pressure will be added to health care systems in the 
decades ahead. Since the onset of the 2010s, the first-borns of the baby-boom generation have 
been reaching 65 years old. As this large generation grows older, it is reasonable to expect 
a massive increase in the utilization· of medical resources. Simultaneously, recent important 
trends, such as the rise in obesity and chronic conditions prevalence, could add to the demand 
for treatments and weigh on many countries' fiscal outlook. In this context, it will be difficult 
to both supply a high quality of care and contain the expansion of costs. 
This thesis aims to shed light on these challenges by focusing on the study of the demand 
for health care. We use a calibrated !ife-cycle modeling approach, drawing notably from the 
theoretical health-capital literature (Grossman, 1972; Wolfe, 1985; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990) 
and its recent computational branch (Picone, Uribe and Wilson, 1998; Hall and Jones, 2007; 
Fonseca et al. , 2009). 
In the first chapter, we look at the demand for care in a public setting and ask whether 
it is desirable to allow waiting times to increase in order to contain ever growing costs of care. 
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If both the cost and the congestion of care are high, we aim to identify which policy stance 
is most beneficiai to social welfare and economie activity. To that effect, we build the first 
t heoretic health-capital demand mode! in a public health care setting. In doing so, we close an 
important gap in t he existing literature: public health care systems are the norm rather than 
the exception in Western countries. 1 To replicate key features of public health care systems, our 
mode! showcases t he importance of waiting t imes, rather than monetary priees, on t he health 
care demand problem of individuals. 
We then embed this demand mode! in the definition of an equilibrium, which arises when 
congestion of the health care system is such that the global demand equals the supply for care. 
The former is modeled as the sum of all agents among a distribution who choose to consume 
health care, weighted by the unit cost of their health leve!. The latter is modeled as the sum of 
public funds obtained from taxes collected from the distribut ion. 
Calibrating our macroeconomie mode! with 2005 Québec data, we find that waiting times 
for care constitute a weak rationing deviee and lead to important welfare !osses if used to contain 
costs. Our policy simulations reveal that a 50% permanent reduction in Québec waiting times 
can be achieved through a variety of fiscal measures that only moderately increase spending. 
While t he choice of reform has important repercussions, all such policies result in major welfare 
gains, with agents willing to sacrifice over 5% of their post-policy consumption to leave the 
existing status quo. 
In the second chapter, we use the framework developed in the first chapter to anticipate 
the impact of the aging baby-boom generation on costs, waiting times and health care use in 
public systems. Our met hodology updates the distribution of agents according to the Institut 
de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) demographie scenarios, and projects policy responses and 
outcomes for Québec's health care system over the period 2005-2050. We include three main 
policy stances in our analysis: increasing the system's budget at a steady pace (Québec's current 
budgeting approach); adapting health care spending to maintain a steady congestion leve!, which 
holds access to care steady; and maintaining the share of health care costs to GDP constant. 
Our results reveal a clear three-way arbitrage between providing a timely access to care, 
containing the rise of health care costs and adopting the newest available medical technology. 
1 Among the 34 OECD member co un tries, the share of health spending assumed by the public sector 
was greater than that of the private sector for 32 countries in 2010. The exceptions were the United States of 
America and Mexico (OECD, 2012). 
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Aging populations increase t he demand for and average cost of treatments while reducing t he 
quantity of working age person per elderly, which restrains ability to pay. As such, aging acts 
as an exacerbating factor on this arbitrage. 
In the last chapter , we turn our attention to the demand for medical care in t he United 
States, in which the share of health spending assumed by the public sector is the lowest among 
OECD countries. Current health care costs projections by the Congressional Budget Office 
( CBO) use exogenous cost increases applied to an otherwise standard microsimulation model. 
A main drawback of such methods is that it often leads to unconstrained growth, which is 
doubtful in the very long run. Wit h co-authors Pierre-Carl Michaud and Raquel Fonseca, we 
aim to forecast the evolution of American healt h care costs, longevity and chronic condit ions 
prevalence in a setting which is consist ent with economie theory. 
We develop a dynamic demand model close to that of Picone et al. (1998) , which intrin-
sically allows agents to curb medical spending if it produces a lower marginal flow of expected 
utility than contemporary consumpt ion. In contrast to the Québécois of our first two chapters, 
the agents of this model are constrained by monetary priees in their consumption of medi-
cal treatments. In our framework, three underlying forces shape the future environment of the 
American population. First, health depreciation increases over time, due to an increase in seden-
t ary lifestyles, which results in a t rend in the prevalence of chronic conditions in the population. 
Second , medical innovations improve the productivity of health care in transforming money into 
health. Finally, the real income of agents grows over time. 
Looking ahead, we find that spending will continue to increase steadily if current trends 
continue at the same pace. By 2050, they would reach 22% of GDP. In our simulations, income 
growth is responsible for roughly three quarters of the increase of per capita spending, against 
one quarter for medical innovations. A main result of our simulations is that chronic conditions 
prevalence is most likely to continue increasing in the years to come, but will not constitute an 
important generator of medical spending. While curbing obesity and sedentary lifestyles would 
certainly lead to better quality of life, less chronic conditions and higher life expectancy for 
Americans, we do not find that it would reduce aggregate health care costs. 

1 HEALTH CARE DEMAND AND IMPACT OF POLICIES IN A CONGESTED PUBLIC 
SYSTEM 
Increasing health care costs and long waiting times for public care are growing sources of concern 
for governments in industrialized countries. In this paper, we investigate the impact of waiting 
t imes on the demand for care, ask whether allowing congestion t o increase in order to contain 
ever growing health care costs is socially desirable, and predict the expected outcome of policies 
aiming at the reduction of congestion and costs of care. We develop a macroeconomie model 
in which agents who differ in terms of age, health capital and wealth choose whether or not 
to use a public health care system funded through income taxes. Calibrating our model with 
Québec data, we find that the aggregate demand for care is quite inelastic wit h respect to healt h 
care congestion. Waiting t imes for care thus constitute a weak rationing deviee and should not 
be used by welfare-maximizing governments to contain costs. On the brighter side, policy 
simulations reveal that a 50% permanent reduction in Québec waiting times can be achieved 
through a variety of fiscal measures that only moderately increase health care costs. While the 
choice of reform has important repercussions on the equilibrium, all such policies result in major 
welfare gains, with agents willing to sacrifice over 5% of their post-policy consumption to leave 
the existing status quo. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Western countries have seen a constant growth of health care spending over the last half 
century, doubling as a proportion of GDP for over half of OECD members and reaching an 
average of 8.6% in 2007 (OECD, 2010). While the causes underlying this trend may vary from 
country to country, it has become a growing source of concern for governments. The public 
provision of care is a common feature in industrialized nations, with t he government of all 
countries except the United States of America and Mexico assuming over half of the health-
related cost s. 
Simultaneously, waiting times have been increasingly used to contain the demand for 
health care (Cullis, Jones and Propper, 2000; Gravelle and Siciliani, 2007) , and are now con-
sidered an important problem in their own right in many industrialized countries. This led to 
the OECD Project on Waiting Times in t he early 2000's, involving 12 countries reporting a 
high congestion1 , and a number of other studies. Despite these efforts, our understanding of 
the relationship between congestion, demand for care and costs in public healt h care systems 
remains limited and many fundamental questions remain unanswered: Is it desirable to allow 
waiting times to increase in order to contain ever growing costs of care? Which patients are 
more likely to be discouraged from using health care as t he congestion of the health care system 
increases? If both the cost and the congestion of care are high, what type of policy is most 
beneficia! to social welfare and economie activity? To answer t hese questions, we first develop 
a theoretical model of health care demand in a public setting characterized by waiting t imes 
and zero monetary priees. We then add an equilibrium concept calibrated with Québec dat a in 
order to quantitavely study the impact of waiting t imes on consumer demand and predict the 
expected outcome and desirability of policies aiming at the reduction of congestion and costs of 
care. 
Our paper departs from and adds to the existing literature in three major ways. First, 
we introduce a health-capital demand model in a dynamic stochastic context that captures key 
features of public systems. This closes an important gap in t he literature. While dynamic 
health-capital models originated in the 1970's (Grossman, 1972) and have addressed a variety of 
important questions, the literature has exclusively assumed that health markets were competitive 
1These were Australia, Canada , Denmark, Finland , Ireland , Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Spain , Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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and cleared with monetary priees. This is also the case wit h t he more recent and growing 
literature which applies numerical methods to estimate the demand for care (Picone, Uribe 
and Wilson, 1998) and macroeconomie health outcomes (Hall and Jones, 2007; Fonseca et al. , 
2009). As noted above, a competitive healt h care market is at odds with the reality of t he 
vast majority of OECD countries. Even the United States of America's portion of government 
spending, t he lowest among OECD count ries, was of 46.5% in 2007 and may rise significant ly 
in the next decade as reforms to increase the generosity of Medicare are being pursued by the 
Obama administration . 
Second, our methodology ad dresses limitations of the empiricalliterature on wait ing times, 
which has so far been constrained to the study of wait ing lists for specifie procedures, such as 
cataract surgery, hip replacement, and hysterectomy, or groups of similar t reatments (Coyte et 
al. , 1994; Anderson, 1997; Mart in and Smith, 1999; Mart in and Smit h, 2003; Siciliani and Hurst , 
2004). The interest in t hese part icular procedures is understandable: sin ce t hey are elective in 
nature, t hey generate the longest waiting lists and are t hus a natural source of public concern. 
However, two mains issues can be raised wit h su ch studies. A first issue is that elect ive surgeries 
are a limited subset of t he quant ity of services provided by health care systems, and agents 
eligible for them are usually similar in terms of age and health. Consequently, t hese studies 
are not informative about t he general congestion of the system. A second issue concerns the 
dist inct ion, raised by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), between waiting queues, where agents 
must wait in persan at a given location , and wait ing lists, where agents can use t heir t ime freely 
unt il receiving t he desired good or service in the future. As rationing deviees, t he lat ter clear 
markets through a decrease in t he present value of the desired good or service, while the former 
impose a direct opportunity cost on agents, who are unable to use this t ime for other purposes. 
Anecdotal evidence and intuition suggest that wait ing time spent in crowded rooms before 
obtaining care (or being added to a list) is an important component of public care congestion 
and, plausibly, its most direct rationing mechanism. Sorne evidence from the medical literature 
also supports this notion. For instance, a 1990 survey revealed t hat t he number of patients 
who left Los Angeles County emergency departments wit hout being seen was correlated both 
with reported waiting times (in queues) and t he public nature of facilit ies (Stock et al. , 1994). 
7.3% of public hospital patients left without being seen, versus only 2.4% of private hospital 
patients. Despite this, queues have largely been ignored by the empiricalliterature. Again, this 
is understandable, since data on the duration of waiting lists abound, while data on t he amount 
of t ime between the arrivai at a care fac ility and entry into the waiting list are quite scarce. 
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Both of these issues are addressed with our approach. We mode! congestion as reducing the 
time available for agents to allocate between leisure and consumption, and assess the demand 
of agents of ali age and health profiles in face of the global congestion of care. 
Third, because of our macroeconomie equilibrium, we t ake into account general equilib-
rium effects such as the reaction of workers to differing taxation mechanisms or congestion levels, 
and are able to predict the welfare impact of policies. 
In our theoretical demand mode!, we study agents who differ in terms of age, health 
and financial assets. The depreciation of health capital and the impact of care on health are 
modeled as stochastic variables t hat depend on the age and health of agents. Death is modeled 
as a t erminal value that arises when a critically low value of health capital is reached. At any 
date, agents ma.ximize their discounted lifetime utility by choosing their consumption, working 
time and whether or not to use the health care syst em. During a given period , the amount 
of time available for production and leisure is limited by t he health of agents and , if they use 
health care, the congestion of the public system. In this mode!, we find that agents choose to 
consume health care when the uncertain expected gain of doing so exceeds the certain utility 
cost endured in the current period, which is directly det ermined by the congestion of care. The 
global demand for public care is modeled as the sum of ali agents who choose to consume healt h 
care, weighted by the unit cost of their health leve!. Equilibrium arises when congestion is such 
that the global demand equals the public funds available for health care, obtained from taxes 
collected from the population of agents. 
We devise a calibration strategy that assigns t he congestion leve!, t ax rate, and the health 
law of motion in order to replicate observed health care use, GDP, healt h care costs , mortality 
rates and !ife expectancy. We calibrate our mode! using Québec dat a from the 2005 Canadian 
Community Health Survey (CCHS). Québec 's case is particularly interesting for two reasons. 
First, health care expenses represented 11.3% (CIHI, 2008) of its GDP in 2007, which would 
have placed second behind the United States of America among OECD ratios (had it been a 
country). Second , indicators and anecdotal evidence suggest that Québec's health care system 
has a high congestion. Of the 12% of Québécois who claimed not to receive the appropriate 
amount of care in 2005 in the CCHS sm'Vey, 47% asserted that wait ing t imes were to biarne. As 
such, Québec is a natural candidate for public reforms to its health care system bath to reduce 
cost s and combat the congestion of care. 
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Using our calibration as a start ing point , we simulate the impact on demand of exogenous 
congestion levels to study elasticity wit h respect to wait ing times, t hen simulate a quant ity of 
policies by modifying the parameters under t he government 's control, such as t he incarne tax 
rate and the generosity of the pension system. Our main findings are t hat demand (as measured 
by t he number of patients) is inelastic wit h respect to waiting times, with a simulated elasticity 
of -0.19 in t he neighborhood of the present congestion level. In other words, a 1% increase in 
wait ing times should be expected to reduce the number of users of health care by only 0.2%. 
When congestion emerges, young, healthy agents are the ones chased away from t he system, 
while agents who st and to benefit the most from health care remain. Since agents wit h lower 
health are most expensive to treat , t he cost of public care is only marginally reduced by t he exit 
of healthy agents. T hus, congestion is a weak deviee for containing healt h-related expenses. 
Policy simulations indicate that reducing healt h care funding, which increases congestion , 
creates large welfare lasses as measured by a variety of welfare measures, including the average 
value of our distribut ion of agents. The results indicate that a 1% reduction in t he tax-to-
GDP ratio of Québec at t he expense of health care would create a 260% permanent increase 
in wait ing t imes, decreasing the welfare of all age and health groups. In cont rast, introducing 
user fees, increasing incarne t ax or decreasing the generosity of ot her government programs 
achieve a similar permanent reduction of congestion (via the increased funding of health care) 
and lead to important welfare gains. However, t he outcome differs depending on t he choice of 
policy. For instance, raising incarne taxes induces t he largest increase in t he number of users 
as it incorporates no replacement t o waiting t imes as a disencentive to using health care. As a 
result, healt h care spending need to grow more as a percentage of GDP to reduce wait ing t imes 
than is t he case wit h the int roduction of user fees. That said, applying high fees is found to 
decrease the welfare of t he poorest and sickest agents, who prefer t he status quo. Alternatively, 
increasing t he retirement age by five years produces a large GDP increase and a reduction in 
the cost of pensions but may be difficult to implement in practice, since Québécois have planned 
their life-cycle savings according to t he existing scheme. We find that a milder combination 
of t hese policies also yields a permanent decrease in congestion and moderates t he undesirable 
aspects of individual policies; it may t hus be t he most attractive and politically feasible policy 
scenario. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.3 describes the theoretical 
demand model. Section 1.4 develops t he equilibrium concept and calibration strategy needed 
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to solve our mode! numerically. Section 1.5 presents the calibrated demand function and our 
simulations of exogenous congestion levels and policies. Finally, Section 1.6 puts our results in 
a practical policy perspective and suggest s future avenues of research. 
1.2 Québec's Health Care System 
Under Canada's constitution, provinces are responsible for healt h care management. 
Therefore, there is not one national healt h care system, but ten independant provincial sys-
t ems reporting to their provincial governments and a relatively small federal program covering 
First Nations and the military. In practice, however, the federal government exerts a strong 
influence on provincial health care delivery through the Canada Health Act (CHA) of 1984. 
This law st ates requirements that must be met by t he provincial health care systems in order to 
qualify for the Canada Health Transfer (CHT), Canada's largest federal t ransfer program. In 
2005-2006 , the base year of our calibration, $5.0B were transferred to Québec through the CHT, 
or 23% of the province's public health care spending (Department of Finance Canada, 2012). 
Among the law's requirements are universality, comprehensiveness, accessibility and public ad-
ministration of care. In effect , the law ensures access to medically necessary health services 
without charges at the point of services for Canadians. The provinces can however define the 
basket of goods deemed necessary, which allows for differences in t he range of services covered 
between provinces and over time (Madore, 2005) . 
Québec's health care supply is managed by the Minist ère de la santé et des services sociaux 
(MSSS) at the provinciallevel and by 95 Centres de santé et de services sociaux (most of which 
include a hospital center) at the locallevel (MSSS , 2008) . The public health insurance plan is 
administered by t he Régie de l'assurance maladie du Québec (RAMQ). This insurance covers 
medical care free-of-charge, as well as dental services for children under 10 years of age and 
optometric services for persons under age 18 and age 65 and over (RAMQ, 201 3a) . T he medical 
services covered include both those rendered by general practitioners and medical specialists. 
They include examinations, consultations, diagnostic procedures, therapeutic procedures, psy-
chiatrie t reatments, surgery, radiology, anesthesia and basic hospital services (RAMQ, 2013b ). 
Since 1997, a prescription drug insurance coverage is also required for all Québec residents , 
eit her through a private employer plan or t hrough a mandatory basic public plan administered 
by the RAMQ (RAMQ, 2013c). 
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1.3 Demand Mode! 
To describe the consumer problem in a public health care setting, we use a discrete 
dynamic programming approach. The fund amental basis of our demand mode! is that health 
care usage is represented as the binary choice a, i.e. whether to use (a= 1) or not use (a= 0) 
the health care system at a given date. While t his discrete-choice approach differs from the 
literature, the rationale is that the quantity of health care received by a patient is not restricted 
by the costs of treatment in a public system. Therefore, an individual that has chosen to seek 
care will usually rely on his physician's diagnosis and accept the treatment chosen for him. As 
such, the level of health care treatment received is irrelevant as a control variable in a public 
system. Also, the user faces a non-monet ary cost associated to the waiting times for health care 
services. The t ime spent waiting in queues at diverse stages of health care production cannat 
be used for leisure or production by agents, and is thus a direct opportunity cost on his ut ility. 
To our knowledge, this cost has not yet been modeled in a dynamic health-capital mode! and 
constitutes the second major addition of this article to existing literature. 
Our model's main concepts and notation draw from Grossman (1972) and Ehrlich and 
Chuma (1990). At the beginning of a given period , the agent chooses his working time, savings 
and health care use in order to maximize his expected infinite-horizon discounted utility: 
00 
max 2:: ,etE [u (Ct, Lt)], (1.1) 
t=O 
where ,B is the discounting factor and Ct and Lt are t he consumption and leisure in good health 
during t he period t. Health does not directly enter the utility funct ion and therefore does 
not contribute to the quality of consumption and leisure. As will be made clear shortly, our 
conception of time is such that health determines the quantity of time available to t he agent , 
which in practice realizes the same effect. We restrict the utility arguments to consumption and 
leisure to avoid redundancy. 
During a given period, the agent faces a certain amount LT (H, œy) of lost time, in which 
H is his health and Î the congestion leve! of the health care system. Lost time can either be 
understood as the literai loss of time due to waiting for health care in a congested facility, or 
as a reflection of lower quality of t ime due to the agent being ill, and thus unable to work as 
productively or enjoy leisure as fully as in full health. In either case, lost time is unavailable for 
• 
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production or leisure during a given period.2 Accordingly, LT is decreasing in its first argument, 
the agent 's health leve! H , meaning that an agent in perfect health faces no lost time, while an 
agent nearing death !oses a much greater portion of the period . If the agent chooses a = 1, the 
second argument is equal to / ,the congestion of the healt h care system. LT is strictly increasing 
in this argument , which means that seeking care bears a cost in t ime for the agent, and that 
this cost is increasing in the congestion of the public system. What is left of the period, the 
agent 's available t ime can be freely divided between working time WT and leisure L. Thus, a 
P-length period is divided as follows: 
P = LT (H ,a1 ) + WT + L (1.2) 
In effect , the agent's decision regarding time at a given date is limited to his use of health care 
a and his working t ime, which joint ly determine the remaining leisure t ime. 
The agent 's productivity w is considered exogenous to his choices and state variables, and 
work income is t axed at rate T in order to fund the public expenses. In addition to his work 
income, the agent can choose to consume sorne of his savings A in any period. The amount of 
savings will not be permitted to be below 0 at any time. For agents in the workforce, it follows 
that t he constraint on consumpt ion c is: 
c ::::: A + w . WT (1 - T) (1.3) 
Since, in this paper, we mode! agents as self-employed, we reduce private pension plans 
t o the choice of savings made by agents during their lifetime: what is left of t heir savings at 
t he time of their retirement can then be used for consumpt ion, in addition to a fixed exogenous 
public pension. Accordingly, we model retirement as the following consumption constraint when 
agents reach t he exogenous ret irement age ao: 
c ::; A+ e if a ~ ao , (1.4) 
where e is t he annual public t ransfer received by retired agents.3 Applying this constraint, we 
2French (2005) uses a similar interpretation of intra-period t ime d istribut ion. 
3While t he study of ret irement choices is not a major aim of t his paper, including a simple form of 
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know that agents will optimally choose WT = 0 when they reach age ae if we consider a utility 
function strictly increasing in both consumption and leisure. 
Like Grossman, we consider that death occurs when health level H falls below a crit ical 
H leve!, after which the agent receives a certain value of death V . To enforce life to be desirable 
over death as a basic rule for t he remainder of this paper , we assign 
V = u(O,O)jl -{3 (1.5) 
For utility functions that are strictly increasing and cont inuous in both consumpt ion and leisure, 
this formulation reaches that effect, t he value of death being then equal to an infinite sequence 
of periods in which the agent neither consumes nor enjoys leisure.4 
With respect to equations (1.1) t o (1.5), the agent 's maximization problem can be written 
as the following Bellman equation: 
{
maxa,WT,c u (c, L) + f3 E {V (a' , H' , A')} 
V(a , H , A )= 
v 
a E {0 , 1} 
s.t. 
WT E [O, P - LT (H ,œy)] 
{
[O, A + w · WT (1 - r)] 
CE 
[ü,A+ B] 
ifa <ae 
if a 2: ae 
if H > H 
(1.6) 
otherwise 
It is noteworthy that 'Y or the tax rate T are fixed in equation (1.6) . While t hey play an 
active role in the optimization problem, t he former is determined by the collective choices of 
the distribution of agents and t he latter is set by the government . By assumption, individual 
retirement in our mode! is useful fo r two reasons. F irst , using Grossman dynamic healt h care demand models, a 
vast li terature found important dynamic interactions between retirement and health care consumption of agents 
(Wolf, 1985; French, 2005; Fonseca et al., 2009). Not involving any form of retirement may thus result in 
misguided results. Second, it will later enable us to test how modifying pension generosity parameters affects 
the health care system. 
4It is wotth noting that a variety of common utility functions, among which the Cobb-Douglas, imply 
u (0, 0) = 0, and th us yield .t: = 0, a seemingly intuitive leve! for the value of death . However, if the utility 
funct ion allows for negative values, choosing ~ = 0 by default may result in sorne agents optimally avoiding 
health care to precipitate death. 
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agents cannot affect these parameters or predict their future variations. In section 1.4, we will 
see how these parameters are determined in the numerical version of the model. 
The laws of motion for the agent's three state variables are as follows. First, the agent's 
stock of health-capital decreases at an uncertain depreciation rate 8 each year, and may also be 
affected by the health care impact of treatment 'lj; if he chooses to seek care. We formulate that 
the mean of the depreciation rate 8 (a, E0) is age-dependent and affected by a stochastic shock, 
Eo . Therefore, the agent cannot predict or choose his age of dea th. This formulation allows 
for appreciations of health without using health care, which happen when 8 is negative. If the 
agent chooses to use health care, he will add 'tf; (H, E'!f;) to his health. The expected impact of 
treatment is dependent on the health level of the patient , though the sign of this relationship is 
debatable. 5 As with 8, the success of health care in improving the agent 's health is an uncertain 
phenomenon and depends on the realization of shock E'!f;· Finally, an agent whose health has 
fallen below the death threshold remains deceased in the next period. The movement of the 
agent's health-capital stock is given by: 
H' ~ { ; · (1- 0 (a ,<o) + o,P (H ,ew)) ifH > H (1.7) 
otherwise 
Second, the amount of savings in the next period is the total amount of money available 
to the agent during the period that is not spent on consumption, increased by the real interest 
rater: 
A'= { (l+r)(A+w·WT(l-r)-c) 
(l+r)(A+B -c) 
if a < ao 
if a 2:: ao 
Finally, at the end of each period , the agent's age a increases by one: 
(1.8) 
5 As discussed by Chang (1995), on the one band, it could be easier to treat a patient with a single illness 
rat her than one wit h multiple illnesses. In this case, the impact of care should be increasing in the leve! of 
health. On the other band, a patient that is suffering from a severe disease, and thus is in very bad health, could 
receive a greater appreciation of his health capital by having access to care than a patient with a mild disease. 
In t his scenario, the impact of care should be greater with the leve! of sickness. To our knowledge, no stylized 
fact currently exists to determine which of these equally plausible interpretations should be retained. 
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a'= a+ 1 (1.9) 
This constitutes the basic health care demand model used in this paper. Before describing 
the numerical mode! and results, we believe it important to briefly analyze the determinants 
of the choice of a in the theoretical version of the mode!. Since health care usage is a binat-y 
choice, the agent's core problem can be expressed as a comparison of the expected values when 
using health care or not. Denoting those values V1 and Vo , where the indices refer to the choice 
of a, the agent will choose to use health care if V1 > V0 . This implies, with respect to (1.6) , 
(3 · (E [V{]- E [V~]) > u (co, Lo) - u (c1, LI) (1.10) 
This inequality can be interpreted as follows: in a public healt h care system characterized by 
waiting t imes, an agent will choose to use care if the expected dynamic gain of doing so, on 
the left-hand side, is larger than the utility loss in the current period, on the right-hand side. 
In this formulation, the gain of using health care is uncertain and set in the future , while 
t he cost is immediate and certain. In Appendix A.1, we further the analytic development of 
the demand mode!: we explore both sides of (1.10) in further detail , clarify the impact of the 
stochastic terms on death, and find that waiting t imes are the most plausible and direct lever 
available to the government to restrict over-consumption of health care. Most interestingly, our 
analytical development enables us to decompose the expected dynamic gain of health care in 
two components. Denoting Pa the probability of being alive in the next period conditional on 
the choice of a, we find : 
E [V{] - E [V~] (l.ll ) 
Life-saving gain 
+ P1 · (E [V{ 1 H~ > li] - E [V~ 1 Hb > li]) 
Quali ty of !ife gain 
The first component of (l.ll) is the expected gain caused by the difference in probability 
of being alive in the next period due to the use of health care. When a patient faces a life-
threatening illness t hat can be addressed with a medical treatment, this component will have 
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a high value. We t hus name t his component the lif e-saving gain. 6 The second component is 
t he difference in the expected value of life in t + 1 conditional to t he agent being alive. This 
component will be high in cases where the use of healt h care increases both the agent's quantity 
of available t ime in subsequent periods and his expected longevity excluding t he very next period. 
As mentioned above, an increase in available time can be interpreted as both an increase in t he 
quality of t he agent's t ime or its literai quantity. We name to this component as t he quality of 
life gain. More discussion on these components is presented in Appendix A.l. 
1.4 Equilibrium and Calibration 
In the remainder of the paper, we aim at numerically answering our research questions, 
which requires calibrating t he model as closely as possible to available data and aggregating the 
choice of agents to predict the macroeconomie outcome of policies. 
Calibrating our model presents two main challenges. First, although there is considerable 
evidence of congestion in Québec's health care system, t here is to our knowledge no single 
indicator t hat can be used to effectively calibrate the congestion of the whole system, Î· Wait ing 
times for specifie procedures or at the emergency room level, though somewhat informative, are 
not satisfying measures of congestion, since Î should reflect t he congestion of all services offered 
by the public healt h care system. Second, t he healt h law of motion (1.7) is unobservable. The 
parameters chosen for this function should replicate sorne observable data, but a strategy is 
needed to achieve t his goal. 
Both to obtain a satisfying calibration and the macroeconomie outcome of policies, we 
add a simple macroeconomie equilibrium to our demand model. To that effect, we develop a 
health care supply and a pension system, both funded by income taxes. 7 We t h en specify the 
model's functional forms, basing ourselves on the literature when possible and on a minimal 
set of int uit ions otherwise. Subsequent ly, we obtain t he equilibrium for a distribut ion of agents 
consistent with Québec data found in the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) of 2005. 
6 We refrain from naming th is component the life-expectancy gain because t he impact of t he use of healt h 
care in t on t he probability of being alive in t + n, n > 1, periods, which also affects the difference in !ife 
expectancy, is found in the second component. 
7 Thus, we impose a coherence between the funds collected by taxing t he distribut ion 's out put and t he 
government 's expenses. Of course, agents may simultaneously use their savings to supplement t he basic public 
pensions. 
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In effect, obtaining the equilibrium reveals the priee of health care according to t he data, which 
in our case corresponds to the unknown parameter f. This approach also provides the taxation 
and wage parameters consistent with Québec's GDP and total health care cost for t hat year. 
Lastly, since the CCHS data is consistent with Québec's population, we are able to choose t he 
health law of motion's parameters in order to replicate three observed mortality measures as 
closely as possible. T he CUITent section covers these methodological steps and describes our final 
calibration. 
1.4.1 Health Care Supply and Equilibrium 
Obtaining a market equilibrium requires two addit ional conceptual steps. First, the ag-
gregate demand for health care is a function of the choices to use t he system made by ali the 
population's N individuals, and their leve! of health, as follows: 
(1.12) 
The public supply of health care is defined as: 
N N 
HC8 = L T. w. WTi - L 1ai 2':ao . e (1.13) 
i=l i = l 
Pensions, like healt h care, are financed through income taxes. The health care supply described 
above is determined only by the government 's health care spending, which is equal to the taxes 
collected minus t he cost of public pensions. The rationale behind t his formulation is t hat higher 
taxes collected for health care should yield a higher quantity of care supplied at an aggregate 
level. T his formulation implies t hat healt h care is produced linearly by t he public system 
and presents no fixed cost. This specification deliberately excludes parameters t hat play an 
important role in the capacity of a system to supply care, such as the number of hospitals, beds 
or physicians. While we are conscious that the supply of health care at an aggregate leve! is a 
complex phenomenon,8 we believe (1. 13) is sufficient for t he study of health care demand, the 
8 For instance, in t he case of Québec, the different professionals involved in the deliverance of care are 
ali represented by separate unions with long term contracts, restricting the impact of policymakers on the fina l 
supply of care. T he specifie care given to a pat ient is det ermined by an independent institution, t he Collège des 
médecins du Québec, which also fixes t he criteria that determines who can work as a physician in the province. 
Also, t he aggregate cost of healt h care is often greater than the resources that were budget ed for a given year , 
yielding deficits. 
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purpose of our paper. 
In this setting, the aggregate equilibrium is obtained when, for a given tax rate T and 
distribution of agents, the congestion level 1 is such that H CD = HC5 . We denote 1* the 
congestion level such that the aggregate demand equals the supply of care. As seen in section 
1.3, the congestion parameter directly restrains health care use through the utility cost in the 
current period and thus lowers HCD. On the other hand, congestion affects HC5 through two 
diverging channels. First, congestion discourages health care use. Agents who decide not to 
use health care have more available time during the period to work, which generates more tax 
revenue. Second, congestion can also lower H C 5 , sin ce patients who are not discouraged spend 
more time waiting in line and have less time available to work, which yields less tax revenue. 
For plausible functional forms and parameters , the marginal impact of congestion is stronger on 
the demand than on the supply, which enables us to obtain a unique numerical equilibrium. 
1.4.2 Functional Forms 
In total , four functional forms need to be specified to solve our problem numerically: 
three at the consumer demand level and one at the aggregate level. First, we specify the utility 
function as: 
( cl-w Lw) 1-p - 1 
u(c, L) = ~-1~-­-p (1.14) 
This utility function is standard in modern macroeconomie models because of two useful proper-
ties. It has a constant Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient of panda constant elasticity 
of substitution between consumption and leisure. 
Second, the time lost at a given period is specified in order to respect the criteria discussed 
in section 1.3: 
LT(H,cxi)=P · ( 1 - H +cxr (~= ~)) (1.15) 
This function is decreasing in health, which means that the sicker the agent, the less time is 
available to be spent for leisure or work. When using the health care system, the agent sacrifices 
an amount of time, increasing in /, in waiting lines, and thus always obtains a higher lost t ime 
when ex = 1. Finally, as observed in the Québec system, patients with severe health problems 
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are prioritized, which means that the waiting time portion of LT increases with health. The 
congestion leve! is allowed to assume values between zero and one and can be interpreted in t his 
formulation as the proportion of the period spent in waiting !ines by an agent with full health. 
Third, the health law of motion, which is a function of current health and age of the agent, 
as weil as both shocks, is chosen as follows: 
(1.16) 
{
H. (1 -(a-=_g,-<6 )bt +a ((!!_-H) . (l+<,p) )b3) 
1 ( ) _ a-g,_ (H - !f_) b2 H a, H ,Eë,E..p -
H 
if H > H 
otherwise 
where g and a are the minimum and maximum ages considered in the calibration and H is the 
health capital corresponding to full health. While not intuitive at first glanee, this functional 
form presents many attractive features. The health capital depreciation rate is increasing in the 
age of the agent for neutra! values of stochastic term Eë. For ages nearing a, even neutra! values 
of the stochastic term yield an important depreciation of health capital. Also, for values of the 
stochastic term above a - g, an agent can see an improvement in his healt h without the use of 
health care. 
The second term, the production of health care, has similar features. We assume that 
agents in bad health - for whom ( H - H) is high - can expect a higher gain from using health 
care. However, for neutra! values of the stochastic term E..p, the agent may not expect to regain 
full health for values of parameter b2 above unity. Also, parameters b1 and b3 enable non-linearity 
in the depreciation and production of health. In effect , these parameters and the distribution 
of the stochastic terms are tools t hat make this law of motion flexible, which we will later use 
to replicate essential aspects of our data regarding health. 
The only function that remains to be specified is the aggregate demand (1.12), which 
is needed to obtain equilibrium and isolate t he congestion parameter "'(. We formulate it as a 
simple linear t ransformation of the sum of users, weighted by the severity of their sickness: 
N 
HCD = d. 2:::: ai. (H - Hi) ' (1.17) 
i=l 
where ai is the optimal choice of a for agent i resulting from the solut ion of our demand mode!. It 
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Table 1.1 Portrait of CCHS 2005 Québec Respondents 
Group n Users9 
Unweighted Weighted (Weighted) 
Age groups 18 to 39 8 911 2 243 093 47. 6% 
(avg. of 46.3) 40 to 64 11 709 2 815 709 53.6% 
65 to 79 4 651 783 272 67.1% 
80 and + 1 230 189 741 75.5% 
Health groups10 0.45 to 0.60 2 345 449 325 75 .7% 
(avg. of 0.81) 0.65 to 0.80 14 448 3 227 621 57.9% 
0.85 to 1.00 9 708 2 354 870 44.0% 
Total 26 501 6 031 816 53.8% 
is noteworthy that this form implies that the cost of treating a given patient is linearly increasing 
in his sickness level ( H - H i) . T he only parameter of t his function, d, is t he marginal cost , in 
dollars, of treating illness. It enables us to express the aggregate demand for care in dollar 
t erms, and thus equate t he demand to the supply, already specified by (1.13) . 
1.4.3 Data 
The bulk of the data used for our calibration is extracted from cycle 3. 1 of t he Canadian 
Community Health Survey (CCHS), conducted in 2005. This survey is conducted annually by 
Canada's national statistics agency, Statistics Canada, wit h t he objective of gathering healt h-
related dat a at precise geographie levels across the count ry and contains hundreds of variables. 
Included in the CCHS data are a subset of variables that enable us to establish t he age, healt h 
level and health care choices of t he respondents in 2005. To obtain t hese, we make a number of 
dat a manipulations, described in Appendix A. 2. 
In total, 26,501 respondents from t he province of Québec and over the majority age of 
eighteen are included in our database. Taking into account the weighting variable of t he survey, 
t hese respondents correspond to 5.98 million Québécois, or 96 .7% of the total adult population of 
t he province for t hat year, according to ISQ data. The weight ing variable was thus re-weighted 
in order to represent the full adult population. Table 1.1 presents a summary of t he resulting 
distribut ion. Health values of 0.45 to 0.60 correspond to the "Poor" (lowest) health label in t he 
t he CCHS self-reported healt h level questions, .65 to .80 to "Fair" and "Good" labels, and 0. 85 
to 1.00 to "Very good" and "Excellent" (highest) labels. 
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1.4.4 Parametric Choices and Calibration 
In order to calibrate our mode!, we fix a minimal number of parameters according to 
the existing literature, data and intuition. First , we fix w = .67, a value effective to replicate 
aggregate choices ofworking time (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992) . 
Second, in opposition to most macroeconomie applications using this function, we limit ourselves 
to values of p < 1, in order for the value of death described by equation (1.5) to be realistic. With 
p ?: 1, this function yields u (0, 0) = - oo, resulting in minus-infinite values of death for the agent , 
rendering their choices at any period irrelevant. By fixing p E (0, 1) , we find V= -lj(l-p)( l -,8) . 
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of t he risk aversion parameter, presented in Appendix A.6, 
which led us to reject values close to unity, which would lead to waiting times of over half the 
period for healthy agents. For ali other values within the test ed range, we found very similar 
quantitative results. Ultimately, we set p to the middle of the possible range, 0.5, which results 
in an equilibrium value of congestion of 0.067. With regards to (1.15), this value means that 
agents in perfect health, who wait the longest for care, !ose 6.7% of the period in queues before 
receiving care. At the opposite of the spectrum, agents with the lowest health leve! only Jose 
0.6% of the period in !ines, as their treatment is prioritized. 
The minimum age we consider is the majority age, after which agents are assumed to be 
in charge of their health related decisions. In practice, we do not impose a maximal age. When 
agents reach any age over the paramet er a = 99, they simply have t he same health expectations 
for a + 1 as agents of that age, which does not impose an automatic death. According to the 
final calibration of our mode!, 18 year-olds in perfect health have a O. 70% chance of reaching 
ages above 99. The health capital vector is set according to the intuit ion that full health is 
represented by unity, and the healt h of death is set above zero to enable our health depreciation 
function to reach H for reasonable combinations of age and E0• We also choose a value of H such 
that LT is strict ly positive and below P. This prevents undesirable outcomes as, for instance, 
agents using healt h care because t he induced waiting time of doing so is nil , their !ost time being 
already equal to the period. Finally, we allow for 15 shocks of both stochastic vectors, in order 
for agents to obtain varied healt h outcomes. 11 
For public pensions, we base ourselves on two basic components of Canada's Old Age Se-
11The specifie values of these parameters are of little importance. Other reasonable sets of parameters 
were found to lead to qualitatively identical results after the execut ion of our calibration algorithm. 
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curity Program, the Old Age Security Pension (OASP) and-the Guaranteed Income Supplement 
(GIS). They are both publicly funded and constitute the minimum pension funds available to al! 
retired Canadians of 65 years of age and over. The age of retirement and generosity of pensions, 
computed as the sum of the OASP and GIS available to agents with no other pension funds in 
2005 , are obtained from Services Canada . 
The remaining parameters are obtained through our calibration algorithm in order to 
replicate the percentage of users found in t he database, severa! demographie facets, the total 
cost of health care and the GDP of Québec. The retirement and macroeconomie parameters are 
drawn from multiple sources, as follows. We obtain the total cost of health care for 2005 , of 19.0 
billion Canadian dollars, by withdrawing the cost of public medication insurance of $ 2.4B , as 
reported by the Régie de l'assurance maladie du Québec, from the total cost of health assumed 
by the public sector of $ 21.4B, as reported by the Canadian Institute for Health Information. 
The GDP of 2005 is $ 272.0B and corresponds to the income-based , market priees annual GDP, 
as published by Statistics Canada. The taxation parameter is set to the ratio between the cost 
of t he public expenses and the GDP, in order to enforce a balanced budget: 
HC5 + ~[:._ 1 1a,>ao · B 
T= GDF (1.18) 
This calibration procedure is explained in Appendix A.4. The full calibration is presented 
in Table 1.2. 
1.5 Numerical Results 
1.5.1 Determinants of Health Care Demand 
The demand for health care resulting from our procedure is an optimal choice of a for 
every combination of health, age and savings. For a given healt h level, we find that older agents 
always display a positive net gain of using care, resulting a smooth age threshold determining 
health care use. F igure 1.1 presents t his optimal threshold for a l! healt h capital values . Al! 
agents below t he line, which are both young and in good health, optimally choose a = O. Al! 
agents on the line or above it choose a= 1. This demand fits the trends observed in Table 1.1 , 
in which we saw that healt h care use was stronger in older and unhealthy individuals in Québec 
Table 1.2 Calibration 
Fixed Parameters 
w: Leisure preference 
p: Arrow-Pratt relative aversion coefficient 
H: Minimum health capital (death threshold) 
H: Maximum health capital 
A: Maximum savings 
g,: Minimum age 
a: Maximum age 
ae: Age of retirement 
B: Annual public transfer to retirees 
T: Income tax rate 
Dimension of vector H 
Dimension of vector A 
Dimension of vectors E8 and E,p 
Algorithm-Determined Parameters 
Î*: Equilibrium congestion rate 
w: Hourly productivity 
b1 : Health depreciation curve coefficient 
b2: Expected impact of treatment coefficient 
b3: Treatment impact curve coefficient 
d: Maximum cost of treatment 
f.l8 = Expected health depreciation shock 
0"8: Std. dev. of health depreciation shock 
f.l,p : Expected treatment shock 
Œ,p : Std . dev. of treatment shock 
Standard deviations covered 
0.67 
0.5 
0.4 
1.0 
$500,000 .00 
18 
99 
65 
$10,319.50 
0.10674 
13 
51 
15 
0.0671201 
$33.33 
1 
15 
1 
$25,562.8 
58.5 
24.1 
-0.55 
0.109 
3 
23 
24 
in 2005. 12 
To assess how savings affect health care consumpt ion in a public system, we computed 
the threshold for the lowest and highest savings levels included in our calibration. We found 
that t hey were perfectly indissociable: t he youngest age for which agents use care is exactly 
the same for the poorest and wealt hiest agents. This result suggests that public health care 
systems are efficient in being equally available to the poor and the rich. While intuitive, t his 
result has several obvious caveats. In our model, wealth differs only through savings and health 
status, while productivity in good health is supposed to be homogeneous and unemployment 
nonexistent. Also, most workers are not self-employed and many of t hem benefit from a form 
of income insurance against the use of health care in the form of sick days. Thus, we may 
incorrectly estimate t he difference in usage between t he wealthiest and poorest agents. 
Figure 1.2 is illustrative of the use of savings by agents in our model. It shows the expected 
savings of agents by age, calculated from the predicted lives of a theoretical population with our 
stochastic design (the approach is described in Appendix A.3) . Agents optimally increase their 
savings until the age of retirement, slowing this trend only in their early 50's, which coïncides 
with the first predicted use of health care for agents in good health in Figure 1.2. They then use 
their savings more extensively as t hey reach retirement to smooth their consumption and utility 
in their later stages of life. In effect, since e is set to the minimum level of pensions given to 
elders in Canada, the savings are used by agents as a primary, privately-owned, pension fund . 
This fund is expected to become extinct soon after agents reach their life expectancy, of 80.6 
years old .13 
12What our mode! fails to predict is the occurrence of youl!g, healthy respondents choosing to use care 
despi te long wait ing times, and vice versa, bot h of which are intriguingly present in the data. T his may occur 
for a variety of reasons. On the one hand , the distribution 's health leve! is computed from self-declared variables 
and may Jack consistency between different respondents. For instance, sorne respondents may report feeling in 
good health while being affl icted by chronic diseases that require continuous care. Similarly, agents may have 
used health care to respond to a temporary decrease of health leve! t hat is untraceable in t he data, since we 
only observe the self-reported health at the end of the period and its yearly variation. That being said, the most 
important factor behind this discrepancy is plausibly that the real decision framework used by agents is more 
complex t han t he one developed in this paper and cannot be replicated perfectly. 
13 We recognize that this occurs because of t he absence of a bequest motive in our mode!. If such a feature 
was added to the mode! , we would observe a fat ter tai! on the right si de of the plot , as agents would aim to leave 
a portion of their lifet ime savings to their heirs. It appears unlikely that this addition would have an important 
impact on our numerical results , since savings have no noticeable impact on t he decision to use health care in 
public systems. 
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1.5.2 Elasticity of Demand With Respect to Congestion 
A key policy issue for count ries affected by a high health care congestion is the elasticity of 
t he demand for care wit h respect to congestion. If elasticity is close to zero, a direct implication 
is that waiting t imes can be easily eradicated by increasing t he resources of the syst em. On 
the other hand , if the demand is very responsive to congestion, even an important increase in 
t he system 's funding and capacity may have lit tle impact on t he system's congestion despite 
the accrued quantity of care received, a plausibly very frustrating outcome for t axpayers. This 
elasticity is also of key importance to policymakers who may choose to control t he demand for 
public care by allowing congestion to increase: if the elasticity of the demand is close to zero , 
such a policy would result in an explosion of t he congestion level with little actual impact on 
the cost of the health care system. 
Mart in and Smith (2003) used a panel data approach to estimate the elasticity of demand 
with regard t o the length of waiting lists for several surgery procedures in the United Kingdom. 
Their approach yielded an overall value of elasticity of -0 .09, with values for individual specialties 
ranging from -0.24 to 0.38. As noted in the introduction of this paper, such studies have two 
important fl.aws, as the accumulation of hours spent in waiting rooms before t he reception of 
treatments is not t aken into account and could intuitively have a larger impact on demand 
than the length of wait ing lists , and their analysis is restrict ed in comparison to the vastness 
of modern health care systems. Our model is thus possibly the best tool developed so far to 
ant icipate a global response to congestion variations. 
To that effect , we compute t he demand for healt h care result ing from our calibration when 
for different values of "(, keeping t he rest of t he calibration presented in Table 1.2 intact . Figure 
1.3.1 presents the result ing proportion of the total population using healt h care for 11 values 
of 'Y between 0 and 0.1. When congestion is zero , health care services impose no cost in our 
model, which results in all agents choosing a = 1. This situation, while theoretically possible, 
is implausible, since it would mean receiving t reatment instantly upon wishing for it, without 
any form of transportation costs or duration of treatment . As expected, the number of users is 
downward sloping in Figure 1.3.1. In t he neighborhood of current congestion "(*, t he elasticity 
of demand is -0.195, indicating that a 1% exogenous increase in Québec wait ing t imes would 
--------- ----------------------------------------
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result in only 0.2% less users of care.14 
Figure 1.3.2 presents the average profile of health care users for the same congestion values. 
As the congestion level rises, young agents and healthy agents are less present in the health care 
system, raising the average age and reducing the average health of patients. This second effect 
means an increase in the average cost per user, and implies that the elasticity of the costs of 
care is even lower than the elasticity of demand . In addition to constituting a weak deviee to 
ration health care demand and costs, these two results suggest that congestion may induce poor 
early detection of diseases in young agents, which may have an intricate dynamic impact on 
both social welfare and public costs as these wait to grow older and more ill before seeking care. 
While the elasticity we find is low, it is twice the global elasticity found by Martin and 
Smith. We believe this arises because, as noted earlier , the congestion of the system as a 
whole affects the utility of agents in a more direct fashion than waiting lists for specifie elective 
surgeries. Another possible explanation for the larger value we obtain is the absence of a fully 
specified job market in our model. Since many workers are insured against income losses through 
a number of sick days, it is possible that we overestimate the impact of congestion on demand. 
That being said , we also find that the demand for care is inelastic, which leads us to conclude 
that reforms aiming at increasing the system's capacity will be efficient at reducing congestion 
even in the absence of productivity gains. 
1.5.3 Predicted Impact of Policies 
ln Table 1.3, we present the results of four types of policies that impact the global outcome 
of the public care system: introducing moderating health care fees and modifying the income 
tax rate, age of retirement, and pension generosity. We simulate these policies by modifying the 
corresponding parameters in our model and iterating on 'Y until a new equilibrium is obtained. 
lncluded in these results are the expected impacts on usage, congestion, GDP and health care 
costs, as well as four welfare measures. These are t he mean, median and minimum value, which 
are informative in an ordinal manner, as well as the consumption adjustment necessary to obtain 
14 We find t his elasticity by simulating the demand resulting from 'Y values at t he proximity of 1* : 
ln (~~1 ai l'Y* · 1.1) - ln (~~1 aih* · 0.9) 
ln ('Y• · 1.1) -ln b* · 0.9) 
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the same average value as t he base case. 15 We also exploit the heterogeneity present in our mode! 
by presenting how different policies affect the use of care and values of agent s of different ages 
and health levels. 16 
lt should be noted that, as is generally the case in this type of analysis, from a given 
initial state, convergence to the equilibrium by applying t he given policies is uncertain , since t he 
distribution dynamics are ignored . Even if convergence was certain, the length of the process 
could be long. This may be especially important considering that increases of revenues for health 
care are implicitly assumed to be directly converted into new services in our mode!. 
A. Introduction of user fees 
Policies 1 to 3 consider the implementation of user fees. We model these as a simple 
modification of the consumption constraint when agents choose to use health care: 
{ ~ A + w · WT (1 - T) - Fee- --c = (l +r) A' A + e - Fee - (l+r) if a<ao if a= 1 (1.19) if a 2: ao 
In Québec's public health care debate, moderating fees have been described by its pro-
ponents as a mean to control the use of healt h care without relying on wait ing !ines, but its 
opponents raised concern that they may prevent poorer citizens from obtaining care. Accord-
ingly, we might expect user fees to decrease congestion through a decreased health care usage 
and increased revenues available for health care. What we observe, however, is that the lowered 
congestion is so significant that t he percentage of users increases despite the fee for al! fee levels 
considered. Even the imposition of a $100 fee peruse, which would account for less than 2% of 
health care costs, would result in a 45% decline in congestion. We also observe a simultaneous 
increase in GDP, caused jointly by the decreased congestion - "users of health care have more 
15This adjustment is obtained by finding the factor k such t hat 
where ( êt , Lt) is the optimal consumption and leisure choices made by agents at the equilibrium consistent with 
the policy scenario, with k = 1. We keep these choices fixed, t hen iterate on k until obtaining an equality. 
16We did not present results per leve! of savings because t hey were allocated by us according to the age 
and health of agents and are thus correlated with those (see Appendix A.3). 
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available time for work during the period - and by a response of health care users to the fee 
in orcier to maintain their consumption and savings levels. In all three cases, this policy yields 
increases in GDP and health care use, and a reduction of congestion. 
Interestingly, we also find an increase in social value as measured by all welfare measures 
when fees are low, meaning that the benefit result ing from a reduction in congestion socially 
outweighs the fees paid by the individuals. However, as the fee increases, this policy cannot 
is not Pareto optimal, since the minimal value in the distribut ion lowers. Poor and unhealthy 
agents prefer being in a system with long waiting lines than paying high fees. Despite this, the 
health care use and average value of all age and healt h groups increase even when high fees 
are charged, suggesting a strong willingness to pay for care with lower waiting lines by almost 
all agents. Furthermore, according to all welfare measures minus the minimum value, the fee 
that would lead to the largest social gain is the largest one, which would reduce congestion by 
almost 90%. We must again remind t he reader that our model has no unemployment and t hat 
socioeconomic status differs only t hrough t he level of savings, since agents have the same wages. 
Whether these large expected social gains would remain without these assumptions is uncertain. 
B. Changes in the income tax rate 
A more common policy to increase funding for public health care is to increase taxes. 
Policies 4 and 5 show the predicted impact of increasing the income tax rate T. As we observed 
with the introduction of fees, these policies are effective in reducing the congestion of care, and 
the number of patients increases in reaction to the reduced waiting times. A notable difference 
from policies 2 and 3 is t hat the minimum value of our distribution of agents now increases as the 
policy intensifies. In this policy scenario, poor and sick agents are no longer charged high fees 
for care and only experience the benefits from the reduced congestion. Thus, if fees were to be 
implemented, taking the capacity of payers into account appears socially desirable. Finally, we 
note that the number of users and health care costs are drastically higher with a tax increase of 
2.5% than with fees of $1000, despite achieving a similar congestion reduction. This constitutes 
the biggest contrast between the results of the two policies and confirms that fees for care do 
act as a rationing mechanism. Otherwise, t he welfare results of policies 4 and 5 indicate that 
raising taxes is a viable option, as long as t he end result is an effective reduction in congestion. 
Policy 6 is equivalent to a government deliberately allowing congestion to rise in orcier 
to lower the cost of health care, which funds a tax eut of 1% of GDP. As predicted in the 
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last section, such a policy induces very high welfare costs, as equilibrium congestion more than 
doubles and the percent of users decreases by 26%. All four measures of welfare also display 
a noticeable reduction compared with the base case, and agents would require a 12% increase 
of their consumption to be indifferent to the base case. As expected, the percentages of users 
in younger and healt hier agents show the largest declines, and the older agents, who remain 
heavily in the health care system, show the largest declines of their average value. 
In Table A.l.iii , presented in appendix, we t est the sensitivity of policies 4 and 6 to six 
different consumer aversion values. We find these policy results t o be qualitatively robust, as 
only the amplitude of the effects is affected by differing values of p. 
C.-D. Changes in age of retirement and pension generosity 
Policies 7 to 11 study the impact of modifying the pension system without modifying the 
income t ax. Thus, if pension costs decrease (increase) , funding that was previously directed to 
retirees is directed to (removed from) t he health care system. These simulations are conducted in 
part as an attempt to determine whether pension generosity or health care should be priorit ized 
when public funds are limited. Also, it has been suggested in Québec's public spending debate 
that the longevity of users could be perceived as an opportunity to increase the retirement age 
and thus generate more production in the economy as a whole, reduce pensions costs and increase 
public funds (Castonguay and Laberge, 2010) . Policies 7 and 8, which increase retirement age 
to 67 and 70 years old , are conducted in this spirit, and largely support this claim. Such policies 
would have t he highest positive impact on aggregate production and would prove beneficia! for 
all our welfare measures . A somewhat surprising result is that both agents of 65 to 79 and 80+ 
see an important increase of their average values . This arises because agents are able to work 
and accumulate savings for five more years, and are able to consume more per period during 
the rest of their lifet ime. 
Interestingly, reducing pension generosity wit hout changing t he retirement age, as simu-
lated in policy 10, yields a much lower GDP increase than encouraging the elderly to remain 
in the work force. This policy forces agents to work and save more during t heir working ages, 
which further discourages the use of care by young agents. This effect can be best seen when 
comparing savings and the use of care by younger groups between policies 7 and 10, which 
otherwise yield a close level of congestion. 
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Policies 9 and 11 are a complement of policy 6, which allowed congestion to increase in 
order to fund a tax eut. Instead, t hese policies explore t he outcome of using the reduced costs of 
care to fund other public programs - in t his case allowing for more generous pension programs. 
Not surprisingly, policy 9, which allows agents to retire at 60 with full pension at t he expense 
of t he public care system, yields an explosion in healt h care congestion, since the funding for 
care is also affected by a decline in GDP as the workforce is reduced. This policy results in the 
worse welfare !osses of our policy attempts, which is a corollary of Castonguay and Laberge's 
claim t hat an increase in retirement age would be socially desirable in Québec. A 10% increase 
in pension generosity, as studied in policy 11 , is less damaging t han lowering t he retirement age, 
but also induces an important congestion increase and a socialloss as measured by al! but one 
welfare measures. Only t he minimal value measure shows an increase, spurred by t he addit ional 
pension revenue. 
E. Combination of policies 
While their results indicate large welfare gains, t he polit ical feasibility of reforms 3, 5 and 
8 seem weak at best , given t heir austere nature. However, policy 12 indicates that a similar 
outcome in terms of additional financing of care, congestion reduction and welfare gains can be 
obtained by combining fees of $250, an increase of 0.75% of the t ax rate and an increase of two 
years to the age of pension eligibility. This policy also presents severa! appealing facets of its 
own: a higher GDP than policies 3 and 5 because of the increased age of retirement; a lower 
percentage of users t han in policy 5 because of the inclusion of user fees; and a reduced need to 
increase the age of pension than in policy 8 because of t he use of two other financing levers. As 
the application of each approach is more modest, such a policy may be more politically viable. 
Summary 
To summarize, we find that reducing the fund ing to a public health care system that 
displays congestion leads to significant welfare !osses, since it causes wait ing t imes to increase 
dramatically. Our results also suggest that Québec's prevailing situation is far from socially op-
timal, as al! policies aimed at increasing the funding for care and decreasing congestion produce 
important welfare gains. For instance, agents would be willing to sacrifice up to 8.3% of the 
flow of their consumpt ion to be in a system where the tax-to-GDP ratio is 2.5% higher but t he 
wait ing times for care are reduced by 90%. While many of the policies that increase healt h care 
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funding are austere in nature and may be politically infeasible, a combination of several more 
modest approaches would lead to similar welfare gains and waiting times reduction. 
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Table 1.3 Results of Simula ted Policies 
1.3.A. Introduction of user fees 
Base Case 1 2 3 
Fee= 0 Fee= 100 Fee= 500 Fee = 1000 
Users (%) 53.7 57.7 61.8 72.1 
'Y* a 100 54.7 36.7 10.9 
GDF 100 102.7 102.6 103.1 
HC5 (% GDP)b 7.0 7.2 7. 7 8.6 
Fees(% HC5 ) 0 1.7 8.6 18.0 
Public pensions 100 100 100 100 
Working time among workers (a< ae ) 
Median 100 100 100 100 
Mean 100 101.7 101.5 102.1 
Savings 
Median 100 89.5 84.2 84.2 
Mean 100 98.7 96.5 95.1 
Welfare m easures 
Median Value 100 100.7 100.9 101.1 
Mean Value 100 100.7 100.8 101.2 
Minimum Value 100 100.3 99.7 99.0 
.0. Consumptionc 100 96.0 94.5 92.0 
Users (%) per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 5.2 10.1 16.9 31.0 
40 to 64 76.4 80.9 84.4 95.2 
65 to 79 100 100 100 100 
80 and over 100 100 100 100 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 91.2 97.4 98.1 100 
0.65 to 0.80 62.3 65.3 72.6 82.1 
0.85 to 1.00 34.8 39.6 40.2 53.1 
M ean value p er age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 100 100.4 100.5 100.8 
40 to 64 100 100.9 101.2 101.6 
65 to 79 100 100.8 101.0 101.3 
80 and over 100 100.7 100.6 100.6 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 100 100.7 100.9 101.2 
0.65 to 0.80 100 100.7 100.9 101.2 
0.85 to 1.00 100 100.6 100.8 101.1 
aEquilibrium congestion of care. 
bHealth care spending. 
c Adjustment to the consumption flow of agents necessary to obtain the same mean value as the base case 
(see Footnote 15). 
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1.3.B. Changes in the income tax rate 
Base Case 4 5 6 
b..T = 0 b..T = 0.01 b..T = 0.025 b..T = -0.01 
Users (%) 53.7 63.7 81.0 39.7 
/ * 100 31.2 8.8 260.2 
GDF 100 102.0 101.8 97.0 
H C 8 (% GDF) 7.0 8.1 9.5 5.9 
Fees(% H C 8 ) 0 0 0 0 
Public pensions 100 100 100 100 
Working time among workers (a< ae ) 
Median 100 100 100 120 
Mean 100 100.8 100.8 101.9 
Savings 
Median 100 84.2 89.5 78.9 
Mean 100 95 .9 95 .4 91.8 
Welfare measures 
Median Value 100 101.1 101.6 97.5 
Mean Value 100 101.0 101.5 98.1 
Minimum Value 100 100.8 101.0 98.1 
b.. Consum ption 100 94.0 91.7 112.2 
Users (%) per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 5.2 21.2 49.5 4.0 
40 to 64 76.4 85.1 99.5 47.5 
65 to 79 100 100 100 99.5 
80 and over 100 100 100 100 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 91.2 100 100 84.0 
0.65 to 0.80 62.3 75 .3 90.8 49.6 
0.85 to 1.00 34.8 41.0 63 .9 17.8 
Mean value per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 100 100.6 100.9 99.2 
40 to 64 100 101 .4 102.0 97.2 
65 to 79 100 101.4 101.8 96.6 
80 and over 100 101.3 101.7 96.9 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 100 101.1 101.6 97.8 
0.65 to 0.80 100 101.1 101.6 98.0 
0.85 to 1.00 100 101.0 101.4 98.3 
36 
1.3.C. Changes in age of retirement 
Base Case 7 8 9 
ae = 65 ae = 67 ae = 70 ae = 60 
Users (%) 53.7 61.1 72.3 33.5 
1* 100 43.6 19.9 363.9 
GDF 100 103.3 108.1 96.3 
HC8 (%GDF) 7.0 7.6 8.4 5.2 
Fees(% H C 8 ) 0 0 0 0 
Public pensions 100 85.8 67.3 143.8 
Working time among workers (a< ae ) 
Median 100 100 100 120.0 
Mean 100 101.1 101.0 109.5 
Savings 
Median 100 84.2 57.9 84.2 
Mean 100 93.5 67.1 96.7 
Welfare measures 
Median Value 100 100.9 100.8 96.6 
Mean Value 100 101.0 101.1 96.9 
Minimum Value 100 100.7 100.9 96.8 
D. Consum ption 100 94.4 93.9 121.0 
Users (%) per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 5.2 16.0 33.2 3.1 
40 to 64 76.4 83.5 93.8 37.0 
65 to 79 100 100 100 91.5 
80 and over 100 100 100 100 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 91.2 98.1 100 83.2 
0.65 to 0.80 62.3 71.2 83.9 41.3 
0.85 to 1.00 34.8 40.2 51.1 13.2 
Mean value per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 100 100.6 100.9 98.6 
40 to 64 100 101.1 100.8 96.0 
65 to 79 100 102.5 103.4 90.8 
80 and over 100 102.5 104.7 92.4 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 100 101.1 101.1 96.3 
0.65 to 0.80 100 101.0 101.1 96.7 
0.85 to 1.00 100 100.9 101.0 97.2 
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1.3.D. Changes in pension generosity 
Base Case 10 11 
B· 1 e. o.9 e. 1.1 
Users (%) 53.7 59.0 46.7 
/* 100 46.9 159.4 
GDP 100 102.7 97.7 
HC8 (% GDP) 7.0 7.4 6.5 
Fees(% H C8 ) 0 0 0 
Public pensions 100 90.0 110.0 
Working time among workers (a < ae) 
Median 100 100 100 
Mean 100 101.7 100.1 
Savings 
Median 100 89.5 78.9 
Mean 100 97.0 91.6 
Welfare measures 
Median Value 100 100.6 98.7 
Mean Value 100 100.6 99.3 
Minimum Value 100 98.5 101.2 
t:..Consumption 100 96.3 104.6 
Users (%) per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 5.2 13.8 4.6 
40 to 64 76.4 80 .9 61.9 
65 to 79 100 100 100 
80 and over 100 100 100 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 91.2 97.9 87.1 
0.65 to 0.80 62.3 67.8 56.6 
0.85 to 1.00 34.8 39.6 25.4 
Mean value per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 100 100.4 99.7 
40 to 64 100 100.9 98.8 
65 to 79 100 100.5 99.3 
80 and over 100 99.9 100 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 100 100.7 99.2 
0.65 to 0.80 100 100.6 99.2 
0.85 to 1.00 100 100.6 99.3 
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1.3.E. Combination of policies 
Base Case 12 
f ee= 0 fee = 250 
b..T = 0 b..T = 0.0075 
ae = 65 ae = 67 
Users (%) 53.7 72.3 
/* 100 18.0 
GDF 100 103.3 
HC8 (%GDF) 7.0 8.7 
Fees(% HC8 ) 0 4.4 
Public pensions 100 85.8 
Working time among workers (a < a6 ) 
Median 100 100 
Mean 100 100.6 
Savings 
Median 100 78.9 
Mean 100 90.1 
Welfare measures 
Median Value 100 101.0 
Mean Value 100 101.3 
Minimum Value 100 100.5 
b..Consumption 100 92.2 
Users (%) per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 5.2 33.2 
40 to 64 76.4 93.8 
65 to 79 100 100 
80 and over 100 100 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 91.2 100 
0.65 to 0.80 62.3 83.9 
0.85 to 1.00 34.8 51.1 
Mean value per age and health group 
Ages 18 to 39 100 100.8 
40 to 64 100 101.6 
65 to 79 100 102.9 
80 and over 100 102.8 
H of 0.45 to 0.60 100 101.4 
0.65 to 0.80 100 101.4 
0.85 to 1.00 100 101.3 
- - -------- --- ----
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1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we build a dynamic stochastic model to study the demand for public health 
care in systems characterized by zero monetary priees and waiting times. Our theoretical results 
show that agents choose to seek care in such a system when the expected gain of doing so, which 
depends on their health movement expectations, outweighs the option cost of spending time in 
congested health care facilities rather than working or participating in leisure activities. 
Our numerical results illustrate the perverse nature of health care congestion. On the one 
hand, users of health care spend a large amount of t lme wait ing in queues for care, lowering both 
their individual utility during the period and the global production of the economy and public 
finances. On the other hand, younger and healthier agents are t he most discouraged by t he utility 
cost of waiting times, which suggest profound negative implications on the early detection and 
prevention of diseases and future public health. In future work, it would be interesting to extend 
our model to study t he effects of waiting times on prevent ion and population health dynamics 
in more detail. 
By simulating how our model reacts to a variety of congestion levels, we find that the 
demand for care is qui te inelastic. In the case of Québec, a 1% increase in waiting times would 
reduce the demand by only 0.19%. Thus, simulations of attempting to reduce of healt h care 
costs by increasing waiting t imes led to strong overall negative welfare impacts . On the bright 
side, a low elasticity means that congestion can be decreased successfully without important 
health care costs increases. 
Our policy simulations reveal t hat, in the case of Québec, a 1% increase of the global 
tax rate, a $500 yearly fee for users of care or an increase of the retirement age to 67 years 
old would be sufficient to eliminate over half of current congestion, assuming that the increased 
public income could be transferred linearly into health care production. While such reforms 
would surely present important political obstacles to implementation in most countries affiicted 
with long waiting times, our simulations indicate that the social value would be improved if a 
permanent decrease in waiting times was realized. 
In our view, this paper should be considered a first attempt at using computational 
methods to gain a better understanding of public health care systems. We note that further 
work needs to be clone to expand on our findings . Because our focus is on the demand for 
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care, we assume t hat supplementary funding can be translated into additional care without 
the need for long term investments, training more skilled personnel or any form of decreasing 
marginal productivity of care. Further research is needed to assess more precisely how health 
care capacity can or should be increased when more financial resources are introduced in the 
health care system. Also, we recognize that our analysis presents a very unconstrained modeling 
of labor: in order to focus our attention on age, health and savings, we assume that agents are 
homogeneous in productivity and can freely choose the precise amount of time to invest in 
their working activity. Adding unemployment and heterogeneity in wages could have a major 
impact on policy outcomes, possibly diminishing the social desirability of reforms aimed at 
reducing congestion for specifie subgroups. For instance, the introduction of user fees would 
likely prove Jess desirable for unemployed agents, while tax increases to finance health care 
supply may be exceedingly costly for agents t hat are both healthy and poor. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the dynamics of the distribution in the years following t he applicat ion 
of policies and their eventual impact on long term equilibrium need to be assessed. This will 
prove particularly helpful in evaluating the practical desirability of policies - notably in societies 
with aging populations. 
In the future, another important question t hat should be addressed is the desirability of a 
dual public-private system in replacement of a public system showing congestion of care, and the 
optimal size that should be allowed for the private sector. This question arises naturally as access 
to care concerns in the United States is answered by reforms increasing the public involvement 
in health care and congestion and costs force many OECD public systems to consider partial 
privatization. In recent years, for-profit private clinics started to emerge in Québec to supply 
sorne services, such as diagnostic testing for colorectal cancer, in competition with t he public 
system. While the stringent provisions of the Canada Health Act restrict the extent of services 
provided by private competitors, their numbers have been growing steadily. From a public 
system presenting long waiting queues, our results suggest that an unrestricted dual system 
could show a massive transition of users to private care, since 72% of our distribution of agents 
seek health care even in the presence of $1000 annual fees when congestion is reduced. We 
conclude by emphasizing the relevance of numerical approaches to gain a better understanding 
of the mechanisms at work behind complex problems such as t hose addressed in this paper. 
2 WAITING TIMES FOR MEDICAL CARE IN AN AGING POPULATION CONTEXT: 
THE CASE OF QUÉBEC 
We study the impact of population aging on Québec's public health care system, focusing on 
waiting times, utilization and costs. To that effect, we build an integrated model that incor-
porates demographie changes and projects policy responses and health care demand over the 
period 2005-2050. We calibrate our model with Québec data and use demographie projections 
by the Institut de la Statistique du Québec as inputs. Our simulations indicate that Québec's 
current budgeting approach of increasing health spending by 5% each year will result in much 
longer waiting times by 2030. To maintain waiting times at current levels, we find that the 
share of health care spending in the economy would need to double by 2050. As the baby-boom 
generation gets older and consumes more care, it will be difficult for policymakers to meet the 
population's expectations of a moderate fiscal burden, a timely delivery of care and an access 
to the most effective medical technology. Taking on the challenge of aging will constitute a 
balancing act between these objectives. 
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2.1 Introduction 
So far , two distinct literature branches have studied t he impact of aging on health ex-
pendit ures. The first has debated the "red herring" argument that longevity gains have but a 
moderate impact on healt h expenditure throughout t he life-cycle. According to this argument, 
since a large share of health related costs occur at the proximity of death, t he longevity com-
ponent of aging merely delays t hese costs, wit h the notable except ion of long-term care costs 
(Zweifel et al. ,1999; Seshamani and Gray, 2004; Hakkinen et al., 2008) . T he second branch, 
which is more Jrelevant to t his article, has attempted to project t he impact of the large baby 
boom generation reaching old age over t he coming decades on population health and costs by 
extrapolating observed spending per age data. It has found t hat this t ransit ion will cause sub-
stant ial increases in spending and pose a financial challenge (Shoven et al. , 1994; Reinhardt, 
2000; Bagust et. al. 2002; Keehan et. al. , 2008). For instance, Keehan et al. (2008) combine 
actuarial projections and empirical cost models to predict US healt h care costs, and predict a 
3% increase in the US share of GDP spent on health between 2007 and 2017. 
In addit ion to health care cost s, the added demand for care brought forward by aging 
baby boomers is likely to affect waiting t imes for care considerably in many countries. In a 
study of waiting lists for several surgery procedures in the United Kingdom, Martin and Smith 
(2003) found that t he elasticity of demand with regard to the length of lists is quite low, with 
an overall elasticity of -0.09. Similarly, in our first chapter, we built a public health care mo del 
calibrated wit h Québec data and found an elasticity wit h regard to wait ing queues of -0.19. 
Given this low elasticity of demand, efforts to moderate the expansion of cost s willlikely result 
in important increases in wait ing t imes and a severe deterioration of t he access t o healt h care 
in many western countries. 
In this paper, our main objective is to provide insight about the full impact of t he aging 
baby-boom generation on public-funded health care systems. In addit ion to costs and their share 
of GDP, we attempt to anticipate the evolution of waiting times and access to care. Secondarily, 
we aim to anticipate the repercussions of different policy stances on these outcomes and quantify 
the scope of uncertainty associated with demographie forecasts. 
We build an integrated model t hat incorporates demographie changes and endogenously 
projects policy responses and outcomes for Québec's healt h care system over the period 2005-
2050. The case of Québec is part icularly relevant for such analysis for many reasons. First , it 
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has a fully public-funded universal health care syst em, as imposed by the Canada Healt h Act. 
Second, its health care system already presents long waiting times for care, which have been a 
policy concern for over a decade. For instance, 47% of Québécois who claimed not to receive 
the appropriat e amount of care in 2005 in the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) 
asserted that waiting t imes were t o biarne, more than any other cause. Third and foremost, 
Québec will experience a particularly severe aging of its population in the decades to come. 
According to the Instit ut de la Statistique du Québec (ISQ), its elderly population will more 
than double between 2006 and 2030 (Figure 2.1). Meanwhile, t he working age population per 
individual aged 65 and over will shrink from 4.7 to 2.2. 
Our mode! has four modules. First , the Population module updates the distribut ion 
according to the Institut de la st atistique du Québec (ISQ) demographie projections. We include 
the ISQ's three main scenarios (Reference, Weak and Strong) in our analysis to account for t he 
uncertainty associated with future demography. The Policy module then determines the income 
tax rate chosen by t he government to fund its programs, which determines the health care supply 
in a given year. We include t hree policy stances: 1) Increasing the system's budget at a steady 
pace (Québec's current budgeting approach) ; 2) Adapt ing health care spending to maintain a 
const ant congestion leve!, which enables a steady access to care; and 3) Maintaining t he share 
of health care costs in the GDP constant. The Health Care module projects the distribution's 
annual demand of health care, based on the life-cycle calibrated demand model set forward in our 
first chapter. Simultaneously, this module finds the equilibrium congestion of care that equates 
the demand and supply. Finally, the Results module computes the equilibrium outcomes for the 
year. 
Along wit h demography, two main trends have an important impact on our results: labor 
productivity gains and technological progress in the provision of healt h care. The former in-
creases t he aggregate ability to pay for care and alleviates aging's impact on the fiscal outlook. 
The latter has more ambiguous implications. Medical progress is generally seen as increasing 
the effectiveness of treatments, but at higher costs. For our three main policy scenarios, we im-
pose this interpretation. However, new discoveries can also reduce costs for existing treatments 
(Jones, 2002). As aging imposes a fiscal pressure on governments, policymakers could ration the 
adoption of pricey new treatments and favor t he adoption of t hose that reduce costs. We thus 
include a fourth policy scenario, which combines this rationing of health care technology with 
maintaining the share of healt h spending in the economy. 
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Our first policy simulation reveals that an institutional status quo of increasing the health 
care's system nominal funding by 5% annually will be insufficient to maintain waiting times at 
or below their current leve! over t he next decades. For all demographie scenarios, waiting times 
would increase by over 75% by 2025. Our second policy simulation shows that maintaining 
waiting times constant in the population aging context of Québec would be quite costly, and 
double the share of health care spending to GDP by 2050. Finally, our last two policy simulations 
indicate that maintainirig health care costs at their 2005 share of GDP, if appealing from a 
public finance perspective, would lead to an explosion of waiting times unless the government 
aggressively rations the adoption of technological progress. 
Aging populations, such as that of Québec in the decades to come, increase health care 
demand and the average cost of treatment white reducing the quantity of working age person per 
elderly, which restrains GDP growth and ability to pay. As such, aging creates a tremendous 
pressure on public health care systems. Despite large differences among the ISQ projection 
scenarios parameters, they lead to very similar results for the majority of our simulations. This 
arises because the inevitable aging of Québec 's baby-boom generation is such a dominating trend 
that all demographie scenarios lead to similar age groups shares in the total population for the 
years to come. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our method-
ological framework. Section 2.3 presents our calibration and discusses our parametric choices. 
Section 1.5 presents our simulation results. Finally, Section 2.5 puts our results in a practical 
policy perspective. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Overview 
This section describes the mode! used to simulate t he impact of population aging on 
Québec 's public healt h care system. Our starting point is the year 2005, in which the initial 
distribution and outcome are obtained from the calibrated mode! of our first chapter. For the 
year 2006 onward, our mode! consists of four distinct modules, synthesized in Figure 2.2. 
First, t he Population module updates the 2005 distribution according to ISQ's demo-
graphie scenarios. Second, t he Policy module determines the taxation rate and medical tech-
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Figure 2.2 Model Overview for Year 2006 
nology adoption. These are chosen by the government following a policy rule after observing 
the population and predicting its demand for medical care. Third, t he Health Care module 
projects t he health care demand of the population by solving a !ife-cycle mode!, and finds the 
equilibrium waiting times (the priee of using a public health care system) such that medical 
services provided by the public system clear. Finally, the Policy outcome module extracts the 
equilibrium results for t hat year. The same process is t hen repeated until year 2050, the last 
year of our simulations. We now describe each module in fur ther detail. 
2.2.2 Population Module 
The Population module updates the distribution used in t he first chapter , which replicate 
Québec's 18+ population in 2005, for years 2006 to 2050. The init ial distribution was created 
to replicate the number of Québécois of each age, health leve! and savings (the three state 
variables of our !ife-cycle health care demand problem) . The age and health distribution was 
obtained through manipulations of the 2005 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) data, 
weigthed to match ISQ population data. The savings of the respondents, which was not asked 
in the CCHS questionnaire, was extrapolated from t he solut ion of the optimization problem. 
Table 2. 1 presents a summary of the initial distribution. 
ISQ demographers produce nine population scenarios for long term analysis, three of 
which are considered reference scenarios. The "A - Reference" scenario consists of mortality, 
fertility, international and inter-provincial migration assumptions based on average trends. The 
"D - Weak" and " E - Strong'' scenarios present more conservative and optimistic assumptions 
in terms of the total population they produce, respectively. They are intended to reftect the 
order of magnitude of the uncertainty of future demographie trends in t he province (ISQ, 2009) . 
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Table 2.1 Portrait of 2005 Distribution 
N Average Average 
Age (Thousands) Healtha Savings ($) 
18 to 19 193 0.81 5,117 
20 to 29 1,040 0.83 38,954 
30 to 39 1,010 0.83 118,876 
40 to 49 1,274 0.81 242,111 
50 to 59 1,116 0.80 355,146 
60 to 69 744 0.79 435,431 
70 to 79 465 0.77 228,690 
80 to 89 163 0.76 35,904 
90 and+ 26 0.77 0 
18 and+ 6 032 0.81 215 941 
aHealt h values of the d istribution are obtained through manipulations of two qualitat ive questions about 
t he perceived health of CCHS respondents. Values of 0.45 to 0.60 correspond to the "Poor" (lowest) health label , 
0.65 to 0.80 to "Fair" and "Good" labels, and 0.85 to 1.00 to "Very good" and "Excellent" labels. See Appendix 
A.2 for more details on this variable. 
The main assumptions of these scenarios are presented in Table 2.2. The extent of population 
divergence between the scenarios is quite large, with over 3 million separating the Weak and 
Strong scenarios in year 2051. In our simulations , we use the Reference scenario as a baseline. 
In year t , let us denote ft (a, H , A) the number of Québécois of age a, health H and 
financial assets A, and Nt (a) the total population of age a. N 2005 (a) is obtained directly from 
the initial distribution. For 2006 onward, Nt (a) is taken from one of ISQ's three reference 
scenario. This module updates the distribution with the ratio of the population of al! ages in 
Table 2.2 Main ISQ Demographie Projections Parameters 
Life expectancy in 2051 (men / women) 
Total fertility rate of females in 2013 
et international migration in 2015 
Net inter-provincial migration in 2013 
Total population in 2051 (millions) 
Source: ISQ (2009). 
Reference Scenarios 
Weak Reference Strong 
83.0 1 86.5 
1.50 
30,000 
-1 6,000 
7.86 
85.5 1 89.0 
1.65 
40,000 
-10,000 
9.17 
88.0 1 90.5 
1.85 
50,000 
-4,000 
10.96 
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t + 1 and t : 
Nt+ l (a) ft +l (a , H, A) =ft (a, H , A) · Nt(a) (2.1) 
With this updating procedure, the ISQ scenarios are t he only drivers of population change, 
while t he savings and health distribut ion among a given age group remains static over t ime. In 
this art icle, the distribut ion of agents serves as an input to predict the optimal use of care 
given a congestion leve!. One of our key results of the first chapter was t hat wealt h has no 
effect on the opt imal medical care consumpt ion in a public setting. Because of this, maintaining 
financial assets const ant has no impact on our simulated results .1 However , health pla ys a key 
role in medical consumpt ion decisions, but its future movements are uncertain. Looking at 
historie CCHS dat a, we find no evidence of a t rend in the self-reported healt h of Québécois (see 
Appendix B.1). T hus, if health was t rended over time, it would raise the question of whether 
our results are driven by t hese predictions and whether they are plausible. In Section 1.5, we 
will discuss the implications of this choice when we analyze our simulated results. 
The algorit hm used in the fi rst chapter to weight t he 2005 distribut ion led to unrealistic 
discrepancies for sorne number of age groups with ISQ's 2006 projections. To minimize the 
impact of these distribut ion differences on our early results , we smooth implausible discrepancies 
between Nt (a) and Nt+l (a+ 1). T his allows for t he distribut ion to quickly catch up wit h ISQ's 
demographie projections, while preventing bumpy results for 2006. An overview of t he divergence 
and the methodology used for t his smoothing are presented in Appendix B.2. 
2.2.3 Policy Module 
The government t axes work income at rate Tt to fund two programs: the public healt h care 
system and t he public pensions for t he population over 65. Each year, once the population is 
updated, the Policy module determines the taxation rate and medical technology to be adopted 
for according to a policy rule. 
We assume that everyone aged 18 to 64 has the same productivity in a given year (wt) 
and works the same number of hours throughout a year (WT) . Thus, the size of t he economy 
1 Financial assets do play an important role wh en considering t he welfare impact of policies su ch as ta.x 
hikes a nd changes in t he generosity of pensions, which are not t he topic of t his article. 
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is directly determined by t he demographie projection and labour productivity: 
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GDPt = L LLft (a,H,A) · Wt · WT (2.2) 
a=l8 H A 
Similarly, public pension costs P Pt are given by the elderly population in t: 
PPt = L .L.L!t (a, H , A). e (2.3) 
a2:65 H A 
where B is the annual public transfer received by retired agents. As in the first chapter , 
public pensions correspond to the minimum public transfers available to all retired Canadians of 
65 years of age. Such transfers correspond to the main components of Canada's Old Age Security 
Program: the Old Age Security Pension (OASP) and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS). 
Both of these programs' rates are reviewed quarterly with the Canadian consumer priee index 
(CPI) to maintain a constant purchasing power over time. We thus hold B at its 2005 level for 
our simulations. With GDP and public pension costs given by (2.2) and (2.3), the health care 
supply H Cf ( expressed in 2005 dollars) is directly determined by t he in come tax rate Tt: 
(2.4) 
Since income tax is the only source of government revenue in our model, TtHC and Tf are the 
share of GDP allocated to health care and public pensions, respectively. 
We assume that t he government perfectly anticipates the GDP, the population distribution 
and its demand for care. Thus, by choosing tax rate Tt, it determines the supply of care H C8 
and can reach a number of policy objectives. We consider three main policy scenarios in this 
module, each reflecting a plausible approach to health care financing in the decades ahead: 1) 
increasing health care costs at a steady pace- Québec's status quo- , 2) funding health care to 
maintain a stable congestion of the health care system, and 3) maintaining the ratio of health 
care costs and GDP constant. With equality (2.4), all policy stances impose a balanced budget 
in the years to come. We discuss t he possibility of using deficits as a financing source in the 
concluding section of this art icle. 
In the first three policy scenarios, medical improvements are adopted automatically by 
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the health care system, which increases the cost of treating patients.2 To better understand 
the role of technological improvements on the provision and costs of health care, we include a 
fourt h policy scenario, which combines scenario 3 wit h a rationing of the adopt ion of medical 
technology. 
We present each scenario in further detail in Section 2.4, before describing their simulated 
outcome in Québec's demographie context. 
2.2.4 Health Care Module 
The Health Care module is t he core of our model. It determines aggregate supply and 
demand for health care, as well as aggregate conditions that reveal waiting times and health 
care consumption in year t. 
Aggregate supply 
The health supply in year t is given directly from the distribution and t he government's 
choice of Tt described in the policy module. With respect to equations (2.2) to (2.4) , the 
aggregate supply HCf is given by: 
HCf =Tt· GDPt- PPt (2.5) 
Aggregate demand 
The aggregate demand prediction is based on t he dynamic demand model set forward in 
the first chapter. This life-cycle model proved useful to understand t he motivations of healt h 
care users and predict t he impact of healthcare financing policies in a static population context. 
Results obtained with the calibrated model indicated that agents optimally choose to demand 
health care when they are older and in bad health, while wealth and retirement have no impact 
on their demand. Also, the elasticity of demand wit h regard to waiting t imes is quite low. We 
found a simulated elasticity of -0.19, which means that a 1% increase in waiting t imes should 
be expected to reduce the number of users of health care by only 0.2%. 
2 Accordingly, the impact of medical treatments on the health of patients (medical productivity bt) , and 
t he marginal cost of care (dt), increase stead ily with t at rates Zb and zd. We discuss t hese parameters and t he 
role of medical technology in further detail in Section 2.2.4, Section 2.3.3 and Appendix B.3 . 
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This demand model combines the well-known health-capital concept of Grossman (1972) 
with key elements of comprehensive public health care systems. In particular , it presents zero 
monetary priees for care and int roduces a non-monet ary cost to users in t he form of lengthy 
waiting t imes. Also, it mo dels health care demand as a binary choice a E { 0, 1} , rather t han 
a continuous choice. The rationale behind this feature is that patients of public health care 
are not rationed by costs, 3 and therefore automatically accept the best treatment available, as 
prescribed by their physician. T heir choice is t hus reduced to seeking medical care (a = 1) or 
not (a = 0). Medical care is desirable because a good healt h increases the agent's expected 
longevity and quality of life, but cornes at a (non-monet ary) cost. Agents must wait a portion 
of t he period - the year t - in line, and thus sacrifice income gains and leisure.4 This sacrifice 
is increasing in t he congestion of the health care system, summarized by variable 'Yt · It is also 
increasing in the agent 's current health Ht , since medical care is allocated in priority to patients 
in bad healt h. The model's equations are presented in det ail in Appendix B.3. 
It is of note at this point that we do not incorporate the life-cycle model's working time 
predictions in our calculation of GDP and H C 5 . As mentioned in the conclusion of our previous 
article, the modeling of labor presents a number of important weaknesses. Notably, the model 
has no unemployment and makes no account of sick days, which insure many Québec workers 
against the income losses of waiting times. For these reasons, the model likely overstates the 
impact of waiting t imes on labour decisions and we deem more plausible, at the macro-economie 
level, to hold working t imes per worker const ant than to use the model's predictions. We however 
maintain the life-cycle model unchanged in the Health Care module since, for workers without 
sick days (mainly low wage and self-employed workers), lost wages due to waiting in line have 
an important impact on t heir decision to visit a physician. 
In this paper, the dynamic demand model provides the demand of each individual con-
dit ional to a given congestion level, a (a, H , A 1 'Yt) · We t hen compute H Cf('Yt), the aggregate 
demand for care ( expressed in 2005 Canadian dollars) given t he distribut ion in t and congestion 
3 In the case of Québec, t he user costs are zero if t he services provided are considered medically necessary 
for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing disease or diagnosing or treating an injury, illness, or disability, 
in accordance with the Canada Healt h Act. 
4 T he mode! explicitly emphasizes t he deterring effect of waiting queues (rather than lists) on the demand 
of public care. Queues induce a direct opportunity cost, since agents waiting in !ines cannot earn work income 
or enjoy leisurely activities. 
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HCf b) = LLLft(a,H, A) · a(a, H,A 1 lt) ·dt· (H - H) (2.6) 
a H A 
where H re presents full health and dt determines the unit cost of treating illness ( H - H) . The 
parameter dt enables us to express the aggregate demand for care in dollar terms, and enables 
us to equate the demand to the supply, already specified by (2.5). 
Equilibrium 
In this 100% publicly-funded health care framework, wait ing times constitute the only 
priee faced by users. In a given year, if the aggregate demand for care is high relative to the 
supply, the health care system becomes more congested, and wait ing t imes increase until an 
equilibrium is reached. Accordingly, we postulate that the equilibrium is obtained when t he 
overall congestion of t he system is such that HCf bt) = HCf. In this module, we iterate on 
/t, solve the !ife-cycle demand mode! and compute the aggregate demand HCf bt) until such 
an equilibrium is obtained. Despite a low elasticity of demand, the equilibrium exists and is 
unique for each year , since HCf is exogenous with regard to waiting times. We denote ,; the 
equilibrium congestion level.5 
2.2.5 Policy Outcome Module 
The fourth and last module computes the results of interest of our simulations for each 
year, ISQ reference scenario and policy. First, the equilibrium congestion of care 1; is a key 
variable, as it enables us to predict how future waiting times will evolve with aging, in comparison 
with contemporary waiting times. Second, we compute t he share of total population that use 
health care over time, which is indicative of access to care. As discussed earlier, the basic 
dynamic demand mode! found that the demand for care is higher in older agents. If we observe 
a decrease in the share of population that choose a = 1 as the elderly population increases, 
for instance, this would mean a significant worsening of access to care conditions. Finally, we 
compute the evolution of aggregate health care costs, both in constant dollars and as a share of 
GDP. In the context of an aging population, these provide a complementary view, because the 
size of the economy is directly linked to demographie projections. 
5 An exception to this occurs when HG[> H Cf(lt) for ali positive values of "ft, i.e. when t he supply 
for care is sufficiently high to eradicate waiting t imes. In such cases, we assign -y; = O. 
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2.3 Parametric Choices and Calibration 
2.3 .1 Health Care Module Parameters 
The bulk of t he parametric choices that need to be specified in our mode! are at the Health 
Care module leve!, and are directly obtained from our first chapter. In that effort , we devised 
a calibration strategy that allowed us to simultaneously replicate essential 2005 moments: the 
precise number of health care users in the 2005 edition of the CCHS survey, the total cost of 
health care and GDP of the province, and the mortality rates and health expectancy published 
by the ISQ. 
The calibration was then found to correctly reproduce the higher usage of health care 
by agents that are older and in bad health. These were observed in the CCHS data, but were 
not directly imposed by the calibration strategy or the mode!. lt also produced an elasticity of 
demand with regard to waiting times of -0.195, within the scope of the results of Martin and 
Smith (2003), which estimate the elasticity of demand with regard to the length of waiting lists 
using panel data methods. 6 
Since we use 2005 as the starting point of our analysis, we use the same parameters in 
this paper, which are presented in Table 2.3. The working time of the 18-64 population, WT, 
is set to 1,614 hours per year , the average working time found in the first chapter. 
2.3.2 Labor Productivity Growth 
Two set s of parameters remain to be established for our dynamic simulations. The first 
is the annual growth of tabor productivity parameter Wt· It has important repercussions on our 
simulated results. Large productivity growth over the years to come would increase the ability 
to pay for health care for all demographie scenarios. l t would thus allow Québec to significantly 
increase the supply for care while maintaining relatively low health care to GDP ratios. As such , 
it would compensate for the growing health care demand that willlikely be induced by the aging 
6 It should be noted that wait ing lists do not ration demand in t he same way as queues, as was formalized 
by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984). On the one hand, queues force individuals to wait in person at a given 
location, while on the other hand, waiting lists allow individuals to use their t ime freely unt il receiving the 
desired good or service in the future. As rationing deviees, the latter clear markets t hrough a decrease in the 
present value of the desired good or service, while the former impose a direct opportunity cost on agents, who 
are unable to use this time for other purposes. Because of this fundamental difference, elasticities with respect 
to waiting lists and wait ing queues do not have t he same interpretation. 
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Table 2.3 Calibration 
Policy Module Parameter" 
WT: Working time in hours 
Dynamic Demand Mode! Parameters" 
-y2005 : Initial equilibrium congestion rate 
b2oo5: Expected impact of treatment coefficient 
d2oo5: Initial cost of treatment parameter 
w2oo5: Initial hourly productivity 
T2oo5: Initial income tax rate 
w: Leisure preference 
p: Arrow-Pratt relative aversion coefficient 
H : Minimum health capital ( death threshold) 
H : Maximum health capital 
A: Maximum savings 
g,: Minimum age 
a: Maximum age 
ae: Age of retirement 
(): Annual public transfer to retirees 
Dimension of vector H 
Dimension of vector A 
Dimension of vectors E0 and E..p 
f-La: Expected health depreciation shock 
a0: Std. dev. of health depreciation shock 
f-L,p: Expected treatment shock 
a,p : Std. dev. of treatment shock 
Standard deviations covered 
Dynamic Trends Parameters 
zb: Medical effectiveness trend 
zd: Medical cost trend 
zw : Labor productivity trend 
"Obtained from the first chapter. 
1613.5 
0.0671201 
0.0666 
$25,562.8 
$ 33.33 
0.10674 
0.67 
0.5 
0.4 
1.0 
$500,000.00 
18 
99 
65 
$10,319.50 
13 
51 
15 
58.5 
24.1 
-0.55 
0.109 
3 
1.018 
1.018 
1.0096 
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population. On the contrary, a low productivity growth would mean that health expenditure 
will need to increase significantly as a share of the economy to allow the province to provide 
timely treatments to its elderly population. 
According to Statistics Canada, productivity per hour worked has grown by an annualized 
rate of 0.96% over the period 1981-2010 in Québec. Our simulations use this value as a baseline, 
and assign Wt = z~- 2005 · w2oo5 with Zw = 1.0096. However, this value is low in comparison with 
neighboring economies: over the same period, the productivity growth of Ontario and Canada 
as a whole were of over 1.2%. Thus, Québec 's Department of Finance has projected that a form 
of catching up with the other provinces willlikely occur, and that labor productivity will grow 
by at this higher rate on average over the decades to come (CCEFP, 2009) . In Appendix B.5, 
we present a sensitivity analysis with Zw = 1.012. 
2.3.3 Technological Progress 
The second set of parameters concerns technological change in healt h care. Recent efforts 
by Hall and Jones (2007) and Fonseca et al. (2009) mode! aggregate health outcomes using 
structural models. They found t hat technological progress are essential components of the 
increase of longevity and aggregate health spending in the US. Both modeled technological 
growth as improving the impact of medical treatments on health, and found an endogenous 
increase in longevity and medical demand. Fonseca et al. developed a dynamic !ife-cycle mode! 
with endogenous death similar to the demand component of our Health Care module. As a part 
of their calibration effort, they found that an annual health productivity improvement of 1.8% 
is consistent with the observed increase in American medical spending and longevity growth. 
Despite t heir strikingly different healt h care structures, it is not implausible that medical 
productivity growth has been similar in Québec and the neighbouring United States, since 
longevity at birth has grown by about 5 years in both jurisdictions over the period 1980 to 
2009. 7 Assuming that technological growth will continue at the same rate, we impose this 
interpretation of medical progress directly in our mode!. Parameter bt, which linearly dictates 
the maximum health attainable by using health care,8 is thus given by bt = z~- 2005 · b2oo5, with 
Zb = 1.018. 
7 According to ISQ and U.S. National Center for Health Statistics data. 
8 See Section "Health" of Appendix B.3. 
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In addition to increasing the desirability of treatments and the demand for them, techno-
logical improvements may also affect costs directly. In particular, Chandra and Skinner (2011) 
point out that many new "gray area" treatments have uncertain medical value and may in-
crease costs without enabling significant health improvements. According to them, the rapid 
adoption of such treatments by the United States may explain the unusually fast increase of 
medical spending in comparison with other western countries. In contrast, Jones (2002) notes 
the continual reduction of the cost of existing treatments, which can act as a counterbalancing 
force to new treatments in terms of aggregate health spending. He estimates the reduction in 
quality-adjusted cost of existing treatments to be of about one or two percent. 
The net impact of future medical technology on Québec's health care system's unit cost is 
uncertain. However, given the steady increase of health expenditure per capita over the last half 
century, t he average cost of treatment, dictated by parameter dt , is likely to keep increasing by 
at least as much as the productivity parameter over the foreseeable future. We thus also increase 
parameter dt by zd = 1.018 annually. We conduct a sensitivity analysis on this assumption in 
Appendix B.5, in which we allow costs to increase at both a slower and faster pace than bt . 
2.4 Numerical Results 
Policy 1: Increasing Health Care Costs at Steady Pace 
In our first policy scenario, the funds allocated to health care increase at a steady rate 
J.L > 1 each year. With this policy, medical facilities' budgets grow steadily over time in nominal 
terms without regard to efficiency of care, demand or GDP growth. Whenever GDP growth 
is less than J.L, the share of health spending in the economy increases. Despite its flaws, this 
approach to funding health care is appealing because of the simplicity of its application and the 
possibility for health care managers to fully anticipate future revenues. 
This "historie" approach to health care budgeting has been t he prevailing policy in Québec 
since the inception of the public health care system. According to a recent analysis produced by 
Québec's Department of Finance, this budgeting approach is set to continue in the foreseeable 
future, at a pace of 5% in nominal terms (Finances Québec, 2010). 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, we impose this policy by choosing the right income tax 
for each year in the Policy module. With regards to equations (2.2) to (2 .4), the share of 
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income tax allocated to care coherent with this policy is TtHC = 11~g~ 1 • We set J..L = 1.0304, a 
value consistent with a 5% nominal budget increase and an annual inflation rate of 1.9%, the 
annualized CPI growth rate over the 2002 to 2011 period. 
Figure 2.3 sums the simulated aggregate results obtained with this policy in four charts. 
Chart 2.3.i presents the equilibrium congestion level of the health care system expressed in 
comparison with the initial congestion. The policy simulation conducted with ISQ's Reference 
demographie scenario is the solid line, while the simulations conducted with the Weak and Strong 
scenarios are the dotted red and blue lines, respectively. Chart 2.3.ii presents the percentage 
of the population that optimally chooses to use the health care system over t ime. Chart 2.3.iii 
exhibits the total costs of the public health care system. For this policy, health care costs 
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increase steadily regardless of demographie outcomes, following our policy rule. Finally, the 
Chart 2.3.iv displays the evolution of the share of the economy allocated to public health care. 
We find t hat Québec's current policy of increasing nominal health care budgets will result 
in considerably longer waiting times for care in the medium term. These will occur despite a 
steadily increasing share of GDP being spent on health care. By 2025, with the ISQ's Reference 
demographie scenario, waiting times will have increased by 128%. Despite these increases, the 
share of the population t hat chooses to use health care during this period is expected to grow, 
driven by the rapid increase in the 65+ population presented in Figure 2.1. This is consistent 
with the results of our previous effort, in which we found t hat the elasticity of demand wit h 
regard to waiting times is quite low and that demand is particularly high in older agents. After 
2025, the slower increase in the elderly population will allow budget increases to effectively ease 
the pressure on t he health care system. Waiting t imes will then decline and fall below 2005 
levels by 2040. 
As previously mentioned, we do not allow the health of our distribution to evolve over 
time. Nevertheless, as medical technology continues to progress, the health distribution could 
improve, notably among theelderly. In the Appendix B.1 , we find sorne indication of the healt h 
of older Québécois improving in the CCHS data. An improving population health among the 
older age groups would mediate the pressure brought forward by Québec's aging population, 
without reducing the number of users of health care. As we detailed in our 2012 article, the 
health care module predicts that older agents optimally consume healt h care even in good health. 
As a consequence, our projected utilization of care would not decrease if we imposed a better 
health among the elderly in our simulations. However, such a change would mean less expensive 
treatments and a decrease in aggregate demand, through equation (2.6) . A lower demand would 
lead to a reduced congestion in Figure 2.3.i and, in turn, to a slightly higher utilization of care 
than predicted by Figure 2.3.ii. 
The Weak and Strong demographie scenarios demonstrate the large uncertainty of the 
outcomes associated with a budgeting policy that does not adjust to aggregate demand. Since 
the projected health care budget is the same for ali demographie scenarios, fut ure waiting t imes, 
health care provision and the share of health care in the economy are quite uncertain. For 
instance, the Strong demographie scenario, which presents a larger population and more demand 
for health care, produces a more severe and persistent congestion increase (to over 275% of t he 
2005 level in 2030). Lower spending per capita would allow for a slower increase of the healt h 
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care to GDP ratio but, because of longer waiting times, less Québécois would use public health 
care. At the opposite, the Weak population scenario would result in lower waiting times and 
more patients, but a 2.6% higher share of GDP spent on health care than the Reference scenario 
by 2050. 
To avoid such uncertainty, the government could adopt policies centered on population 
needs or costs, which is the rationale behind policy scenarios 2 and 3. 
Policy 2: Funding Health Care to Maintain a Steady Congestion Level 
Our second policy scenario allocates spending in order to maintain waiting times for care 
constant at their 2005 level. This scenario allows us to project health care costs and the share 
of GDP that would be needed to maintain a similar: access to care for future users in an aging 
population context . 
This policy can be achieved in our framework through the anticipation by t he government 
of the aggregate demand for care. Denoting H Cf ( 'Y2oos) t he demand for care of the population 
at year t given the 2005 congestion of health care, the Policy Module simply chooses rtHC such 
that HCf = HCf (r2oos). The simulated results of this policy are presented in Figure 2.4. 
Targeting congestion of care shows the government modulating health care costs to adapt 
to t he aggregate demand. Thus, the increase in the share of the population that uses health 
care of chart 2.4.ii resembles the increase in the elderly population presented in Figure 2.1. For 
the Reference demographie scenario , this share grows by 11.3% from 2005 to 2030 as the 65+ 
population more than doubles, to 2.3 million. Then, from 2030 to 2050, the elderly population 
increases at a much slower pace, which is refl.ected in t he slower growth of health care use in the 
total population. 
Since this policy shows health care supply adapting to population size, it results in much 
less variability caused by demography than our first policy scenario, both in terms of the share 
of population that uses care and of the portion of GDP allocated to health care. We see this in 
the closeness of the th_ree demographie scenarios in charts 2.4.ii and 2.4.iv. 
Unsurprisingly, these simulations reveal that costs would need to increase substantially 
in comparison with current spending levels to keep congestion constant as Québec's population 
ages. By 2025, costs would need to increase by at least $ 17B for all demographie scenarios, and 
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their share in t he economy by 4%. For ali demographie scenarios, costs would be superior to 
those of Policy 1 until 2030, after which maintaining a steady access to care will require a slower 
budget growth. By 2050, health care costs would reach 15.7% of GDP, more than doubling from 
their 2005 level. This leads us to our t hird policy stance, in which the government maintains 
the share of the economy allocated to its health care system constant. 
Policy 3: Maintaining Health Spending Constant as a Share of GDP 
Our third policy scenario keeps the share of public medical spending in t he economy, 
denoted À, constant at 6.98% of GDP. 9 This scenario reflects the reticence of policymakers and 
taxpayers to allow an ever larger share of the economy to be spent on publicly funded health 
care. In our Policy module, this policy is obtained, quite simply, by choosing TtHC =À for each 
year. 
In Québec, eight public inquiries, special committees and working groups were formed to 
address increasing health care spending since 1988. While these efforts have yet been largely 
unsuccessful at stabilizing costs, it remains important to assess the impact such a policy would 
have, were it to succeed, in an aging population context. 
The simulated results, shown in Figure 2.5, are catastrophic. Policymakers implicit ly rely 
on waiting t imes as a non-monetary priee to clear the health care market. However, the demand 
for care is inelastic with regard to waiting times. In the severe population aging context of 
Québec, this means that waiting t imes would need to literally explode in order to maintain 
currents shares of GDP; according to chart 2.5.i, they would increase by a factor of 15 compared 
to their 2005 length. Only older agents in very bad health would remain in the health care 
system, which would be used by less than 35% of the population by 2025. These extreme 
outcomes are obtained with all demographie scenarios. 
In our view, these results attest to the impractical nature of aiming to maintain public 
health care costs low in an aging population context while providing the newest medical technol-
ogy. Because of Québec's demographie context, the relative size of the working age population 
shrinks (Figure 2. 1.ii). Meanwhile, as discussed in Section 2.3, technological progress implies 
9 In 2005, the total cost of health assumed by the public sector was of$ 21.4B, as reported by the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information. Since we focus on medical spending, we withdraw from that amount the cost of 
public medication insura nce of$ 2.4B, as reported by the Régie de l'assurance maladie du Québec . The resulting 
public medical spending is of$ 19.0B , 6.98% of the $ 272.0B GDP for that year. 
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annual increases of the unit cost of treatment of 1.8%. These combined factors restrict Québec 's 
ability to pay for the newest health care technology. 
In practice, to maintain TtH C low without an explosion of waiting times, policymakers 
would either need to dramatically increase the productivity of medical expenditures, increase 
the productivity of workers and GDP, or ration the adoption of new technology. The latter 
strategy is the basis for our fourth policy scenario. 
Policy 4: Rationing the Adoption of Technological Developments 
Our last policy scenario also holds the ratio of health care to GDP is held constant at 
its 2005 level, and has the government choosing to introduce new medical technology only if it 
reduces the costs of treatments. 
In our Policy module, this policy is obtained by choosing TtHC = À for each year, as in 
the previous scenario , and by replacing our baseline technological trends values by Zb = 1 and 
Zd = 0.99, respectively. This value of Zd is chosen based on the estimation by Jones (2002) 
that the quality-adjusted cost of existing treatments decreases annually by between 1% and 2%. 
This could be interpreted as aggressively rationing technological progress with the purpose of 
containing health care costs. Alternatively, the same results would be obtained with a fixed 
technology if productivity gains of 1% were obtained in the production of medical care. 
The results, displayed in Figure 2.6, differ drastically from those of Policy 3. They show 
the lowest congestion of care and highest use of the health care system of all our policy scenarios. 
For all demographie projections, waiting times would be eliminated by 2040. With zero waiting 
times, the cost of using health care is nil and the model predicts that 100% of the population 
would consume health care. In reality, however , transportation costs, factors such as the duration 
of treatments and the risk of contagion in health care facilities would prevent su ch an outcome. 10 
Such a policy stance would certainly prove difficult to implement in practice. In 2050, 
the newer technology of the first t hree scenario is 2.2 times more effective than that of this 
scenario. Understandably so, patients would quickly demand that the more effective (and costly) 
treatments be available to them. Nonetheless, these simulated results show how productivity 
gains and discriminating against the adoption of pricey, "grey area" technology may contribute 
10This figure does not include the Healt h Care Costs and Costs as a Share of GDP charts that were 
presented for the other th ree policies, since they are t he same as those of Policy 3, already shown in Figure 2.5 . 
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to alleviate the challenge of aging. 
2.5 Discussion 
In this article, we study the impact of population aging on Québec's public health care 
system. Our analysis focuses on waiting t imes, demand for care and health care costs. To that 
effect , we build a health care mode! that predicts Québec's aggregate health care outcomes for 
the years 2005 to 2050. We then simulate the impact of four different policy stances according to 
the three reference demographie scenarios produced by the Institut de la Statistique du Québec 
(ISQ). 
While Québec's current budgeting approach of increasing health spending by 5% each 
year is easy to implement , it fails to adapt to the needs of the population. Our simulations 
show that these needs will be greatly amplified by Québec's aging demography: an institutional 
status quo would result in twice longer waiting times by 2030. Despite a more difficult access to 
care, utilization would increase steadily, as the baby-boom generation grows older and its health 
depreciates. According to our simulations, if the government aimed to maintain waiting t imes 
at current levels, the share of health spending in the economy would need to double by 2050. 
An amelioration of the health st atus of the elderly would moderate these results, but we find 
no clear evidence of such a trend in the Canadian Community Health Survey. In this context, 
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we find that maintaining a steady share of GDP allocated to health care would be catastrophic. 
Since the demand for care is inelastic with regard to waiting times, such an approach in the face 
of Québec's demography would lead to a 15-fold expansion of waiting times. 
These results assume that Québec's health care will remain publicly financed with zero 
costs to users in t he decades to come, and that medical innovation will be automatically intro-
duced. Reforms, such as the inclusion of moderating fees or the privatization of a portion of the 
services currently paid for by the province, could indeed lighten the increase of waiting times 
with no additional taxation. Such policies would however transgress the Comprehensiveness and 
Accessibility criteria of the Canada Health Act, and would expose the province to severe finan-
cial sanctions.11 Another strategy could be to agressively ration the adoption of new technology; 
we find that it may lead to the elimination of waiting times by 2040. Such a strategy would 
however be difficult to implement in practice, since patients would quickly demand for the more 
effective technology to be available to them. Finally, of course, the province could use public 
debt to pass the expansion of its health costs over to future generations. From our simulation 
results , we can infer that such a strategy would quickly become unsustainable for Québec: by 
2025, maintaining waiting times at their current leve! without increasing taxes would generate 
a$ 137B cumulated deficit. This figure is equivalent to 42% of that year 's predicted GDP. 
This article shows that , as the baby-boom generation gets older and consumes more care, 
it will be extremely difficult for policymakers in countries with a comprehensive public health 
care system to meet the population 's expectations of a timely delivery of care , an access to the 
newest medical technology and a moderate fiscal burden. Facing this challenge will constitute a 
difficult balancing act between these three objectives. It is of note that our results do not reveal 
which policy stance is better. Future research should focus on finding t he optimal course of 
action for countries facing this dilemma. With the demographie transition of the baby-boomers 
into retirement already underway, time is running out. 
11 In 2005, t he federa l Canada Healt h Ttansfer to Québec was of $ 5.0B, over a fourth of t he province's 
health care budget . 

3 FORECASTING POPULATION HEALTH, HEALTH SPENDING AND MORTALITY 
Alt hough old-age disability has decreased among the elderly in the US over t he last decades, sorne evidence 
support t he possiblity t hat it could increase in the fut ure due, fo r example, to t he alarming t rend in obesity 
and its consequences such as diabetes. On t he other band , technological progress in medical care, in part icular 
curative care, may continue to alleviate sorne of these pressures, allowing a higher quality of !ife for ill and older 
individuals, and sustain the rise in !ife expect a ncy. However, both an increasing prevalence of chronic conditions 
and technological progress may raise t he dem and for healt h care, resulting in a higher allocation of resources 
towards healt h care. Using a dynamic st ochastic healt h production mode! calibrated to the US experience over 
the last 25 years, we show that it is possible to simultaneously obtain an increase in longevity and health spending, 
white at the same time observing a deterioration of population health in terms of chronic conditions. The pace 
of technological progress in curative care plays a key role in producing t his outcome. Looking ahead , our mode! 
predicts that chronic conditions prevalence will continue to increase in the years to come, but will not directly 
contribute to increased medical spending. Unless income or medical innovations were to grow at a slower pace, 
we find t hat spending will likely increase to over 22% of GDP. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Needless to say, predicting future health, mortality and health spending is vital for evalu-
ating the fiscal outlook in the US and other countries. Two popular approaches for forecasting 
these outcomes are extrapolation based on times-series and dynamic microsimulation. For ex-
ample, demographers use the Lee-Carter model and other projection models to project how 
mortality will evolve in the future (Lee and Carter, 1992). The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) projects health care costs using exogeneous cost increases applied to an otherwise stan-
dard microsimulation model with labour supply, taxes and Social Security (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2009). One of the main drawback with extrapolation methods is that it often predicts 
an unconstrained growth of health care spending. If current rates of expenditure growth are 
maintained, we would be spending all our ressources on health by 2100. To counter this, the 
CBO imposes an ad hoc limitation to stop the rise of health expenditures as a fr action of GDP. 1 
Dynamic microsimulation models assume reduced-form relationships between health, mor-
tality and health spending (e.g. Goldman et al. , 2004) . These models cannot foresee behavioral 
responses, such as a change in the consumption of medical care in response to income shocks 
or changes in the relative priee of health. They are also subject to the problem of unbounded 
growt h. In those models, spending is not productive (in t he sense of reducing disease prevalence) 
and is kept fixed as a function of other characteristics of the household. Further, spending does 
not respond to relative priee changes or changes in lifetime resources of the population. 
In this paper, we explore another avenue where the behavior of future agents, including 
how much to spend on health, evolves optimally over the life-cycle in a way which is consis-
tent with economie theory. This allows to model the behavioral responses to the changing 
circumstances of households, in particular technological change, in a way which does not lead 
to unbounded growth in expenditures. We use our model to project the evolution of its chronic 
condition prevalence, healt h spending and longevity in the US over t he period 2010-2050. 
In order to project forward , it is important to look back at what has happened. Over 
the last 50 years, four stylized facts about the population health have received considerable 
attention. First, there has been an alarming increase in the prevalence of various clu·onic and 
acute health conditions, across cohorts at t he same age. In 1980, fewer than 3% of the adult 
1T he Office imposes a graduai decline of the Medicare and Medicaid "excess cast growth", the increase 
of health spending per capita relative to the growth of GDP per capita, in its projections (Manchester, 2012) . 
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American population had type 2 diabetes while in 2010, 9% had diabetes according to the 
Center for Disease Cont rol (CDC) . A major contributor to the higher prevalence of diabetes 
is obesity. In 1980, 22 .9% of Americans were obese compared to 30.5% in 2000 (Flegal et al., 
2002) and 35.7% in 2012 according to the CDC. These trends are potent ially the result of more 
sedentary lifestyles, in part caused by t echnological innovation both in the economy in general 
and in particular in the production of food (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2009; Cut ler , Gleaser 
and Shapiro, 2003). 
Second, there has been a steady decline in t he prevalence of disability at older ages, at a 
rate of 1.5% per annum (Manton, Gu and Lamb, 2006). A number of studies have documented 
a strong decline in the fraction of disabled respondents citing cardio-vascular disease, vision 
problems and musculoskeletal condit ions (Freedman et al. , 2007). 
Third, we have witnessed a steady, quasi-linear, rise in life expectancy over the last 50 
years (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002). This trend has been driven by a proport ional reduction 
in mortality rates after the age of 40. Murphy and Topel (2005) show t hat since the 1970s, 
remaining life expectancy at age 50 has risen much faster than life expectancy at birth. 
Finally, healt h spending has risen as a share of GDP from less t han 4% to 16% between 
1950 and 2005. Meara et al. (2004) document that this increase accrued disproportionally after 
age 65. Relative to those aged 35-44, per capita spending was on average five t imes higher 
for those age 75+ in 2000 compared to 2.5 times in 1963. The literature aimed at explaining 
those facts has focused extensively on technology (Newhouse, 1992; Cut ler , Deaton and Llearas 
Muney, 2006; Shoeni et al. , 2008; Fonseca et al. , 2009). This informs us that a model aimed at 
forecasting those outcomes into the future should have as one of its main driving force advances 
in medical technology. 
Advances in medical technology may in fact affect different ially different facets of the 
healt h of individuals, since a common view among epidemiologist s and gerontologists is t hat 
population health is multidimensional (Crimmins, 1996). Indeed, medical technology can pre-
vent the onset of healt h conditions, increase quality of life of individuals wit h a condit ion and 
lenghten remaining lifespan. When progress is "biased" towards treating conditions which emerge 
with age, such as cancer, resources may be optimally allocated towards older rather t han younger 
ages from a cross-sectional perspective. In t urn, this bias may lead to technological change im-
proving health at older ages while t he health at younger ages deteriorates. Added to this, the 
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expectation of technological progress may also give t he incent ives, at the individual leve!, to 
delay health investments and t hus exacerbate the trends observed. 
A good example of t he role of technology in raising expenditures but also delivering large 
benefits in terms of reduced mortality and disability at older ages can be found in the evolut ion 
of cardio-vascular disease and its t reatments. Sorne of the risk factors for cardio-vascular disease 
have been on t he rise over the last 30 years (in particular hypertension and obesity) . But from 
1960 to 2000, close to 70% (4.88 years) of the increase in !ife expectancy of new borns could 
be traced back to a reduction in the mortality rates from cardio-vascular disease (Cut ler et 
al. , 2006) . The introduction of angioplasty, beta-blockers and st atins are good examples of 
medical technologies and advances that have reduced significant ly mortality and disability rates 
from cardio-vascular disease (Cutler, Deaton and Llearas Muney, 2006; Schoeni et al. , 2008) . 
These technologies may have increased healt h spending, particularly at older ages, but wit h 
considerable value (Cutler and McC!ellan, 2001). Simultaneously, the prevalence of cardio-
vascular disease may have increase as a result of t he lower mortality. 
We propose a dynamic stochastic mode! of health production where three underlying 
forces shape the future environment of the population. First, a deterioration of healt h, due 
t o an increase in sedentary lifestyles which will then result in a trend in the prevalence of 
chronic conditions in t he p opulation. Second, an increase in t he productivity of healt h care in 
t ransforming money into health. This will be t he pathway to build in the effect of improvements 
in medical technology into the forecasts. Finally, a change in real income of households over 
time. The allocation of resources both within and across cohorts will depend on the relative 
strength of these forces. The mode! can generate both posit ive or negative longevity and old-age 
disability t rends depending on the strength of t hese t rends, and can be used to assess a variety 
of different scenarios. 
We calibrate our model and our trend parameters to match the 1985-2005 U. S. experience. 
We t hen show that it is able to replicate the stylized facts about population healt h we just 
mentioned. Projecting into the future, we find that spending will continue to increase steadily 
if current obesity, medical innovation and income trends were to continue at their recent pace. 
By 2050, we find t hat medical spending will account for 22% of GDP. Despite our trend of 
worsening lifestyles, our baseline projection suggests that !ife expectancy will cont inue to rise in 
the decades to come, due to higher available income and improvements in medical technology. 
We t hen consider a number of scenarios aimed at understanding t he sensitivity of t hose forecasts 
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to the underlying trends. According to our simulations, spending per capita is mostly amplified 
by income growth, and would lower considerably in the case of an downward income shock. 
While income directly affect t he leve! of medical spending, we find that medical innovations are 
the factor t hat leads to the increase of spending as a share of the economy. If future medical 
productivity grew at half of its current pace, the share of GDP allocated to health would stabilize 
and eventually decrease to 15% by 2050. Ali our other scenarios find a growth in the share of 
the economy allocated to health care in the future . 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the dynamic 
health care demand model. Section 3.3 presents our main data sources. Section 3.4 presents 
our calibration. Section 3.5 shows and discusses our results . Finally, Section 3.6 discusses the 
implications of our results suggests future research avenues. 
3.2 Mode! 
Since the pioneering work of Picone et al. (1998), numerical methods have proved in-
valuable to study questions in which the stock of health-capital2 and mortality of agents are 
endogenous and uncertain. Recent examples include French (2005), Jung and Tran (2007), Blau 
and Gilleskie (2008), Galama et al. (2008), Halliday et al.(2009), Scholz and Seshadri (2010) and 
Baicker and Skinner (2011 ). 
In a paper closely linked to the objectives of this article, Hall and Jones (2007) introduced 
an income growth trend to the health care problem of agents and concluded t hat the rise of 
the share of health spending in t he economy is optimal, given that healt h spending constitute 
a superior good wit h an income elasticity above one. Looking ahead, they predicted that this 
share will exceed 30% by 2050. Fonseca et al. (2009) pushed t he analysis of Hall and Jones 
further, adding changes in insurance coverage and technological developement as driving forces 
of health care spending, and found that these forces accounted for over 50% of the increase in 
spending since 1965. 
The mode! we propose is an extension of Hall and Jones that includes savings, uncertainty 
in health and dynamics in health. Health is modeled as a stock t hat decreases t hrough life and 
can be affected by negative persistent shocks ( chronic conditions). Agents spend in medical care 
in order to increase their expected longevity. Our mode! makes technology a prominent force of 
2 A concept introduced by Grossman (1972) . 
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the recent U.S. experience. 
3.2.1 Timing 
Between 1985 and 2005, US health expenditures grew at a brisk pace, and their share in 
the economy increased by over 5%. In our mode!, we consider five-year periods starting with 
1985 , so that t = 1985, 1990, 1995, ... Agents are born at age 25 and may live up to a maximum 
age of 110. In the remainder of the text, we refer to agents as being of cohort t if they were 
of age 25 in year t . The death of agents is both stochastic and endogenous to their choices: 
death may occur at the end of any period, but its probability increases as t he health of agents 
decreases. 
The timing of the consumer problem is as follows. At the beginning of period t , an agent 
of age at , financial wealth Wt , health Ht and chronic condition state ét chooses how much to 
consume, spend in medical care and save during the period. He obtains periodic utility u (Ct), 
increasing in his consumption. At the end of the period , his health leve! depreciates and is 
affected by medical spending and chronic condit ions, and becomes Ht+l · Depending on his 
end-of-period health, a lottery determines if he survives and has a chronic condition in the next 
period. If he survives, he faces the same problem in t + 1 with his updated state variables. 
Three kinds of t rends affect this dynamic problem: an income trend, a health depreciation 
trend ( resulting from changing lifestyles) and a technology trend. Because of those period effects, 
agents face a different problem than their eiders: t heir health depreciates faster but they have 
access to more productive health care and more income to allocate between consumption, medical 
spending and savings. We assume that agents have a perfect foresight of the impact of these 
trends on their optimization problem. 
3.2.2 Preferences 
An agent born in year t0 chooses his periodic consumption Ct and medical expenditures 
Mt (which jointly define next-period financial assets Wt+I) in orcier to maximize his expected 
flow of life-time utility: 
(3. 1) 
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Where (3 is the discounting factor of the agent and a the maximum age he can expect to reach. 
The utility function is: 
cl --y 
u(Ct) = b+ - t-
1 - ! 
(3.2) 
This utility function has a constant relative risk aversion of 1 and is increasing in con-
temporary consumption. Parameter b corresponds to the baseline utility of being alive during 
the period, and is calibrated to ensure !ife to be desirable over death for ali agents. Medical 
consumption and health do not increase periodic utility directly, but are desirable to increase 
longevity. 3 
3.2.3 Budget Constraint 
We assume that there is no income uncertainty and that ali working-age agents work full 
time. The agent 's budget constraint is determined by his wealth Wt and income Y (t, at) , where 
age at = t- t0 + 5.4 Denoting X (t, at, Wt) the cash-on-band , we have: 
(3.3) 
We obtain an exogenous trend of rising household revenue by increasing t he periodic income at 
rate z y > 1: Y (t, at) = Y(1985, at) · zt-1985 . Thus, an agent of age at has Zy more revenue than 
an agent of the same age in t - 1. 
There is a strict borrowing constraint imposed so that the agent is not allowed to borrow 
against future income. His assets in t + 1 are the total amount of resources available but not 
spent in t , increased at exogenous rateR= (1 + r) 5 : 
(3.4) 
Where OOPt (Mt ) is the port ion of medical spending Mt spent out-of-pocket by the agent . 
3This function corresponds to t he baseline utility funct ion of Hall and Jones (2007) , in which the quality-
of-life component was set to zero. 
4 While we could rewrite our madel in terms of to, we introduce at for simplicity. 
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3.2.4 Health Insurance 
All agents are insured for their health spending. As in Fonseca et al. (2009), the out-of-
pocket payments are determined by the total cost of medical treatment Mt and the deductible 
and co-insurance rate of the policy (J..L1 and J..L 2 , respectively): 
(3.5) 
otherwise 
3.2.5 Health Law of Motion 
As first modelled by Grossman (1972), health acts as a human-capital in the agent 's 
problem. We consider that health varies from a minimum of zero to a full health leve! of fi . 
We choose a formulation of t he healt h production function similar .to Picone et al. (1998). 
Health depreciates at rate 1-8 (t, at) each period , where 8 (t, at) = Oo (t) exp ( -81 · at) :::; 1 is t he 
share that remains in t + 1 in the absence of chronic conditions and medical care consumption. 
The parameter o0(t) < 1 imposes a natural depreciation of healt h for ail ages, while 81 > 0 
accelerates the depreciation as agents grow older. Imposing a faster depreciation with age 
results in slowly declining health levels and low mortality rates at younger ages, and rapidly 
declining health and mortality rates after middle-age. 
As with real income growth, we aim to replicate the observed trends of faster declining 
health over time. This trend can be thought of as t he toll from t he adoption of lifestyles that 
can be hazardous to healt h in the long term, such as changes in nutrition and exercise habits, 
higher rates of sedentary employment, etc. Such lifestyle changes are associated with higher 
obesity rates and lower health among the yout h, which cont ribute to the prevalence of medical 
conditions such as diabetes. We thus mode! the natural depreciation parameter as declining at 
rate z6 < 1 in time: 80 ( t) = 80 · z~- 1985 . As we will see in our simulations, this trend will be 
correlated wit h the model's predictions of chronic conditions prevalence. 
As in Picone et al. (1998), the stock of health can also decrease due to the occurrence 
of a stochastic health shock Et E { -d, 0} . The effect of Et is only realized at the end of the 
period , which allows the agent to use medical expenditures in order to minimize its impact. An 
L_ _____________________________________________________________________________ _ ___ - ---
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important distinction from Picone et al. is that our shocks are perfectly persistent; agents who 
had tt = - d will also have a negative shock in t + 1, t + 2, ... This modeling approach replicates 
the long term cumulative effect of the prevalence of chronic conditions, such as hypertension 
and diabetes, on the health of agents. The possibility of obtaining a first shock tt = - d adds a 
to the depreciation of health in a stochastic way, and creates an incentive to invest in preventive 
care. 
The full effect of medical expenditures Mt on health is given by health production function 
e (t, Ht , Mt , t t ), defined as: 
(3.6) 
This function is increasing in Mt and decreasing in both health capital level Ht and chronic 
condition state Et· Parameter B1 dictat es the portion of health care productivity available to all 
agents, while e2 adds to the effectiveness of medical care for agents with chronic condit ions.5 
By premultiplying health production by( ffHH,) and imposing B2 (t) > 0, we enforce the idea 
that health care is more productive for agents with low health and chronic conditions. Finally, 
paramet er B3 E (0, 1) imposes a decreasing marginal productivity of medical spending. 
Combining these three elements, the end-of period health-capital is given by: 
(3.7) 
Our reading of the recent history is that most technological innovations in medical care are 
targeted to curing diseases or minimizing their symptoms rather than preventing them. Notably, 
as we discussed in the introduction, over half of the increase in life expectancy ince the 1960s · 
linked to progress in the curative treatment of cardio-vascular disease. This observation suggests 
that we ought to model technological developments as an improvement in the productivity of 
curative care. With this objective, we model e2 (t) as increasing at rate Z() > 1: e2 (t) = 
e . z t-1985 2 () . 
5 As discusssed by Chang (1995), a patient that is suffering from a severe disease could expect to receive 
a greater appreciation of his health capital by having access to care than a patient with a mild disease. This is 
also a feature of Picone et al.(l998). 
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3.2.6 Uncertainty 
Two components of t he individual demand model remain to be specified. First, as men-
tioned when we described the timing of the model, t he probability of being alive in t + 1 is 
increasing in the end-of-period health of t he agent, H t+l· Like Scholz and Seshadri (2010), we 
formulate the survival function as a cumulative distribution function: 
(3.8) 
Where parameters v1 and v2 determine the shape of the function and the probability of surviving 
for a given health. We will chose their value in order to replicate mortality and longevity 
moments. Thus, by investing in his healt h in t , the agent can add t o his probability of being 
alive in t + 1 and his life expectancy as a whole. 
Similarly, t he probability of cont racting a chronic condit ion is decreasing in t he end-of-
period health. The chronic conditions are persistent for the remainder of the agent's lifetime, 
and t hus the probability of having Et+l = - dis 
if Et= 0 (3.9) 
if Et = -d 
3.2. 7 Bellman Equation 
With respect to equations (3.1) to (3 .7), t he Bellman equation summing this dynamic 
problem is 
V (t,a, W,H ,E ) 
\
maxc,M u (C) + Psf3 (P< V (t + 1, a+ 1, A', H', E1 ) 
+ (1- Pe) V (t + 1, a+ 1, A' , H' , E1)) 
maxc,M u (C) 
if a < a (3.10) 
if a = a 
~~---~~---------------------------
{
C 2: 0, OOP (M) 2: 0, A' 2: 0 
s.t . 
A'= R(X (t,a, W)- C- OOP) 
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Since maximal age ais fixed at 110 years old, we can solve this dynamic problem numer-
ically with standard backward induction. 
3.2.8 Aggregation of Results 
The objective of this paper is to predict aggregate medical consumption, prevalence of 
chronic conditions and longevity over the years to come. To obtain these, we need to solve a 
distinct equation (3.10) for all cohorts of agents alive in a given year. This arises because an 
agent of age 40 in 1985 faces a quite different problem than an identical agent in 2005, since 
the environment (in our case: medical technology, income and lifestyle) greatly affects his ex-
pectations and behaviour.6 We predict the future of these cohorts by computing the tree of all 
their future possible states with probabilities Ps and PE· We save these intermediate probabilis-
tic results and then draw from them to compute aggregate variables. These calculations are 
presented in Appendix C.l. 
3.3 Data Sources 
3.3.1 Distribution of Agents 
The main data sources that we draw from to build our distribution of agents are the 1985 
and 2005 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal 
household survey that originated in 1968 and contains information about income, wealth, ex-
penditures, education, health and numerous other topics. We use it to extract average income, 
assets and healt h status of the American population aged 25 and over in 1985 and 2005. The 
health status of respondents is derived from the self-rated health status question, in which re-
spondents choose between five qualitative choices ("Excellent" , "Very good", "Good", "Fair" or 
"Po or"). We construct a health index by performing principal-component analysis and create a 
6This assumes that agents have a perfect foresight . In other words, having witnessed the steady evolution 
of lifestyles, technology and income over their lifetime, they are able to correctly predict that these trends will 
continue in the future. 
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score bounded between 0 and 100.7 
The prevalence of chronic conditions is absent from t he 1985 edition of the P SID; hence, 
we obtain it from the National Health Interview Survey ( HIS) . We define a respondant as 
having a chronic condition ( E1985 = -d) if he ever had hypertension, diabetes, a he art condition, 
a stroke in the past , or more than one of these. We t hen assign the prevalence per age in 
our distribution of agents based on t hat found in the NHIS . We note t hat cancer prevalence 
was missing in the 1985 NHIS survey. Thus, we underestimate the real prevalence of chronic 
conditions. 
The size of our cohorts is obtained from the Human Mortality Database (HMD) for years 
1985 to 2005. For our simulations of the future, we use t he 2010-2050 population projections of 
the 2009 census. A summary of t he initial distribut ion is presented in Table 3.1. 
3.3.2 Moments 
As we discuss in the next section, our calibration strategy aims to replicate a number of 
essential moments, including the recent evolution of medical spending, longevity gains, mortality 
rates and chronic condition prevalence. 
Total health spending for 1985 are obtained from Meara et al.(2004), which estimate per 
person medical spending by age group by combining household surveys and total spending dat a. 
Their measure includes hospital care, physician and clinical services, prescript ion drugs, home 
health care, nursing home care, dental care, durable medical equipment and other professional 
services. We estimate 2005 healt h spending by applying their methodology to more recent 
data. We use total medical spending from t he 2004 Medical Expendit ure Panel Survey (MEPS) , 
to which we apply the adjustments of Meara et al. for the institut ionalized nursing home 
population (excluded from t he MEPS). This adjustment consists of adding 18% to t he spending 
of t he populat ion aged over 75 . We then adjust the t he MEPS totals to obtain t he Nat ional 
Healt h Expenditure (NHE) per capita spending in 2005, of $ 6,868. In Figure 3.1, we present 
average medical spending per age in 1985 and 2005. Both years present a steady increase of 
spending with age. However, 2005 spending levels were much greater, more than doubling for 
all age groups. In part icular , medical costs increased by over $ 10,000 (200%) for Americans 
7We choose this scale for simplicity. We later a.dapt t hese scores to a different scale in our numerical 
mo del. 
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Table 3.1 1985 Distribution Summary 
A ge N a Incomeb Wealthb 
H ealth Chronic condition 
index e preval en ce (%) d 
25 21,564 32.6 33.7 95 9.2 
30 19,772 40.4 66.8 94 11.4 
35 17,273 49.2 117.1 95 13.6 
40 13,891 57.5 147.2 92 17. 1 
45 11,523 59.2 186.7 90 21.5 
50 10,921 58.5 203.7 83 24.5 
55 11 ,282 57.2 228.5 84 28.6 
60 10,875 52.7 195 .1 69 35.4 
65 9,271 38.3 206.7 70 39.5 
70 7,473 34.9 181.1 67 42.2 
75 5,447 28.0 162.7 59 46.4 
80 3,331 27.2 140.6 52 44.7 
85 1,697 27.0 204.3 52 45.2 
90 676 24.9 65.3 41 26.3 
95+ 181 14.9 26.2 41 36.1 
apopulation in thousands. Source: Human Mortality Database (HMD). 
bThousands of 2005 dollars. Source: Panel Study of Incarne Dynamics (PSID). 
eThe scale is from 0 to 100. Source: PSID, authors' calculations. 
dPercent of respondants claiming to have hypertension, diabetes or a heart condition , or to have had a 
stroke. Source : NHIS. 
over 75 years old. 
Longevity gains are approximated by life expectancy, which we obtain from the National 
Center for Health Statistics (2011). Since we want our calibration to be consistent with our 
initial distribution in Table 1, we compute mortality rates directly from the PSID database 
rather than use external data. 
Finally, we use the evolution of GDP per capita over the period 1985 to 2005 to calibrate 
in come growth. The average 5-year growth, of 10.3%, is obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) data. 
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Figure 3.1 Total Medical Expenditures Vs. Age 
Sources: Meara et al. (2004) for 1985 totals; authors' calculations based on MEPS and NHE data for 2005 
totals. 
3.4 Calibration 
When possible, we assign values for our parameters according to existing literature or 
estimate them directly from the data. That said, many of the parameters, such as those that 
govern health production and depreciation, cannot be obtained through conventional means. 
Thus, we calibrate their value by manually choosing them so that we fit moments in terms of 
health, mortality and health spending. We note that the set of parameters presented here may 
not be the only one that replicates our moments, and that others may provide an equally good 
fit to our modeL Our complete calibration is presented in Table 3.2 . . 
3.4.1 Health Insurance Parameters 
As discussed by Fonseca et aL(2009), fixing unique values for insurance parameters (de-
ductible J.L1, co-payment rate J.L2) is complicated , given the variety of plans available and the 
fundamental differences between individuals younger than 65 (ineligible for Medicare) and the 
elderly. For instance, sorne elements of medical spending included in the Meara et aL (2004) 
medical spending calculation may not be covered even for agents who are insured. Also, while 
Table 3.2 Calibration 
Periodic Parameters 
Period length (in years) 
Minimum age (t = 1) 
T: Maximum age 
r : Annual return rate of savings 
{3: Discounting factor 
Healt h Insurance P arameters 
/-LI: Deductible 
1-'2: Co-payment rate 
Health P arameters 
fl: Maximum health 
<la: Natural depreciat ion of health 
61: Health depreciation curve coefficient 
d: Health depreciation due to chronic condition 
Probability Functions Parameters 
VJ: Survival probability parameter 
v2: Survival probability parameter 
7j;1: Negative health shock probability parameter 
7f;2: Negative health shock probability parameter 
Medical techno logy 
5 
25 
110 
1.04 
0.951 
0 
0.2 
191.5 
0.9950 
0.0230 
7.620 
0.160 
0.640 
0.235 
0.525 
81: Preventive health care productivity coefficient 8.126 
02 : Curative healt h care productivity coefficient 1.066 
03: Health care product ivity curve coefficient 0.0015 
Utility Function Parameters 
b: Baseline utility 
"(: Relative risk aversion 
Thends Parameters 
Z6: Health depreciation trend parameter 
ze: Medical productivity trend parameter 
Zw: Earning trend parameter 
0 
0.0722 
0.9971 
1.1070 
1.1039 
81 
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Medicare part B has a common deductible and co-insurance structure, Medicare part A cost-
sharing depends on hospital stay. 
In this paper, we choose to greatly simplify this aspect of the problem and only impose 
a co-payment rate of 20%. This value is both the median rate found by Blau and Gilleskie 
(2008) among insured individuals under 65 and the rate in Medicare part B. Renee, we believe 
it successfully conveys t he marginal cost of medical care faced by most Americans over their 
life-cycle. A caveat of this choice is that it implies that everyone is de facto covered by an 
insurance plan. 
3.4.2 Realth Depreciation and Probability Parameters 
We calibrate the parametric values of 8o, 81,v1 , v2, 'lj;1, 'lj;2 and d to match observed 
health and mortality measures. These parameters govern health transitions and mortality in 
t he absence of trends and health care consumption. Renee, we assign their value in order to 
match data for year 1985 (which is our initial year and thus precedes trends) while witholding 
agents to use health care. We conduct this step by finding the mortality, chronic condition 
prevalence and life expectancy when imposing a zero productivity of care (81 = 82 = 0) in our 
numerical model. 
We choose our parameters in order to replicate the 1960 life expectancy of 69.7 years old. 
The underlying assumption is that, if agents did not have access to health care in 1985, they 
would have had the same life expectancy as in 1960. We choose to replicate 1960's statistic 
because this year predates t he medical improvements that played a major role in t he rapid 
increase of life expectancy over the last half century. Simultaneously, the parameters are set to 
produce very low mortality and rare occurrences of health shocks among younger agents and 
both high mortality rates and prevalence of chronic condit ions as agents reach ages of 80 and 
over, as observed in the PSID data. We set t he upper bound of our health scale by computing 
if= ( -log(0.01) / v1) '/"2 , in order for an agent with maximum health to have a 99% probability 
of surviving in the next period. 8 
8 In our simulations, we adjust the health of our distribution of agents presentee! in Table 3.1 aœordingly. 
------------ - --- - - --------- - - - --- - --- --- - - - - - -- -- -- --- ---
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3.4.3 Medical Technology Parameters 
Next, we assign the values of medical technology parameters e1, e2 and e3 to replicate 
the impact of medical consumption on !ife expectancy. To do t his, we allow agents to consume 
health care but hold income, medical technology and lifestyle parameters constant at t heir 1985 
leve! (by imposing zy = zo = z0 = 1). The medical technology parameters are then set to 
reproduce t he observed 1985 !ife expectancy of 74.7 years old wit h the agents' optimal medical 
spending. This means that our model's 1985 medical technology enables agents to improve 
their expected longevity by five years over an environment with no health care. This is in line 
wit h our interpretation that the !ife expectancy gains were driven in large part by medical care 
developements over the last decades. 
Also, we assign t hese parameters to impose a rapidly decreasing marginal medical produc-
tivity, via curve coefficient e3 = 0.0015. Given that health depreciation due to chronic condit ions 
paramet er d is set to -7.62, we set our parameters el and e2 so that preventive and curative 
care were equal in t heir impact on t he health of agents in 1985 . Given t he health law of motion 
(3 .6), we t hus iterate on these parameters with the restriction el = 7.62 . e2 unt il we replicate 
1985 !ife expectancy. Wit h the passage of time and our medical technology process, the curative 
component becomes gradually more important and dominates preventive care in later years. We 
present a sensit ivity analysis with different relative productivity of curative and preventive care 
in Appendix C.2. 
3.4.4 Utility Parameters and Discount Factor 
We set relative risk aversion parameter 1, baseline utility b and discount factor f3 simul-
taneously with the medical technology parameters described above t o reproduce the average 
savings per age found in t he PSID and lifetime medical expendit ure for year 1985. Specifically, 
the medical expenditure moment we replicate is the average lifetime medical spending of an 
agent who lives his whole !ife in a 1985 environment. It is computed as: 
I:!~25 fe (1985, a)· M (1985 , a) 
m 1985 = =="-.:.....:'--J,:'-e--:(-19....:.8_5:....., 2-5.,-) -'--~ (3.11) 
Where fe (1985, a) corresponds to the number of Americans of age a in 1985 according to the 
HMD, and M (1985, a) their average medical spending according to the results of Meara et 
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al. (2004). Using the model's predictions with a given set of parameters, we find the average 
spending per age M (1985, a) and compute t he corresponding simulated moment: 
110 -
- L:a=25 f e (1985, a)· M (1985, a) rn - ~~~~~--~~--~----~ 1985 
- f e (1985, 25) 
Both wealth and medical spending are directly driven by relative risk aversion parameter 
1, which encourages agents to both increase their savings and spend more on medical care. In 
our calibration exercise, we allow for values comprised between 0 (risk neutrality) and 2 for 
this parameter. As discussed by Hall and Jones, the latter bound is a reference value in the 
economie literature due to its success in replicating asset accumulation decisions of agents over 
their life-cycle. However, this literature usually studies contexts of either infinite or exogenous 
lifespans for agents. Thus, only the budget constraint of future periods is uncertain. In our 
context, agents are both subjected to uncertainty regarding future medical spending and an 
endogenous and uncertain lifespan. Given this fundamental difference, we find that lower values 
of 1 perform better in our setting, while values above unity usually result in extremely high 
medical spending through the agents' life-cycle. We ultimately assign a value of 0.07, close to 
risk neutrality. We conduct a thorough senstivity analysis with larger values of this parameter 
in Appendix C.2 . 
Baseline utility b is set in orcier for ut ility to be positive and thus enforces life in t + 1 to 
be desirable for all agents even in the event of a very low consumption level. Considering our 
specification of the utility function, this can be obtained by: 
if, > 1 
otherwise 
Where _ç is a minimal consumption value.9 Since our choice of 1 is below unity, we fix b =O. 
Meanwhile, we assign {3 = 0.951 , which is consistent with a one-year discount factor of 
0.99. This high appreciation for future periods compensates for our low value of 1 in terms 
of replicating observed savings patterns. We note that such high values have previously been 
found to be plausible by the precautionary savings literature that studied t he Euler function 
9 VI'e use f. = 10. 
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using simulated methods (Cagetti, 2003). 
3.4.5 Trend Parameters 
Finally, we choose the trend parameters in order to best recreate the evolution of key 
variables over the period 1985 to 2005. The wage trend is directly computed from the real GDP 
per capita growth over the period. It produces a real income increase of 10.3% every 5 years, 
or just under 2% per year. The two remaining parameters, medical productivity growth zo and 
the impact of lifestyle changes on health depreciation Z§, are set simultaneously to reproduce 
the evolution of two crucial moments: the growth of aggregate medical spending (as computed 
by equation (3. 11)) and longevity growth. Our five-year medical productivity growth of 10.7% 
(2.1% in annual terms) is within the range found in the relevant literature: Fonseca et al. 
and Hall and Jones use a 1.8% and 2.3% annual productivity growth for their simulations, 
respectively. Finally, parameter Z§, despite being close to unity, has an important compounding 
effect on the nat{rral health depreciation factor Oo (t) . For instance, 80 (1985) = 0.9950 , while 
Oo (2010) = 0.9834. 
The implication of these parameters is that the health of agents decreases faster over time, 
but agents have more resources available to spend on curative care for chronic conditions, which 
also becomes more productive. We will discuss the success of our calibration, in particular with 
respect to producing increases of the prevalence of chronic conditions, in the next section. 
3.5 Forecasting Results 
In this section, we use our model to forecast health, longevity and spending oucomes for 
the decades ahead. First, we present the model's predictions of medical spending, prevalence of 
chronic condition and life expectancy according to a baseline scenario in which our three trends 
(medical innovations, income growth and worsening lifestyles) continue at their recent pace in 
t he years to come. Second, we create four alternative scenarios, in which we allow each trend to 
grow weaker in the future, and see how each scenario affects our baseline projections. Finally, 
we run a sensitivity analysis to determine how different values of our relative risk aversion and 
technology parameters would affect our results. 
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3.5.1 Baseline Projections 
Medical Spending 
A main interest of this research project is to anticipate the evolution of medical spending 
in the future assuming t hat cmTent trends remain unchanged. In Figure 3.2.i and 3.2.ii, we 
present our model's prediction of medical spending per capita and as a share of GDP. The 
variable presented here corresponds to total health expenditure (Mt ) and not out of pocket 
medical expenditure. According to both of these measures, health spending is expected to 
cont inue to increase in the foreseeable future. Medical spending per capita, which increased by 
79% to $ 6,500 between 1985 to 2005, would reach $ 11 ,000 in 2025. lt would then more t han 
double by 2050, to $ 23,000. The somewhat bumpy spending and longevity results obtained 
between 1985 and 2000 are attributable to changes in the income per age of our distribut ion 
for 1985 to 2005, which are obtained from the PSID. For inst ance, the decline in spending per 
GDP in 1990 occurs as the income of young agents increases faster t han that of older agents. 
Similarly, t he jump in life expect ancy in 2005 refl.ects a higher healt h spending path t han that 
of agents born in 2000 . Past 2005, the income distribution of 2005 is updated at a steady pace 
with Zw· 
Our mode! predicts a relatively slow growth of t he share of medical spending in the 
economy, to 21.5% in 2050. This projection contrasts with the results of Hall and Jones, which 
project health spending to reach over 30% over t he same period . This slow increase of medical 
spending may be caused by our concept of technological growth. We mode! it as increasing 
the productivity of dollars spent in medical care over t ime, to refl.ect the ability of individuals 
to reach better healt h despite chronic condit ions. However, Chandra and Skinner (2011) point 
out that many new treatments increase costs without enabling significant health improvement . 
According to them, the adopt ion of such technology may explain in large part t he fast increase 
of medical spending in the United States. Since this facet of innovation is lacking in our model, 
we project t he evolut ion of future spending if new treatments with poor cost-effectiveness were 
systematically rejected. Even in this optimistic setting, we find that the share of the economy 
allocated to health spending will rise by over 5% in the decades to come. In the next sub-section , 
we will see that decreases of the share of the eco nom y spent on health may occur, depending on 
the evolution of technological improvements and income. 
Since our mode! presents tl1ree main drivers of change over time, it remains unclear at 
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this point which are responsible for the increase in costs, and to what extent. To grasp a better 
understanding of the underlying dynamics at play, we run three additional simulations. For each 
simulation, we allow only one of our three trends to take place and find the predicted impact 
on per capita spending over the period 1985 to 2050. The results are presented in Table 3.3. 
Unsurprisingly, t he rise of available income and new medical technology both lead to higher 
spending in accordance with the results of Fonseca et al. (2009) and Hall and Jones (2007). 
However, the result of our simulation with only the health depreciation trend (zo) is quite 
striking. By itself, this trend, which reproduces the impact of worsening lifestyles, leads to a 
slight decrease of medical spending. This may appear surprising, since a declining health is 
generally associated with higher medical spending. In this simulation, this is dominated by a 
concurrent factor. The faster decline of health leads to higher prevalence of chronic conditions 
and worse health for all age groups, which shorter lifespans and the number of periods during 
which agents spend on health. As we see in Table 1, this effect is quite important. Thus, 
our results suggest that worsening lifestyles and the rise in chronic conditions may not be an 
important factor of medical spending growth over the life-cycle, despite their well established 
impact on life expectancy and quality of life. 
The difference between the total per capita spending increase of$ 19,610 and those pro-
duced with each isolated trend provides information about the amount of complementarity 
between the forces at play. We find that this difference is of only 0.2%, which suggests that 
virtually no spending over time is incurred because of t he simultaneity of the trends. 
Chronic Conditions Prevalence 
Our baseline scenario produces a smooth, almost linear increase of chronic condition 
prevalence over the 1985 to 2050 period (Figure 3.2.iii ). We note t hat this increase, which is 
consistent with t he stylised facts on chronic conditions noted in the introduction, is endogenous 
to the model and was not directly imposed by our calibration strategy. 
T hree main factors drive this result, two of which are endogenous to the model. First, 
prevalence increases most directly because of t he health depreciation trend z0, which increases 
the probability of contracting conditions at young ages. Second, prevalence increases because 
agents suffering from them have access to better care and, as we saw, spend more on medical 
care. They can thus expect to live longer with their condition. Combining a faster depreciation 
Table 3.3 Simulated Impact of Isolated Trends on Medical Spending 
Total annual medical spending increase (1985 to 2050)a 
Increase due to medical productivity trend (ze)b 
Increase due to income trend (zw) 
Increase due to health deprec iation trend (z0 ) 
Increase due to interactions between sourcesc 
aobtained with our baseline projections. 
Per Capita Spending 
$ 19,610.8 
25.8% 
75.9% 
-1.9% 
0.2% 
89 
bCorresponds to the percent of the baseline 1985-2050 increase of per capita spending obtained when 
only the medical productivity trend is applied. We conduct this simulation by imposing ze = 1.070, Zw = 1 and 
zo = 1. 
cDifference between t he tot.al medical spending increase and the sum of t he increases with the individual 
trends. 
of health and higher survival rates of agents with chronic condit ions, we find t hat the prevalence 
of chronic condition at all ages should continually increase over time (see Figure 3.3). Finally, 
an important cause of the increased chronic conditions prevalence is exogenous to our mode!. It 
is the rise of the share of the elderly population due to the aging of the baby-boom generation. 
Since such conditions are more present in the elderly population, the rapid growth of the elderly 
population will play a considerable role (see Figure 3.4). 
Life Expectancy 
Our mode! predicts that life expectancy should continue to rise despite the noted increase 
in the prevalence of chronic conditions (Figure 3.2.iii). Ali other things being equal, an increase in 
chronic conditions would decrease life expectancy, via a quicker depreciation of health. However, 
in our baseline scenario, agents suffering from chronic conditions have access to better care, and 
optimally choose to spend more on medical care. We believe our simulations provide a quite 
plausible explanation for recent trends, namely the simultaneous decline in the prevalence of 
disability among the elderly, the increase in longevity and the increase in the prevalence of 
chronic conditions. 
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3.5.2 Alternative Scenarios 
Our baseline scenario reveals that, if recent trends were to continue at the cmTent pace, 
life expectancy, chronic condition prevalence and health spending will al! continue to rise in 
the decades ahead. But what if these t rends were to cont ract? After decades of impressive 
technological growth that greatly improved our ability to treat acute conditions, perhaps new 
discoveries will show less improvement and fall more and more in the costly, "grey area" category 
of Chancira and Skinner (2011). Also, the societ al trend that lead to unhealthy lifestyles may 
ftatten as more Americans value better nutrition, exercise, etc. In particular , policy efforts to 
encourage healthy lifestyles may contribute to such a reversai in the years to come. Finally, 
our baseline scenario of 2% annual increases of real incomes may prove too optimistic. Over 
the period 2005-2010, which is not considered in our calibration, the US GDP per capita has 
declined by 0.22% annually, and it is uncertain if and when past growth rates will be reached 
again . Even if GDP growth were to revert to its 1985-2005 average and remain at such a leve! 
until 2050 , it is unclear whether the income of al! age groups will rise, which we assume in 
our baseline scenario. In the PSID data, we find that the annual average income growth of 
respondents of the same age was of only 0.8% over the 1985-2005 period, manifestedly less t han 
real GD P per capita growth. 
To shed sorne light on the uncertainty of future trends, we run our baseline scenario over 
years 1985 to 2005, then alter one of our three trend parameters until 2050. We then capture 
the impact this change would have on t he outcomes presented in figure 3.2. We create three 
alternative scenarios: 
1. Slower medical productivity growth: Our first alternative scenario reduces the growth of 
medical technology to Z() = 1.0535, half of the baseline value. 
2. Stabilization of health depreciation: Our second scenario reduces the health depreciation 
parameter to ~8 = 1. This means that the recent adoption of sedentary employment and 
poor nutrition habits halts and that lifestyles will remain unchanged in the future. 
3. Slower pace of income growth: This scenario has the real income of agents growing at t he 
rate found in the PSID database, i.e. Zw = 1.0439. In comparison with the baseline, this 
scenario imposes a sharp drop in the anticipated lifetime earnings of agents in year 2010. 
As we ment ioned, this rate is considerably slower than 1985-2005 per capita GDP growth. 
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4. Combination of scenarios 1 to 3: This scenario combines t he slower medical productivity 
growth, stabilization of healt h depreciation and slower incarne growth of scenarios 1, 2 and 
3. This scenario aims to capture possible complementary effects between these underlying 
forces. 
The results of these simulations are contrasted with our baseline projections in Figure 3.5. 
Medical Spending 
U nsurprisingly, we find th at a slower in come growth (our t hird scenario) would have 
the largest impact on medical spending levels. According to this scenario, agents perceive an 
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important drop in their future earning flows , and respond immediately by sharply lowering their 
medical spending. This is in li.J.1e wit h t he observed decline in out-of-pocket spending per capita 
over 2007 to 2010 as real incomes fell (see Figure 3.6). However, the observed decline was 
of only 5%, whereas our model produces a 21 % drop in per capita spending.10 This reflects 
the permament nature of the decline in GDP growth in our simulation, in contrast with t he 
temporary nature of the recent economie downturn. Past t hat init ial drop in spending levels, 
we predict that spending would continue to increase over the remainder of the period, both in 
dollars per capita and as a share of GDP. 
If medical technology was to improve at a slower pace t han in the past (our first scenario), 
we find t hat medical spending would increase in a fashion similar to our baseline projections 
until 2025. This corresponds to the period during which the rise of the share of the elderly 
population will be the fastest (Figure 3.4). Spending per capita would then increase at a slower 
pace than the baseline until 2050, and t he share of GDP would peak at 16% before falling down 
and stabilizing at 14% of GDP. This scenario reveals that higher incarnes may not automatically 
translate into ever growing shares of GDP being allocated to health care, as Hall and Jones (2007) 
find to be optimal. Medical productivity also matters. In this scenario, we find that agents will 
eventually lower the share of their spending allocated to health care if medical productivity fails 
to increase fast enough. 
In Table 3.3, we saw that worsening lifestyles have a rather ambiguous impact on medical 
spending. On the one hand, this phenomenon leads to higher costs per age over t ime; on the 
other hand, all other things being equal, it decrease life expectancy and the number of years 
during which agents pay for medical care. Thus, when we hold the health depreciation at its 
2005 level over years 2005 to 2050 (our second scenario) , the resulting projection is very close 
to the baseline scenario. 
Our fourth scenario combines a deceleration of the growth of incomes and medical pro-
ductivity with a stabilization of the depreciation of health. In t his scenario, both the ability 
to pay for care and the productivity of medical spending are lower than the baseline, resulting 
in the lowest projected health spending per capita. This would result in the share of health 
spending oscillating between 14 and 15.5% of GDP between 2020 and 2050, below the current 
share. 
10 Calculated between the per capita spending in 2005 accm·ding to t he base scenario, and our projection 
for 2010. 
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Chronic Conditions Prevalenœ 
As seen in Figure 3.5.iii, a ll scenarios lead to very similar predictions in terms of chronic 
condit ions prevalence in the future. In large part, this is caused by the demographie transition 
of Figure 3.4. The resulting s:pread of prevalence rates among our simulations is only 1.65% in 
2050. 
The baseline scenario combines a faster health depreciation with efficient technology to 
treat chronic conditions and a high ability to pay. It thus produces the best conditions for high 
prevalence rates, which would reach 34.3% of the population in 2050. Among our scenarios 1 
to 3, we find that a slower iocrease of medical productivity growth would lead to the lowest 
rates . A relatively lower curat ive medical productivity in the future means that Americans with 
chronic conditions will not li,·e as long as in the baseline scenario, which reduces prevalence. 
When we stabilize all trends (scenario 4), the difference in prevalence with the baseline 
scenario (1.65%) is roughly a11alogous to the sum of the reduced prevalence observed with the 
three first scenarios (2.05%). 
Life Expectancy 
Our life expectancy results, presented in Figure 3.5.iv, show more variation. This vari-
ability results from our conception of life expectancy, which is forward-looking and anticipates 
future mortality rates (see A:ppendix C.1). Thus, moving from one scenario to another greatly 
affects current life expectancy. 
In terms of longevity, medical technology (scenario 1) and lifestyles (scenario 3) prove to be 
the most important factors. In our first scenario, medical technology improves at a much slower 
rate than the baseline scenario, and is insufficient to compensate for the worsening lifestyles 
imposed by z0 . T his decreases life expectancy over the decades to come. At the opposite, a 
stabilization of lifestyles would improve t he health of agents over their life-cycle, and improve 
life expectancy. 
Thé reduced medical spending due to a lower economie growth (scenario 2) would lower 
life expectancy of 2050, but by only 0.3 year. We model dollars spent on medical care as having 
a rapidly decreasing marginal productivity, via parameter fh. Spending levels thus have a lower 
impact on health than medical technology and lifestyles. 
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When we combine scenarios 1 to 3, we find an init ial reduction in life expectancy, caused 
by the deceleration of technological progress. However, the simultaneous stabilization of health 
depreciations means that even a slower technological growth leads to improvements in life ex-
pectancy over time, in contrast with scenario 1. 
3.5 .3 Sensitivity of Results 
In Appendix C.2, we conduct sensitivity analyses to evaluate how different choices of 
relative risk aversion and technology parameters would influence our results. 
For higher values of 1, we find that the negative income shock of our third scenario 
would induce an increase in the share of GDP spent on medical spending, the opposite of the 
prediction of our calibrated mode! of the impact of an income shock on health spending to GDP 
ratio. However, Hall and Jones (2007) indicate that health spending should have an income 
elasticity well above one, invalidating this possibility. This analysis supports our choice of a low 
value of 1· 
With regard to our technology parameters, we test the implications of changing produc-
tivity of preventive care el while adjusting e2(t) to maintain the 2010 productivity of health 
care (81 - 82 (2010) Et) constant for agents with chronic conditions. This modifies the relative 
productivity of prevent ive and curative care, which we arbitrarily set as equal in 1985 in our 
calibration. We find that both our baseline projections and scenario simulations are qualitatively 
robust to these changes. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop a dynamic stochastic health care demand madel that incorpo-
rates endogenous chronic conditions and mortality. We use a numerical version of the mode! 
calibrated with t he U.S . experience over the period 1985 to 2005 to project medical spending, 
longevity and chronic condit ions prevalence in the decades to come. 
We find t hat income growth and technological progress in curative care will be t he main 
drivers of spending in the decades ahead, in line with the findings of Hall and Jones (2007) 
and Fonseca et al. (2009). In our simulations , income growth are responsible for roughly three 
quarters of the increase of per capita spending, against one quarter for medical innovations. 
However , we find that innovations are the largest drivers of the increase of the share of GDP 
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allocated to health care. Unless income growth st agnates or medical productivity does not 
improve as quickly as in the recent past , we project that medical spending will continue to 
increase at a brisk pace in the foreseeable future. In our baseline projections, in which only 
cast-effective technology is adopted, the share of health spending is expected to reach 22% of 
GDP by 2050. 
A main result of our simulations is that chronic conditions prevalence is most likely to 
continue increasing in the years to come, but will not constitute an important generator of med-
ical spending. Chronic conditions lead to higher medical spending at ail ages, but also decrease 
the number of years during which ag€nts consume medical care, via a lower life expect ancy. 
While curbing sedentary lifestyles and obesity would certainly lead to better quality of life, less 
chronic condit ions and higher life expectancy for Americans, we do not find that it would reduce 
aggregate medical spending. 
Our mode! can be extended to study a number of essential questions. A question of inter-
est is how the optimal consumption and population health would be affected by a reduction in 
insurance coverage, as medical spending impose an increasing toll on the fiscal out look over t ime. 
Our mode! can be used to assess the evolution of the tax needed to finance medical spending not 
spent out-of-pocket over the years to come, and how imposing such a t ax would affect welfare. 
Also, a facet that remains to be integrated in our model is the causes of technological improve-
ments in curative care, which we assume to be exogenous. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) find that 
innovation in pharmaceutics is largely determined by future market size, defined as the number 
of individuals who would potentially consume new drugs. Following this logic, our predicted 
increase in chronic condition prevalence will spur research efforts in curative care, which will 
in t urn generate more costs. This potentially important link between chronic conditions and 
medical costs will need to be explored in the fut ure. 
Finally, the mode! could be adapted in a straightforward fashion to study the health and 
healt h care costs outcomes of a number of policy scenarios, such as t he shift towards Accountable 
Care Organizations and the adoption of specifie components of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 . 

A HEALTH CARE DEMAND AND IMPACT OF POLICIES IN A CONGESTED PUBLIC 
SYSTEM 
A.1 Analytic Developments 
In this appendix, we explore the theoretical determinants of healt h care consumption in a 
public health care system by analyzing both sides of inequality (1. 10) in further detail. First, we 
take a closer look at t he expected dynamic gain of health care. In the following developments, in 
orcier for both shocks to affect the agent's future health positively, we will assume that 5 (a, E6) 
is decreasing in E6 , while 'ljJ (H,E..p ) is increasing in E..p. Denoting f (E6) the density function and 
F ( E6) the cumulative densitr function of the stochastic shock on the health care depreciation 
rate, E6, t he expected value when not using care is as follows: 
E [V~] = j V (a+ 1, H · (1- 5 (a, E6)), A~) f (E6) dE6 (A. 1) 
For a given H , we can obtain a critical value E6 such that H · (1- 5 (a, E6)) = H . By 
construction, any realization of E6 equal to or below that value results in death and a V value 
for the agent in the next period. By differentiating, it is easy to show that E6 is an implicit 
function of age and health, increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter. Intuitively, the 
older and sicker the agent, the more plausible is his death at the end of the period. Using this 
tenn, we can rewrite (A.1) as the probability of being alive in t + 1 times the expected value 
conditional to being alive plas the probability of dying times 1::':: 
E[V~] = (1-F (E6)) · E [V(a+ 1 , Hb ,A~) 1 E6 > ~ + F(E6) ·V (A.2) 
With sorne further work, we can express the expected value when a = 1 in a similar 
fashion. Since the agent is no1v affected by two stochastic shocks, one on his health depreciation 
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and the second on the success of health care, we cannot find a single critical value of E1{; such 
that H' = H. Instead, E1{; is a continuum of critical values with respect to the realization of the 
first shock, E0, such that H · ( 1 - o (a, Eo) + 1/J ( H, E1{; )) = H. Differentiation reveals that E1{; is 
an implicit function decreasing in Eo and increasing in age, white the impact of H can be either 
posit ive or negative, as discussed in the previous section. Figure A.1 graphically summarizes 
t he concepts just developed. T he probability of living in t he next period is t he probability of 
picking a couple (E0, E..p) above the function E..p (E0). Ê'I/J is the shock on health care production 
such that the impact of care is exactly zero and only o affects health, i.e. 1/J (H, 21/J) = O. If 
the agent does not use health care or, equivalently, uses health care but obtains shock Ê'I/J, the 
probability of being alive is simply t he probability of picking a depreciation shock above E0. 
Denoting t he density and cumulative density functions of health care production shock 
g (E..p ) and G (E..p ), respectively, we find the following expected value when using health care: 
E[V{] 
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( 1 - 1 G ( c,p (ca)) f (ca) dca) · E [V (a+ 1, H~, A~) 1 c,p > c,p (co) V ca J (A.3) 
+ 1 G ( c,p (ca)) f (ca) dca · V 
Unsurprisingly, we find once again that the expected value is determined by the probability 
of dying, the expected value in the next period conditional to being alive, and the value of death. 
It is by combining (A.2) and (A.3) that we can decompose the expected dynamic gain in a life-
saving and a quality of life components, as discussed in the last paragraph of section 1.3. As 
should be clear by now, for a given combination of health and age, both components of the 
dynamic gain of health care are determined by the distributions of health shocks, f (ca) and 
g (ca), whose joint distribution result in at+ 1 health distribution. Denoting this distribution 
j (H~) , we present in Figure A.2 a graphical analysis of three scenarios. The first two present a 
situation in which one of the component of dynamic gain is positive and the other is negative. 
In Figure A.2.i, health care induces a lower probability of being alive in t + 1, but a higher 
expected leve! of health in the case of survival. For inst ance, a delicate attempt to remove a 
tumor might yield such a distribution of future health. Figure A.2.ii , on the other hand , presents 
a case in which treatment increases the agent 's probability of being alive in the next period , 
but lowers his expected quality of life. This could be observed in the case of the amputation of 
an infected limb, for instance. Figure A.2.iii presents an interesting special case, in which all 
realizations of c,p are superior to Ê,p , meaning that the impact of health care usage is strictly 
positive. Conditional only on the value function being increasing in H , we can show that this 
situation ens ures a positive expected gain of health care. In the absence of this extreme scenario , 
for a given patient-treatment combination, we must attempt to estimate both of the components 
of gain to ensure a positive expected impact of health care. In particular, the increase of the 
expected health leve! of a patient is insufficient to ensure a gain. These observations are largely 
in agreement with the seminal article by Arrow (1963) , which emphasizes t he importance of 
uncertainty on individual health care consumption choices. 
In summary, the left-hand side of (1.10) is mainly determined by t he variables affecting 
the agent's future health. These variables are the depreciation function o (a , ca) , the health 
production function 'lj; (H, c,p ), the agent's age via its impact on the depreciation of health, the 
agent's leve! of health in the current period and the distribution of health shocks, f (ca) and 
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g (t: ,p ). We also note t hat t he Lmportant factor in t he agent 's decision is not the real distribution 
j (H~), but the perceived one, a theoretical justification of advertisement campaigns informing 
t he population of new t reatments and recommending early detection of diseases. This also 
suggests t hat public policies would have little success restraining t he use of health care t hrough 
t his side of t he inequality, unless governments deliberately lessened t he perceived quality of care 
by replacing procedures by lesseffective ones, an improbable strategy. Of course, other variables, 
such as T and "( , also impact the dynamic gain t hrough the expected values in t + 1, but t his 
impact is indirect, sin ce they appear in both V{ and V0. 
We now focus our attention on the right-hand side of (1.10), the utility sacrificed in t he 
current period when choosing a = 1. To keep t he following developments as simple as possible 
and focus on the most pertinmt aspect s of the model for policy purposes, we will be omit ting 
the savings variable, which means imposing A = A' = 0.1 Under this assumpt ion, t he only way 
to impact the inter-temporal aspect of his problem is t hrough the use of health care. Assuming 
t he agent is of working age, 011ce t he choice of a has been made, t he remaining choice is limited 
to how much time the agent s:pends working, which determines directly, through t ime constraint 
(1.2) and consumption constraint (1.3), the level of consumption and leisure t ime. Interestingly, 
this problem is both st atic and very simple: 
maxu (w · WT · (1 - T), P - LT (H , a"() - TW) 
W T 
s.t . WT E [0, P- LT (H, œy)] 
(A.4) 
The interior solution to t his problem result ing from t he fi rst arder condit ion is the common 
microeconomie result that the ratio of marginal ut ilit ies of consumption and leisure must be equal 
to the ratio of their priees. For ut ility functfons t hat present convex indifference curves, the single 
constraint of (A.4) is always respected. Now, assuming only that LT (H , a"() is strictly higher 
when using health care, it is easy to show using differentiation t hat the first order condit ion yields 
both lower consumption and leisure time if a = 1, implying t hat u (eo , Lo)- u (c1 , LI) > O. T his 
assumption is int uit ive in our context , since we are interested in healt h care systems presenting 
1 As will be obvious in Section 1.5, savings are main! y used by agents as a tool to smooth t heir consumpt ion 
over t ime, to insure against health shocks, and to use fo r their consumption during ret irement. We believe that 
such results can be left to numerical analysis. 
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long waiting t imes. Unsurprisingly, differentiation shows that this utility loss is increasing in t he 
accrued !ost time incurred by using health care. This is directly relevant for policy purposes, LT 
being increasing in the congestion of health care. Since the only direct impact of this parameter 
on the consumer problem is an increase of the cost in utility of seeking care, this result leads us 
to conclude that allowing t he congestion of the system to grow constitutes a plausible mean for 
governments to restrain health care consumption. 
AU other things being equal, the second parameter determined by the government , T, 
has a much less direct impact on the cost of using care, as it affects the agent's utility in t for 
both values of a. Also, its impact on the optimal choice of working time depends on the utility 
function , since income or substitution effects could be dominating. It would thus be necessary 
to impose additional assumptions on the value function to obtain a clear impact of T on the 
utility loss, which we will refrain from doing here. The same applies to the agent's productivity 
w, the second determinant of real wage in the model. T and w are expected to have an impact 
on the use of health care, but also on the general equilibrium of the mode!, since t hey also affect 
the working time and consumpt ion of agents, the economy's global production and the funding 
of the health care system. Thus, numerical results are more appropriate to inform us about 
these parameters. 
A.2 Data Manipulations 
To obtain a distribution of agents compatible wit h our numerical mode!, we adapted 
the CCHS database in severa! ways. First the age of adult respondents in the dataset is a 
choice between one of 14 adult age groups, from 18 ta 20 to 80 ta 101 and over. We use 
demographie data from the Institut de la Statistique du Québec (ISQ) to establish the proportion 
of respondents in each age group, then allocat e a precise age to the respondents within the age 
group randomly, thus replicating the age distribution of t hat year. 
Second , as for the health variable, the survey contains two questions useful for our purpose. 
The first asks respondents their self-perceived leve! of health at the moment of the survey, the 
choices being "excellent", "very good", "good", "fair" and "poor". The result of this question 
alone is not suffi.cient to calibrate the health of agents, as we wish to know the health leve! 
before their health care consumption decision. The second question enables us to fill this gap, 
as it asks the perception of this year's health in comparison to t he last, the choices being "much 
better", "somewhat better", "about the same", "somewhat worse" and "much worse". Using both 
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variables, we infer the health level of the respondents at the beginning of the year, before the 
health care decision. However, since both variables are expressed in a scale of one to five, this 
results in large numbers of respondents spread among few health levels. This made obtaining 
a value of 1* all but impossible, since either nil or very wide variations in the number of users 
were then observed when iterating on "(. To avoid this, we allow for 12 different health levels 
(excluding death) , and picked random health values between the bounds of our health variable 
corresponding to the respondents choices, resulting in a more diverse distribution. 
Third, the database contains two variables that allow us to determine t he choice of a made 
by respondents: the number of consultations wit h general practitioners during the year and with 
medical doctors .in general. Combining those variables, we infer the number of consultations with 
specialists as the total number of consultations minus those with general practitioners. In effect, 
numerous Québécois visit general practitioners on a yearly check-up basis, which, being planned, 
is neither submitted to t he waiting times found in the remainder of t he healt h care system nor 
is an active consumpt ion decision. Thus, we interpret as choosing to use health care during the 
year any respondent who either visited a specialist or had more than one visit with a generalist. 
Those choosing accordingly represent 53 .8% of the population in 2005. 
Last, a caveat of the CCHS survey is t hat it does not include any savings variable. Thus, 
following each value function solution, we calculate the savings most probable with our model for 
all age-health combinations, which we then allocate to the CCHS distribution. This approach, 
which we describe in Appendix A.3, is opted for instead of a simpler randomization of savings 
among our distribution because early results suggested a clear and intuitive strategie savings 
path result ing from dynamic maximization. This savings path is presented and discussed in 
section 1.5. 
A.3 Mortality, Life Expectancy and Savings Calculation 
Following any value function solution, we compute a probability tree from a theoretical 
starting point where a population Q1s of agents are 18 years old, have maximum health capital 
H and zero savings. For all following ages, we mechanically predict the quantity of agents of all 
possible age-health-savings profiles, as follows: 
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Q(a+ 1, H , A ) L LQ (a, H , A )· 1A'=A 
H> li. A 
M 
· [(1 - Cl:* ) L Pm · 1 Hb(H ,a ,<ôm )=H 1 
m= l 
M N 
+a* L L Pm · Pn · l H; (H ,a ,<ôm, <.pn) = H'], 
m = l n =l 
(A.5) 
where A' and Cl!* are t he optimal savings and health care demand choices of agents with 
profile Q(a, H , A) . For each a, we isolate the number of agents whose health level falls below 
H , and are thus eliminated from t he stock of living agents: 
QH (a) LQ(a+l , H , A) (A.6) 
A 
We do so until the quantity of living agents falls below a sufficient ly low threshold, that we 
set to 1/2 ·108 . This means t hat we consider the theoretical population extinct when individuals 
have less than 1 chance in 200 million of falling in any given age-health-saving category t he next 
year. 
This procedure achieves two distinct purposes. First , it enables the estimation of t he 
mortality per age group and life expectancy result ing from the model, which are necessary for 
our calibration algorithm (see step 6 of Appendix A.4) .We calculate the mortality rate for a 
given age group k as the ratio between the quantity of agents that are predicted to die and t he 
quantity of agents that are predicted to be alive during the ages covered by the age group: 
MR - ~~ak Qli. (a) 
model ,k - '\"' ak '\"' '\"' Q ( A) ' 
L.Ja=ak L.JH>H. L.JA a, H, 
(A.7) 
where ak and ak are the lowest and oldest ages included in age group k. Note that agents may 
be counted as many t imes as t he number of years comprised in t he age group, as long as they 
survive each age. In turn, t he life expectancy is computed as follows: 
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LE ~a a· Qlf_ (a) model = Q 
18 
(A.8) 
Second, it enables us to predict the amount of savings agents of a given age and health profile 
should possess, on average, according to the model's predictions. This information is essential to 
our research because our dat abase contains no information on financial assets, which is necessary 
in arder to calculate the optimal choices of our distribution and the ensuing macroeconomie 
outcome. For a given age-health combination, the expected asset assigned to our distribution is 
the average asset leve! saved by agents of that profile: 
Â(a H) _ ~A Q(a,H,A)·A 
' - ~A Q (a ,H , A) (A.9) 
Whenever an age-health combinations is not experienced in the probability tree but present in 
the CCHS data, such as very young agents in bad health, we chose the average savings of the 
closest health leve! with Q (a, H, A) > O. 
A.4 Calibration Algorithm 
We use a recursive approach to calibrate the free parameters of the mode!. This approach 
enforces that our calibration replicat es the precise number of health care users found in the 
dat abase, the total cast of health care and GDP of the province, and the mortality rates and 
health expectancy published by the Institut de la Statistique du Québec (ISQ). The algorithm 
we use is as follows: 
1. As a start ing point, we use an ad hoc calibration. 
2. We solve the Bellman equation (1.6) by iterating on the value function of agents. Since 
t his step is central to our numerical analysis, we describe it in Appendix A. 5. From the 
solution, we extract the optimal choices of our distribution of agents, which enable us to 
compute H CD and HCs result ing from the current calibration. 
3. We iterate on 1 unt il the predict ed total number of users is sufficiently close to the 53.8% 
observed in the CCHS data. 
4. We fix b4 = I:f=, !:tl-H;), which enforces HCD = HC5 . This also ensures t hat the 
congestion leve! found in the previous step is exact! y 1 * . 
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5. We observe the GDP and working t ime of agents and adjust w. T he new value to be 
implemented is w = GDP2oos/'2:,~ 1 WTi, in orcier to replicate t he observed GDP in the 
next iteration if t he working t ime decisions of agents are sufficiently close to t hose in t his 
iteration. Init ial results showed t hat this strategy is efficient when the new 'Y* is close to its 
predecessor, since a property of our ut ility function is t hat the individual choice of W Ti is 
unaffected by the real wage of agents . We then repeat steps 1 to 5 until GDF = GDP2005 . 
6. At this stage, we fix t he optimal choices of agents and iterate on large quant it ies of dif-
ferent plausible combinations of the health function parameters. We use the probabil-
ity tree scheme presented in Appendix A.3 to calculate t he resulting mortality per age 
group and life expectancy of a given health function. We t hen systematically restrict t he 
range of t he different parameters in orcier to minimize t he following m ortality criterion : 
SSE~"t · SSE~k · IErrorLEI 0·3 . If this criterion is minimized, we believe t he healt h 
function parameters are effective in approximating t he health movements that agents can 
expect togo through , and th us effective for t he purpose of this art icle. Its first sub-criterion 
is the sum of squared errors of mortality rat es per age group as compared wit h mortality 
data from ISQ. Denoting by k t he age groups for which ISQ publishes mortality rates, this 
sub-criterion can be expressed as SSEt,M = L k (MRmodel,k- MRr sQ,k) 2 . Since mortal-
ity is much higher in t he older age groups, this component really measures the success of 
repli ca t ing the mortality rates of t he elderly. The dynamic choices of agents being based in 
part on t heir expectations of being alive in t he next period, we find important to replicate 
very well the mortality rates of these later age groups, and t hus give t his sub-criterion a 
larger value. The weighted mortality component, on t he other hand, is the sum of t he 
squared errors of mortality rates per age group divided by the observed mortality rates: 
SSEwM = L k ( MR..mo~';1;{1~::18Q , k ) 2. This weighing ensures t hat t he observed mortality 
in the younger age groups is also well replicated. While we would expect that a calibration 
that yields good results for t hese sub-criteria will also yield a life expectancy close to the 
one observed in t he data, we observed discrepancies of up to 4 years with ISQ estimates 
when targeting only the first two sub-criteria. This discrepancy could result from the 
coarseness of the ISQ mortality age groups, which contain 5 years each. By including the 
absolute life expectancy error as the third sub-criteria, we are able to ensure a minimal 
gap.2 
2T he reasons why we fix t he optimal choices at t his stage are twofold. First, steps 1 to 5 are extremely 
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7. To confirm the quality of the health function paramet ers isolated in stage 6, we repeat 
steps 1 to 6 until the health function parameters yield stability in the mortality .criterion. 
The model's GDP and health care c<Jst s obtained with the calibration are 0.04% and 0.07% 
smaller than t hose observed in 2005, respectively. The !ife expectancy error is of 0.05 years, t he 
SSEuM is of 15 155 and the SSEwM is of 8.4, resulting in a mortality criterion of 36.2. As can 
be seen in Figure A.3, while the mortality rates of our calibrated mode! replicate the general 
t rend of the data, our rat es are somewhat superior for ages 70 to 90 and lower for agents over 
90. 
calculation-heavy and necessitate a prohibitive amount of t ime at existing calculat ion speed. It would t hus 
be unfeasible, even wit h a considerably larger comput ing power t han t hat in our possession, to directly test 
t housands of different health law of motion parameters, which we are able to do by using this scheme. Second, a 
feature t hat proved consistent for a variety of calibrations is t hat old agents with low healt h are t he most prone 
to use healt h care. Differing health functions merely affect the crit ical health leve! for which an agent wit h a 
given age-savings combination will choose to use healt h, whi le globally maintaining t his result intact. We discuss 
t his result in sect ion 1.5.1. W hat this means for our calibrat ion strategy is that even ad hoc healt h function 
parameters generate relatively accurate opt imal choices following steps 1 to 5, enabling us to test t he healt h 
parameters without repeating t hese steps. 
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A.5 Bellman Equation Solving Algorithm 
To solve the dynamic problem represented by Bellman equation (1.6), we iterate on the 
value function following Banach's fixed-point theorem. First, we choose an ad hoc initial value 
function, set to V (a, H , A)= .OUsing this initial value, we calculate the expected value in t + 1 
for both choices of a and for all possible choices of savings in the next period: 
E [V; (a, H) 1 A'] 
E [V{ (a, H) 1 A'] 
!~'Pm· V (a+ 1, HO (H, a, ,,m), A') if a< a LPm ·V (a, Hb (H , a, Ecïm) , A') if a = a m= l 
! 
M N 
~1 ~Pm · Pn ·V (a+ 1, H~ (H , a, Ecïm, E,pn ) , A') 
M N 
L LPm ·Pn · V (a, H~ (H , a, Ecïm, E,pn) , A') 
m=ln=l 
(A.10) 
if a< a 
(A. 11) 
if a= a 
We then find the optimal savings and working time in t + 1 for bath choices of a using expected 
values (A.10) and (A.ll), as follows: 
Va(a, H,A ) 
s.t . 
max u (c, L) + E [V~ (a, H , A) 1 A'] 
WT,A' 
c = {A + w · WT (1- T)- (1 + r) A' 
A + e- A' 
L = P- LT (H ,œy)- WT 
u ( c, L) = - inf 
(A.12) 
if a< ae 
if a~ ae 
if c < 0 
Assuming that the expected values computed previously were right , t his process explicits the 
value functions for both possibilities of a. We can then find t he value function and optimal 
choice of a: 
V(a, H , A)= max Va (a, H , A) 
<> 
(A.13) 
Replacing our initial ad hoc function with this new one, we repeat steps (A.lO) to (A.13) until 
the supremum of the point-by-point distance between two successive value functions is nil. 
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A.6 Relative Risk Aversion Sensitivity Analysis 
Table A.1 presents how the main results of our paper would be affected by adopting differ-
ent Arrow-Pratt consumer relative risk aversion values. We present the results for 7 alternative 
values of p within the span of possible valuesE (0, 1) , keeping ali the other calibration param-
eters of Table 2 intact. The first sub-table presents the global equilibrium obtained with ail 
parameters, the second presents the elasticity at the proximity of 1* and the t hird reproduces 
the results of policies 4 and 6 from section 1.5.3. 
Throughout the table, column 7, with p = 0.9, presents the largest differences with our 
base results ( column 4, in bold characters) . With a high risk aversion value, agents are extremely 
fearful of death and avid consumers of care, which leads to equilibrium waiting times escalating 
to almost 60% of the period - 7 months - for users in good health. This leads to small GDP 
and funds for care in contrast to the other values of p, as users of care wait astronomie times 
in queues and cannot work as much. Ironically, this reduced funding for care and large waiting 
times also mean that such a risk aversion leads to less users of care and a higher elasticity of 
demand at the proximity of 1*. This implausibly high congestion rate and the extreme welfare 
impacts of policies increasing the tax rate are such that we outright reject this value of risk 
aversion for the purpose of our paper. 
For risk aversion values of 0.1 to 0.9, we note quantitative variations but find largely similar 
qualitative results. In Table A.1.ii, the elasticity of demand is small and negative at the proximity 
of 1* for ali values of p , and t able A.1.iii indicates that the expected impact of modifying the tax 
rate on the number of users, waiting times and welfare are quite similar. The general impact 
of different risk aversion values may be summarized as follows: when characterized by lower 
values of p, agents are less avid users of care, which generates lower equilibrium congestion and 
a lesser welfare impact of policies. The results from our sensitivity analysis support our choice 
of p = 0.5 by indicating that the results presented in the remainder of the paper would only be 
affected quantitatively by other values of r. 
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Table A.1 Sensitivity of Results to R e la tive Risk Aversion Va lues (p) 
i. Sensitivity of global outcome 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
p= 0. 1 0.25 0.4 0 .5 0.6 0.75 0.9 
Users (%) 58.3 53.5 53.7 53.7 54.7 54.2 41.1 
,. 0.034 0.057 0.063 0 .067 0.067 0.092 0.581 
GDF 285.7 273.6 272.4 271.9 274.0 27l.6 242.1 
H C8 ($B) 20.5 19.2 19.0 19.0 19.2 19.0 15.8 
Median value 107 005 30 754 9 314 4 300 2 042 709 226 
Mean value 98 681 28 514 8 577 .3 955 1 877 647 191 
Minimum value 5 513 1 757 564 254 97 -31 -204 
Ages 18 to 39 11.9 6.6 5.4 5 .2 5.2 4.7 3.8 
40 to 64 80.8 74.8 76.1 76.4 78.5 77.9 50.7 
65 to 79 100 100 100 100 100 100 98.8 
Users (%) 80 and over 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
H of 0.45 to 0.6 98.1 93.7 91.8 91.2 91.2 89.0 82.9 
0.65 to 0.8 66.4 62.5 62.3 62.3 62.8 62.5 51.9 
0.85 to 1.0 39.4 33.5 34.5 34.8 36.8 36.3 18.2 
ii. Sensitivity of demand elasticity at the proximity of 1* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
p= 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.75 0.9 
,. 58.3 53.5 53.7 53.7 54.7 54.2 41. 1 
Users (%) , •. 0.9 59.0 54.9 54.8 54.5 55.4 55.0 43 .1 
, •. 1.1 56.9 51.1 51.8 52 .4 53.8 53.4 38.5 
Elasticity -0. 184 -0 .358 -0.283 -0 .195 -0.144 -0.1 49 -0.563 
iii. Sensitivity of policy results 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
p= 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.75 0.9 
f::..T = 0 Users (%) 58.3 53.5 53.7 53.7 54.7 54.2 41.1 
(Base Case) ,. 0.034 0.057 0.063 0 .067 0.067 0.092 0.581 
Mean value 98 681 28 514 8 577 3 955 1 877 647 191 
f::..T = 0.01 Users (%) 67.9 64.8 62.9 63.7 64.7 65.3 66.8 
(Policy 4) ,. 0.014 0.017 0.026 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.027 
Mean V (%BC) 100.9 101.4 101.0 101.0 100.9 100.9 106.4 
f::..Consumption 97.1 94.7 95.2 94.0 93.8 91.1 43.8 
f::..T = -0.01 Users (%) 48.6 45.4 42.2 39.7 39.2 37.2 36.0 
(Policy 6) ,. 0.066 0.092 0.138 0.175 0.215 0.335 0.682 
Mean V (%BC) 98.5 98.7 98.2 98.1 97.8 97.4 98.9 
f::..Consumption 105.2 105.5 109.4 112.2 117.5 131.9 115.4 
B WAITI IG TIMES FOR MEDICAL CARE IN AN AGING POPULATION CONTEXT: 
THE CASE OF QUÉBEC 
B.1 Evolution of Self-Perceived Health in the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) 
As described in section 2.2.2, we update our distribution by changing the weight of each 
age group according to demographie projections by the ISQ. By doing so, we keep the health 
distribution among a given age group constant, which constitutes a strong assumption when 
projecting health decisions in the long run. To validate this choice, we examine if t he self-
perceived health variable of the CCHS presents a noticeable evolution over its four bi-annual 
cycles. These cycles range from 2000/ 2001 to 2007/ 2008. 
The wording of the self-reported health question is "ln general, would you say your health 
is (excellent, very good, good, fair or poor)?" In Table B.1 , we present the distribution of Québec 
respondents among the five categorical answers using the CCHS weighting variable to compute 
provincially representative percentages. Other than the first cycle presenting a higher number 
of "excellent" responses, we notice little change among the cycles. 
This could , however, mask a trend among different age groups. To investigate this further, 
we map t he categorical responses along the health-capital scale of our numerical health care 
demand mode!. We assign scores of 0.95 to "excellent", 0.85 to "very good", 0.75 to "good", 0.65 
to "fair" and 0.55 to "poor" responses. We then calculate the average health score of Québécois 
for four different age groups for each CCHS cycle. The results are presented in the Figure 
B.l. On a year-to-year basis, we find statistically significant (p<0.05) decreases of self-reported 
health between cycles 1 and 2 for the population aged 18 to 49, and increases between cycles 2 
and 3 for the population aged 35 and over. Ali other year-to-year variations are not significant. 
Since we find no evidenc~ of a clear trend in self-perceived health over the period 2000-2008 in 
t he CCHS, our population update procedure appears to be justified. We however discuss how a 
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Table B .1 Categorical Self-Perceived Health Responses of Québécois 
CCHS Cyclea 
1 2 3 4 
Excellent 28.3% 23.2% 23.4% 24.5% 
Very good 32.9% 33.7% . 36.0% 34.7% 
Good 27.7% 32.3% 30.2% 30.8% 
Fair 8.9% 8.6% 8.3% 7.8% 
Po or 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 
Missing 0.0% 0.1% 0.1 % 0.1% 
N 22,012 27,599 29,165 23,545 
Source : Statistics Canada. 
acycle 1 data was collected in 2000/2001, Cycle 2 in 2003 , Cycle 3 in 2005 and Cycle 4 in 2007/ 2008. 
trend of improving health for the elderly population would affect our results in Section 2.4. 
B.2 Population Smoothing Procedure 
The 2005 initial distribution is taken from our previous effort. lt was built by randomly 
allocating a weight to each CCHS respondant from Québec to mimic 2005 population esti-
mates. Because these estimates predate the 2006-2050 projections and this random allocation 
was imperfect in replicating each age, we observe sorne unrealistic discrepancies between the ini-
tial distribution and the 2006 projections. Figure B.2 presents these discrepancies graphically. 
While the general shape is the same, there are two types of inconsistencies that are problematic. 
First, in sorne instances, the population aged a + 1 in year 2006 is larger than the population 
aged a in 2005. This is t he case, for instance, for ages 45 to 49 and 80 to 90, where the 2006 
population is clearly larger than its 2005 counterpart. Second, in sorne cases, the difference 
between the population of age a in 2005 and that of age a+ 1 in 2006 would require a mortality 
rate significantly above those produced by the ISQ for these age groups in 2005. For instance, 
over 15%o Québécois of ages 20 to 24 would need to have died to meet the 2006 projection, while 
the ISQ's mortality rates for this age group was of only 0.4%oin 2005. 
To avoid major differences between 2005 and 2006 results to be caused by these discrep-
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ancies, we use a simple smoothing procedure. Let us denote 
MR ( ) = (Nt (a)- NrsQ ,t+l (a+ 1)) t a - Nt(a) 
the mortality rates of age a implied by the difference between the distribution in t and the ISQ's 
projection for age a+ 1 in t + 1, and M RrsQ (a) the mortality rates produced by the ISQ for the 
same age in 2005. We smooth aberrations between Nt (a) and NisQ ,t+l (a + 1) by imposing: 
!Nt (a)· (1 - 0.5 · MRt (a)) if MRt (a)< 0 Nt+! (a+ 1) = Nt (a)· (1-1.5 · MRrsQ (a)) if MRt (a)> 1.5 · MRrsQ (a) NisQ,t+l (a+ 1) otherwise 
This procedure allows for a graduai catching up towards ISQ's projection scenarios rather 
than an abrupt jump between the 2005 and 2006 populations. For all three projection scenarios, 
we find that the distributions are identical by 2025. 
B.3 Dynamic Demand Model 
This appendix aims to provide an overview of the life-cycle demand model at the heart of 
the Health Care module. A more detailed description of this model and analytic developments 
are presented in the first chapter.The model's main concepts and notation draw from Grossman 
(1972) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). lts numerical version is inspired by Picone, Uribe and 
Wilson (1998), who first applied numerical methods to study health care demand. 
Overview 
At the beginning of a given period, the agent chooses his working time, savings and health 
care use in order to maximize his expected infinite-horizon discounted utility: 
(8 .1) 
where {3 is the discounting factor and Ct and Lt are the consumption and leisure in good health 
during the period t. As mentioned in section 2.2 .4, the fundamental basis of this demand model 
is that health care usage is represented as the binary choice o , i.e. whether to use ( o = 1) 
--- --- ------ - - - --- - - - - - - --- - --- --- - - - - --- --
117 
or not use (a= 0) the health care system at a given date. In public health care system with 
zero monetary priees such as Québec's, the quantity of health care received by a patient is not 
restricted by the costs of treatment. However, the user faces a non-monetary cost associated to 
the waiting times for healt h care services. The time spent waiting in queues at diverse stages of 
health care production cannot be used for leisure or production by agents, and is thus a direct 
opportunity cost on his utility. 
Constraints 
We assume that t he agent is unable to predict future fluctuations of his net wage, which 
depends on his productivity Wt and the government's income t axation rate Tt· Thus, the agent's 
maximizes while holding productivity w and rate T constant in the future. In addition to his 
work income, the agent can consume sorne of his savings A in any period. The amount of savings 
is not permitted to be negative at any time. For agents in the workforce, it follows that t he 
constraint on consumption c is: 
c:::; A + w. WT (1 - T) (B.2) 
What is left of the agent's savings A at the time of their retirement can be used for 
consumption, in addition to a fixed exogenous public pension. Accordingly, we model retirement 
as the following consumption constraint when agents reach retirement age ae: 
c :::; A + () if a 2: ae, (B .3) 
where () is the annual public transfer received by retired agents . 
During a given year, the agent faces a certain amount LT (H , c:q) of lost time, defined as: 
LT (H, œy) = 365 · ( 1 - H + œy (~ = ~)) (B.4) 
where H is his health, H and H are t he health capital levels corresponding to full and lowest 
health, respectively, and Î the congestion level of the health care system. This function is 
decreasing in healt h, which means t hat the sicker the agent, the less time is available to be 
spent for leisure or work. When using the health care system, che agent sacrifices an amount of 
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time, increasing in /, in wait ing !ines, and thus always obtains a higher lost t ime when a = 1. 
F1nally, as observed in the Québec system, patients with severe health problems are priorit ized, 
which means t hat the wait ing t ime port ion of LT increases with health. What is left of the 
period, the agent 's available t ime can be freely divided between working t ime WT and leisure 
L. Thus, a one-year period is divided as follows:LT (H, a1) + WT + L = 365. French (2005) 
uses a similar interpretation of intra-period time distribut ion. 
Healt h 
The agent's stock of health-capital decreases at an uncertain depreciation rate each year, 
and may also be affected by the healthcare impact of treatment if he chooses to seek care. We 
formulat e that the depreciation rate is age-dependent and affected by a stochastic shock, E6. If 
the agent chooses to use health care, the expected impact of treatment is dependent on t he healt h 
level of the patient , though t he sign of this relationship is debat able. As with J , the success of 
healt h care in improving the agent's health is an uncertain phenomenon and depends on t he 
realization of shock E,p . Finally, an agent whose healt h has fallen below the death threshold 
remains deceased in the next period. The movement of the agent's health-capital stock is given 
by: 
1 
{H. (1 - ( a~~'" ) +a (b . (H-=~~+<w l )) if H > H 
H (a, H ,E6,E,p ) = ( ) 
H otherwise 
(B ~ 5) 
where g and a are the minimum and maximum ages considered in the calibration. The healt h 
capital depreciation rate is increasing in the age of t he agent . We assume that agents in bad 
health - for whom (H- H) is high - can expect a higher gain from using health care. The 
parameter b dictat es the capacity of cmTent technology to improve the health of the agent 
t owards H . We assume bath shocks to be distributed normally and chose t heir distribution, as 
well as the value of b (see table 2.3), to replicate essent ial 2005 moments. 
We consider that death occurs when health leve! H falls below H , after which the agent 
receives a certain value of death V. To enforce !ife to be desirable over death, we assign 
v = -lj( l- p)( l- /3) (B.6) 
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Since our calibrated value of p = 0.5, this value of death is equal to an infinite sequence of 
periods in which the agent neither consumes nor enjoys leisure. 
Bellman Equation 
With respect to equations (B.1) to (B .6), t he agent's maximization problem can be sum-
marized by the following Bellman equation: 
a,WT,c l-p ifH > H !
max (cz -w Lnl -p-1 
V (a, H , A)= : ,BE {V (a+ 1', H' (a, H , t:8, t:,p), A')} 
otherwise 
s.t. 
a E {0, 1} 
WT E [0, P- LT (H, œy)] 
{
[O,A+w·WT(1-T)) ifa <ao 
CE 
[0, A + B) if a 2: ao 
A'= { (1 +r)(A +w·WT(1- T)-c) 
(1 +r)(A+B-c) 
if a < ao 
if a 2: ao 
(B.7) 
This constitutes the basic health care demand model used in this paper. Since health 
care usage is a binary choice, the agent's core problem can be expressed as a comparison of the 
expected values when using health care or not . Denoting those values V1 and Vo , where the 
indices refer to the choice of a, the agent will choose to use health care if V1 > Vo. This implies, 
with respect to (B .7) , 
,8. (E [V{]- E [V~]) > u (c0, lo)- u (c1, h) (B.8) 
This inequality can be interpreted quite easily. In a public health care system characterized by 
waiting times, an agent will choose to use care if the expected dynamic gain of doing so, on the 
left-hand side, is larger than the utility loss in the current period, on the right-hand side. In 
this formulation , the gain of using health care is uncertain and set in the future, while the cost 
is immediate and certain. 
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B.4 Bellman Equation Solving Algorithm 
In our previous effort, we solved the dynamic problem represented by Bellman equation 
(B.7) by iterating on t he value function, following the Banach fixed-point t heorem. This ap-
proach enabled us to find a value for t he ages over a without enforcing death at any age but, 
given t he complexity of the dynamic problem, proved to be quite slow to solve. In t his paper, 
we iterate on 1 and T to solve t he equilibrium for 45 different years (2006 to 2050), four policy 
stances and t hree demographie scenarios. Thus, we choose a simpler algorit hm t hat remains co-
herent the indeterminat e lifespan of our previous effort. To do this, we assume that the expected 
value at ages over a, E [V~ (a, H , A)], will remain unchanged unt il 2050 at t he value found in 
our previous effort. Th en, for all ages a E [Q, a], we solve the dynamic problem using regular 
backward induction. 
Given t his assumpt ion, the value at age a for both choices of a and for aU possible savings 
in t he next period is: 
Va(a, H ,A) 
s.t. 
max u (c, L ) + E [V~ (a, H , A ) 1 A'] 
WT,A' 
c= { A+w· WT (1 -T)-(1 +r)A' 
A +B-A' 
L = P - LT (H ,œy)- W T 
u ( c, L ) = - inf 
(B.9) 
if a < ae 
if a ;::: ae 
if c < 0 
This process defines the value at age a for both possibilities of a . We then find the value 
function and the optimal choice of a: 
V(a,, H , A) =max Va (a,, H , A) 
Q 
(B.10) 
Using t his value, we calculate t he expected t + 1 value at age a- 1, for both choices of a 
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and for all possible choices of savings in t he next period: 
M 
E [V~ (a - 1, H ) 1 A'] L Pm . v (a, H~ (H, a- 1, E8m), A') (B. ll) 
m= l 
M N 
E [V{ (a- 1, H ) 1 A'] L LPm. Pn. v (a, Hf (H , a- 1, E8m, E,pn), A') (B.12) 
m= l n=l 
We t hen use these expected values to maximize the consumer problem at age a -1 by repeating 
steps B.9 and B.lO. We solve this problem unt il reaching minimal age Q.. 
B.5 Sensitivity Analyses 
This appendix aims to evaluate how our choices of t rend parameters Zw and Zc influence 
our results. 
Labor Productivity Trend 
On the one hand, the main implication of labor productivity growth Zw in our mode! is to 
increase Québec 's collective ability to pay for care over t ime. As we mention in Section 2.3, we 
increase the productivity of labor annually by 0.96%, its observed annualized rate during years 
1981 to 2010. However, Québec's Finances department anticipates a faster pace of 1.2% over 
the next decades. We t hus simulate our t hree main policy scenarios with this 50% larger value 
and compare the results with our baseline calibration. In the Population module, we use the 
ISQ's "A-Reference" population scenario for t his analysis. 
The results of this analysis for our three main policy scenarios are presented in Figure 
B.3. We notice that a higher productivity growth would only affect t he share of GDP spent 
on medical care in our first two policy scenarios (Figure B.3.i and B.3 .iii), since the amount of 
spending in the dollars is identical to the baseline. Jn spite of a 50% increase in the rate of 
productivity growth, we find a relatively small impact on the share of t he economy that would 
be spent on health in these scenarios. In comparison with the base scenario, that share would 
decrease by 0.7% of GDP in 2025 and 1.6% in 2050. For the last policy scenario (Figure B.3.iii), 
we find that a stronger productivity trend would not do much to offset the large congestion 
increases predicted by our baseline scenario when maintaining the share of medical spending at 
6.98% of GDP in the decades ahead. 
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Medical Cost Trend 
On the other hand, the impact of technological improvements on costs, Zc, increases the 
unit cost of treatment over time, which has important ramifications in our simulations. With 
regards to our po licy scenarios, this par ameter directly affects the amount of t reatments supplied 
for a given spending and the taxes needed to maintain waiting times constant in t he future. While 
we posed that the annual increase in the unit cost of treatment due to technological progress 
would be of 1.8%, analoguous to t he increase in their productivity, t he literature suggests that 
it could go both ways. We t h us conduct our policy simulations with both slower (1%) and faster 
(2.5%) growths of unit costs, assuming that population evolves according to ISQ's "A-Reference" 
scenario . This exercise also sheds light on the implication of the health care system's stance 
towards the application of new medical technology. If all new technologies that produce health 
gains are adopted with little regard to their cost effectiveness, the unit cost of treatments will 
tend to grow faster than their productivity. 
The results, presented in Figure B.4, show the far-reaching implications of the unit cost 
of treatments. Notably, if the cost increase is close to that of labor productivity in the other 
sectors of t he economy (zc = 1.01), the increase in the share of GDP required to maintain at 
t heir current levels (sub-figure B.4.ii.d) appears sustainable, stabilizing at 10% of GDP after 
2030. Even in that optimistic scenario, however, maintaining the current share of GDP spend 
on health (Figure B.4.iii) would result in an explosion of congestion as the elderly population 
grows older. At the opposite, we find that up to 21 % of GDP may be needed to be spent on 
health by 2050 if costs increase at a 2.5% rate, a threefold expansion from 2005. 
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Figure B.4 Medical Innovation Cost Trend Sensitivity Analysis 
C FORECASTING POPULATION HEALTH, HEALTH SPENDING AND MORTALITY 
C.l Results Calculations 
Aggregate Medical Expeditures 
Denoting f (t , a, W, H , E) the number of agents with state variables (a , W, H, E) in year 
t and M * (t , H , W, E) their optimal medical consu mption as predicted by the mode! in that 
year , we obtain aggregate medical expenditure for 2005 , M2005 , by summing individual medical 
spending over cohorts and state variables: 
M _ 2:::!:?25 LH Lw L< f (2005, a, W, H, E) · M * (2005, a, H, W, E) 
2005 - 110 La=25 LH Lw L< f (2005, a, W, H , E) 
Thus, calculating aggregate medical spending in 2005 requires solving the problem of 18 
different cohorts (of ages 25 to 110 in that year) , which are al! facing a different dynamic problem 
looking forward. 
Prevalence of Chronic Conditions 
We proceed likewise for the prevalence of chronic conditions in a given year. In 2005, it 
is computed as: 
Cc _ 2:::~:?25 LH Ew f (2005, a, W, H , -d) 2005- 110 La=25 LH ~w L< f (2005, a, W, H , E) 
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Life Expectancy 
We compute the !ife expectancy of a cohort with the model's predicted size of that cohort 
in the future. For instance, the !ife expectancy of the 2005 cohort, denoted LE2oo5 , is: 
110 
LE
2005 
= 2:::: 2::::2::::2:::: f (2005- 25 +a, a, W , H , c) 
a=25 H W E f (2005, 25 , W, H , E) 
This concept of !ife expectancy reflects future trends that will affect t he cohort's health 
and longevity, and thus differs from the usual concept of !ife expectancy that only takes into 
account mortality rates observed in a given year. In section 3.5, we study different scenarios in 
which we modify our baseline trend parameters. Because of the compounded impact of these 
changes, these scenarios have a large impact on current !ife expectancy as weil as future !ife 
expectancy. 
C.2 Sensitivity of Results 
This appendix aims to evaluate how different choices of relative risk aversion and tech-
nology parameter would influence our results. 
Relative Risk A version Parameter 
As discussed in Section 3.4, our calibration effort assigns "( = 0.0722 simultaneously with 
technology parameters in order to be consistent with observed 1985-2005 spending patterns. As 
we noted, this risk aversion value is low in comparison with the literature that studies asset 
accumulation in the !ife-cycle, and means that the preferences of our agents are close to risk 
neutrality. In Figure C. l , we show how the baseline results of Figure 3.2 would be affected if we 
chose larger values of"( for the period 2010 to 2050. 
As expected, higher risk aversion parameters translate into higher medical spending in 
figures C. l.i and C.l.ii. With "f = 0.3, spending in 2010 would be of almost 25% of GDP; similar 
tests with "f = 1.001 , not presented here , produce a 70% share of GDP allocated to health for 
that year. It is not surprising to find higher spending levels when we increase the risk aversion 
of our agents. However, we also find that spending would tend to converge with t he predictions 
of our calibrated mode! over time. In 2050, both spending levels and spending as a share of 
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GDP are similar for ali values off. Such a trend towards similar spending values refl.ects the 
limitations of health care spending productivity imposed by our low value of B3 and the severity 
of ill ness factor in equation ( 3. 7). Des pite the o bserved differences in spending levels and their 
t rajectory, projected chronic condition prevalence and !ife expectancy are quite similar for al! 
values of r· 
To further investigate the implications of this parameter, we conduct simulations of our 
four alternative scenarios of Section 3.5.2 with 1 = 0.1 and 1 = 0.2, and see how t hey affect our 
results. In Figure C.2, we present the projections of spending to GDP ratios and !ife expectancy 
obtained with our scenarios with these parameters. These compare to Figures 3.5.ii and 3.5.iv 
of Section 3.5.2, respectively. 
Like in Section 3.5.2, we find that a decline in the rate of medical innovations (scenario 1) 
would produce the lowest health spending to GDP ratios among the first three scenarios. Also, 
we find that the stabilization of health depreciation (scenario 2) would have only a moderate 
effect on spending in comparison with the baseline scenario, though this effect seems to increase 
with r· 
A main difference with the results of Figure 3.5.ii concerns the reaction of users to a decline 
in GDP growth (scenario 3). With 1 = 0.2, this scenario produces the highest health spending 
to GDP ratios. Agents with such preferences t hus increase the share of their income allocated to 
health when confrorited with a negative income shock; hence, health care consititutes a necessity 
good for them. Similarly, when combining our three scenarios (scenario 4), we obtain the lowest 
shares of GDP spent on health with 1 = 0.1 (as we found in Figure 3.5.i with 1 = 0.07) and the 
second largest shares when 1 = 0.2, refl.ecting the difference in the reaction of agents to income 
shocks depending on their aversion to risk. 
Finally, alllife expectancy projections of Figures C.2.i and C.2.ii are quite similar to those 
found in Section 3.5.2. 
This sensitivity analysis reveals that, with suffiently low values of'' our simulations are 
quite similar to those of Section 3.5.2. Higher relative aversion parameter values eventually 
produce an income elasticity of demand of care smaller than one, and invert our calibrated 
model's prediction that a negative income shock would lower health spending to GDP ratio. 
Nevertheless, Hall and Jones (2007) stress that standard preferences imply that health spending 
should have an income elasticity weil above one, invalidating this possibility. This analysis thus 
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strengthens our choice of a low f. 
Health Care Productivity 
As detailed in Section 3.4, we assumed that the impact of preventive care (el · M) was 
equal to the impact of curative care ( - e2 (1985) d · Mfh) in 1985. To assess the impact of this ad 
hoc choice, we modify the effectiveness ratio of e1 and e2 in 2010 and conduct a similar sensitivity 
analysis . For our sensitivity tests, we assign e1 = À·e1 with À# 1. We then keep 2010 productiv-
ity constant for individuals with chronic conditions by choosing e2 (2010) = (1:12(2010)d-1:1, (1-.\))/d. 
In our first sensitivity test, we ask how our results would differ with relatively more productive 
curative care, and choose À= 1.2; this results in values of el and e2(2010) of 9.751 and 1.388, 
respectively. In our second test, we choose À = 0.8, which translates in technology parameters 
of e1 = 6.501 and e2 (2010) = 1. 815. In Figure C.3, we show how t he baseline results of Figure 
3.2 are affected by these different technology ratios. 
The evolut ion of spendiug in the decades to come (Figures C.3.i and C.3.ii) are robust 
these different technology parameters. With À = 1.2 (e1 = 9.75; e2(2010) = 1.39) , the 2010 
medical productivity is t he same for agents with chronic conditions, and 20% higher for agents 
without conditions. Since preventive care, which is available to ali agents, is more productive, 
this sensitivity scenario yields higher spending throughout the horizon and 0.6% less chronic 
conditions than the baseline by 2050 (Figure C.3.iii). However , the long-term path of medical 
productivity is lower than with our calibrated values, since the compounded improvements of 
medical productivity gains are applied t o a lower e2(2010). This yields lower !ife expectancies 
than the baseline in Figure C.3.iv, despite higher medical spending. For À = 0.8, we find the 
opposite. 
In Figure C.4, we simulate the four alternative scenarios of Section 3.5.2 with these mod-
ified technology parameters. The simulated spending with more productive preventive care 
(Figure C.4.i.A) are quite similar to t hose of our calibrated mode! (Figure C.2.ii). In both fig-
ures, Scenarios 1, 3 and 4 produce lower health spending to GDP ratios than the baseline. Also, 
the stabilization of health depreciation scenario produces spending close to the baseline, which 
rise to about 22 % in 2050, in both figures. 
With a higher relative curative care (Figure C.4.ii.A), we notice the same general trends, 
but with sorne notable differences. First, the 2010 health to GDP ratios are lower, which is 
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consist ent with our reading of Figure C.l.ii. Second, the impact of scenarios 2 and 4, which 
both contain a slower pace of GDP growth , are more moderate in comparison with t he baseline 
scenario t hen we found in Figures C.2.ii and C.4.i .A. This lesser impact of income on spending 
is caused in part by the higher chronic condition prevalence noted in Figure C.3.iii, and in part 
by the higher productivity path st emming from the compounded impact of medical innovation 
being applied to a greater e2 (2010) . This second factor also explains why the share of GDP 
allocated to care increases faster past 2035 for t he Baseline scenario and scenarios 2 and 3 in 
Figure C.4.ii.A; these three scenarios allow for a fast pace of productivity growth. 
Finally, the impact of the modified technology paramet ers on !ife expectancy projections, 
presented in Figures C.4.i.B and C.4.ii.B , are very close to those of our baseline. 
For both of t hese senstivity tests on our key medical technology parameters, we find that 
our scenario simulations are qualitatively similar to those reported in Section 3.5.2. 
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